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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ASYLUM
Lucas Kowalczyk & Mila Versteeg†
The issues of mass migrations, displaced persons, and
refugees from war-torn countries are not new, but they have
become particularly prominent and contentious in recent years
and will garner even more attention as climate change refu-
gees begin to cross borders seeking new homes in foreign
countries.  Academics and policy-makers have jointly turned
to international law to remind states of their international le-
gal obligations toward refugees; yet they are also quick to
point out the inadequacies of the international legal frame-
work.  At the same time, efforts to address these inadequacies
and to lay down general legal standards and policies to man-
age the growing migration flows have faltered.
Surprisingly, in light of the mounting crisis, it has largely
escaped the attention of commentators that a substantial
number of countries provide a right to asylum in their constitu-
tions.  Remarkably, constitutional asylum provisions often go
beyond states’ international legal obligations and establish
permanent legal solutions for those seeking sanctuary.  In ad-
dition, constitutional provisions are insulated from changing
political tides and encourage governments to honor their com-
mitments even when doing so lacks popular support.  These
constitutional provisions thus hold substantial promise to ad-
dress some of the most pressing legal problems of our time.
This Article offers the first systematic exploration of con-
stitutional asylum provisions.  It presents an original data set
on right to asylum provisions in all national constitutions writ-
ten since 1789, explores the first instances of adoption, and
traces the right’s development over time.  The data reveals
that, currently, approximately thirty-five percent of all coun-
tries have constitutionalized the right to asylum.  Drawing on
both real-world examples and regression analysis, we find
that constitutional asylum provisions serve a complicated pur-
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pose.  Some constitutions frame asylum as a right for all those
in need, thus, seemingly serving a true humanitarian purpose.
Other states, however, use the right as an instrument to
broadcast their doctrines and to cast judgment on the views of
other countries by granting asylum only to those that share
the ideology of the host nation.  This latter version of the right
to asylum is particularly prominent in authoritarian and so-
cialist constitutions.  Thus, asylum provisions can serve as
both a humanitarian tool for providing state-sponsored sanc-
tuary to persecuted persons and an overt instrument of foreign
policy deployed to achieve the political objectives of the host
nation.
We further find that the adoption of asylum provisions can
be motivated by self-interest.  Even when framed as a univer-
sal right, asylum might be a useful tool to condemn the human
rights records of foreign countries.  Moreover, we find that
countries with net refugee outflows, such as some of the
smallest and poorest African states, as well as nations with
aging and declining populations, such as Germany, more
readily entrench the right to asylum in their constitutions.  We
conclude that these apparently self-serving motivations for
constitutionalizing asylum rights are not necessarily detrimen-
tal for asylum-seekers, nor do they necessarily undermine the
right: appealing to self-interest, rather than self-sacrifice or
humanitarian ideals, might actually prove more effective in
motivating states to ensure adequate protection of human
rights, including the right to asylum.
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INTRODUCTION
The era of the refugee has already begun.  Most estimates
suggest that by 2050, rising sea levels and worsening droughts
will displace between 50 and 250 million people.1  Many small
island nations may soon be completely submerged by rising
seas.2  Although climate change-related relocation is not a new
phenomenon, the modern scale of migration and potential dis-
placement presents an unprecedented challenge for the inter-
national community.3  Meanwhile, millions of people have fled
war-torn Syria, escaping oppression and, for many, possible
death at the hands of the Islamic State.4  Their journey across
Europe often turned out to be just as life-threatening;
thousands have drowned crossing the Mediterranean5 or suffo-
1 Jane McAdam, Environmental Migration, in GLOBAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE
153, 153–54 (Alexander Betts ed., 2011).  Despite the enormity of these displace-
ment figures, some commentators call them “conservative.” NICHOLAS STERN, THE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 91–92 (2007).  Others criticize
those numbers as “at best, guesswork.”  Tom Wilbanks et al., Industry, Settlement
and Society, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 357,
365 Box 7.2 (Parry et al. eds., 2007).
2 See, e.g., Anna Edwards, Life on the Next Atlantis: Doomed Pacific Island
Which Will Be Swallowed by the Sea Within 60 Years, DAILY MAIL (Jun. 13, 2013,
7:15 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2340804/Beautiful-Pacific-
island-nation-Kiribati-claimed-sea-60-years-rising-ocean-levels.html [https://
perma.cc/T26F-SHG9] (stating that the island nation of Kiribati “will be swal-
lowed by the sea within 60 years”); Cole Mellino, Which Country Will Be First to Go
Completely Underwater due to Climate Change?, ECOWATCH (May 22, 2015), http:/
/ecowatch.com/2015/05/22/maldives-underwater-climate-change [https://
perma.cc/VMZ9-VFYM] (warning that the Maldives “could become the first state
in history to be completely erased by the sea”).
3 See JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 3 (2012).
4 Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Origin, WORLD BANK, http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG.OR [https://perma.cc/FT43-
7NEF].
5 Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals in 2016: 204,311; Deaths 2,443, INT’L ORG.
FOR MIGRATION (May 31, 2016), https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-mi
grant-arrivals-2016-204311-deaths-2443 [perma.cc/BH7T-V52L] (estimating
that some 4271 refugees and migrants have died or gone missing between Janu-
ary 2015 and May 2016).
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cated in overcrowded boats and trucks.6  The growing stream of
displaced masses poses an important moral dilemma for desti-
nation countries given that accepting refugees is often both
politically unpopular and financially costly.  The European
Union (EU) has been slow to respond to the recent migrant
crisis and has failed to adopt a unified policy.  Indeed, most EU
countries have rejected German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s
plan for an EU quota system; as Slovak Foreign Minister Miros-
lav Laje`a´k said, “quotas only increase the incentives for migra-
tion.”7  Across the Atlantic, the newly elected President of the
United States, Donald J. Trump, was quick to pass an execu-
tive order that indefinitely suspended admission of Syrian refu-
gees and temporarily limited the flow of all other refugees into
the United States.8  Indeed, many countries are prioritizing
border protection and the reduction of migrant flows.9
Few issues in international law have generated as much
disagreement as refugee protection mechanisms, thereby
pushing the legal status of displaced persons to the forefront of
some of the most politically charged debates of our time.10  The
efforts by the international community to lay down general
standards and policies to manage growing migration flows have
not escaped scholarly attention.11  Overwhelmingly, the litera-
ture has concluded that these attempts to address the mount-
ing and complex crisis have been inadequate, and the existing
international legal frameworks are often underenforced.12  A
6 See Alison Smale et al., Europe Reels from More Migrant Deaths on Land
and Sea, N.Y. TIMES (Aug 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/
world/europe/migrants-bodies-austria-truck.html [perma.cc/6AN4-7CQ4].
7 Frank Zeller, Merkel Isolated as EU Partners Slam Door on Refugees, YAHOO!
NEWS (Feb. 13, 2016), http://news.yahoo.com/merkel-isolated-eu-partners-
slam-door-refugees-095551766.html [perma.cc/4SPB-QWZT].
8 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
9 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
10 “Many people leave their home countries for a combination of political,
economic and other reasons.  This mixture of motives is one factor creating a
perception of widespread abuse of asylum systems, which is often manipulated by
politicians and the media.”  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], THE STATE
OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES 2000: FIFTY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 155 (2000)
[hereinafter FIFTY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION] (footnote omitted).
11 See Eike Albrecht & Malte Paul Plewa, International Recognition of Environ-
mental Refugees, 45 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 78, 79 (2015) (“Although the debate on this
issue has been going on for more than three decades, however, no universally
accepted and legally binding solution has been developed.”).
12 See, e.g., GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 201–84 (3d ed. 2007) (analyzing the evolution of the principle of non-
refoulement); James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of
Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 130 (1990) (describing the divergent concep-
tions of refugee rights and protections present among the states that drafted the
1951 Refugee Convention).
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host of studies have further highlighted the limitations of the
primary international legal documents pertaining to refugees—
the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Optional Protocol.13
Scholars have observed that only a small portion of those seek-
ing refuge fall within the Convention’s narrow definitions and
that states are not required to provide permanent solutions to
integrate refugees, who frequently remain in camps for de-
cades.14  For instance, while the Convention offers a range of
protections to those who meet the narrow definitions of refu-
gee, it does not require states to grant refugees asylum, which
13 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention or Convention].  The Ref-
ugee Convention of 1951 included temporal and geographic restrictions in that it
applied to refugees in Europe who became refugees because of events that oc-
curred prior to 1951.  The 1967 Protocol removed these restrictions.  Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
14 For a general treatment of the topic, see MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE LAW AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: REFUGE FROM DEPRIVATION (Crawford et
al. eds., 2007); JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005); DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION: LAW AND POLICY (2d ed.
2013).  For criticism of the refugee definition, see GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra
note 12, at 9 (“Many key terms [of the Refugee Convention] are vague, undefined R
and open to interpretation . . . .”); see also Eduardo Arboleda & Ian Hoy, The
Convention Refugee Definition in the West: Disharmony of Interpretation and Appli-
cation, 5 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 66, 66–68 (1993) (discussing different interpretations
of the definition and resulting inconsistencies in application); Walter Ka¨lin, Refu-
gees and Civil Wars: Only a Matter of Interpretation?, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 435,
444–45 (1991) (arguing that the “open-ended” text of the definition should be
construed liberally).  For suggestions on revisions to the Convention, see Joan
Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229
(1996); Todd Stewart Schenk, Note, A Proposal to Improve the Treatment of Women
in Asylum Law: Adding a “Gender” Category to the International Definition of
“Refugee”, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 301 (1994).  For scholarship pointing at
limitations of international refugee law, see Arthur C. Helton, Forced International
Migration: A Need for New Approaches by the International Community, 18 FORD-
HAM INT’L L.J. 1623, 1627 (1995); Satvinder Juss, Toward a Morally Legitimate
Reform of Refugee Law: The Uses of Cultural Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
311 (1998).  For arguments that the locus of responsibility should be in countries’
collective protection efforts rather than in individual nations, see Gervase Coles,
Approaching the Refugee Problem Today, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
373, 408 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989); Peter Harder, Opinion,
Migration: A New International Dimension, 5 INT’L. J. REFUGEE L. 101, 104–06
(1993); James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee
Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection,
10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115 (1997).  For discussions on the development and future
of refugee law, see NIRAJ NATHWANI, RETHINKING REFUGEE LAW (2003); David A.
Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1247 (1990); Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition,
45 UCLA L. REV. 733, 782 (1998); Dirk Vanheule, A Comparison of the Judicial
Interpretations of the Notion of Refugee, in EUROPE AND REFUGEES: A CHALLENGE?
(Jean-Yves Carlier & Dirk Vanheule eds., 1997).
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would allow refugees to take up permanent residency in the
host country.15
Perhaps surprisingly, despite the controversy that interna-
tional legal refugee protections have generated, much less is
known about asylum in domestic law.  It has largely escaped
the attention of legal commentators that a substantial number
of countries have enshrined a right to asylum in their constitu-
tions.16  According to our own data, about thirty-five percent of
all countries include asylum in their founding legal documents.
A diverse set of countries with dissimilar legal histories—in-
cluding Germany, Colombia, and Burkina Faso—have all con-
stitutionalized asylum.  At first glance, these protections hold
substantial promise to address some of the most difficult legal
problems surrounding states’ obligations toward refugees.  In-
deed, when a constitution stipulates that “[t]he politically per-
secuted shall enjoy the right of asylum,” as provided in the
German constitution of 1949, the state is constitutionally re-
quired to grant asylum to those in need, thereby going beyond
state obligations under international law.17  Moreover, the con-
15 See infra notes 99–113 and accompanying text. R
16 The literature lacks a systematic and comprehensive study of the constitu-
tional right to asylum.  See LIZA SCHUSTER, THE USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL ASYLUM
IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY 88–89 (2003) (describing the constitutional right to asylum
in Germany and comparing it with the practices of Great Britain); Roman Boed,
The State of the Right of Asylum in International Law, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1,
14–16 (1994) (exploring the constitutional asylum law of the Czech Republic,
Germany, and Italy only); Marı´a-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Asylum as a General Principle of
International Law, 27 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 3, 23–24 (2015) (listing the countries that
recognize a constitutional right of asylum without further analysis); William
Thomas Worster, The Contemporary International Law Status of the Right to Re-
ceive Asylum, 26 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 477, 488–90 (2014) (same).
17 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] 1949, art. 16, cl. 2 (Ger.), translation at
http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/7fa618bb-604e-4980-
b667-76bf0cd0dd9b/publishable_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZKV-CP5S].  In the
aftermath of World War II, Germany enshrined the right to asylum in its constitu-
tion, the Basic Law.  Article 16(2) of Germany’s 1949 constitution stated simply:
“The politically persecuted shall enjoy the right of asylum.”  As construed by
Germany’s Constitutional Court, Article 16(2) provided a subjective right belong-
ing to the asylum-seeker and directly enforceable against the government.  How-
ever, due to growing nativist fears, Article 16(2) was amended in 1993.  The new
constitutional right to asylum retained the provision that “[p]ersons persecuted on
political grounds enjoy the right of asylum.”  GG 1993, art. 16a(1), translation at
https://www.pravo.unizg.hr/_download/repository/the_basic_law.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y7ZL-NLPB].  However, Article 16 was expanded to include additional
provisions limiting, or otherwise defining the scope of the right.  In fact, the 1993
amendment to Article 16 made the German formulation of the right to asylum the
most elaborate, cumbersome, and lengthy of all provisions in world constitutions.
See generally Sam Blay & Andreas Zimmermann, Recent Changes in German
Refugee Law: A Critical Assessment, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 361 (1994) (discussing the
constitutional amendments and the resulting changes).  Most importantly, the
newly-added provisions preclude foreigners arriving from “safe” countries from
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stitutionalization of the right, as opposed to mere codification
in ordinary law, insulates it from politics and thereby prevents
perfunctory revisions when honoring asylum obligations be-
comes politically inconvenient.18  In light of the mounting refu-
gee crisis today, it is surprising that these self-imposed
constitutional obligations to grant asylum have largely escaped
the attention of academics and policymakers alike.
This Article takes up the challenge.  Drawing on original
data based on coding all of the world’s constitutions since
1789, this Article traces the historical origins and development
of asylum in national constitutions, analyzes the first cases in
which the right was adopted, and statistically explores the
predictors of the right.  The analysis reveals that asylum provi-
sions often serve a more complicated purpose than the German
example alone suggests.  In particular, we discover that the
adoption of the right is dominated by considerations of political
economy.  As we spell out in this Article, the right to asylum
does not merely confer entitlements upon refugees but also
brings important potential benefits to the right-granting states.
Notably, a constitutional asylum provision can serve as a for-
eign policy tool that allows a state to cast judgment on the
invoking the right. See GG 1993, art. 16(a)(2)–(3).  As such, refugees who enter
Germany from a third state where, because of the adoption of the Refugee Con-
vention, they are assumed to be safe from political persecution, may not invoke
the constitutional right to asylum.  Because Germany is bordered solely by na-
tions that have adopted the Convention and are thus characterized as “safe,”
reaching Germany while retaining the ability to invoke Article 16’s protections has
become discouragingly difficult. The new constitutional right to asylum appears to
concern itself less with persecution on political grounds and its alleviation as a
humanitarian responsibility and more with the banal issue of asylum-seekers’
method of reaching Germany.  As such, deprivation of rights does not in itself
guarantee sanctuary under Germany’s constitution.  The assumption here is de-
ceptively simple: “safe” third countries somehow mitigate the need for Germany to
recognize even the most legitimate persecution, giving Germany a (constitution-
ally entrenched) reason to refuse humanitarian protection.  The amendment dras-
tically reduced both the influx of asylum-seekers and the number of applicants
that were granted asylum. See Stefan Heuser, Is There a Right to Have Rights?
The Case of the Right of Asylum, 11 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 3, 7–9 (2008).
Today, Germany has positioned itself among the many “affluent nations [that]
curtail . . . the right of asylum through extraordinary legal measures and close
their borders to those seeking protection.”  Christoph Auffarth, Protecting Stran-
gers: Establishing a Fundamental Value in the Religions of the Ancient Near East
and Ancient Greece, 39 NUMEN 193, 194 (1992).
18 See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT,
AND CONSTRAINTS 101 (2000); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of
Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 227–28 (Jon Elster & Rune
Slagstad eds., 1988); see also JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36–37 (1984) (likening constitutions to Ulysses’s
ropes that helped him honor his earlier commitment to resist the singing of the
Sirens).
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practices of other sovereigns.19  Granting asylum to the citizens
of another country can serve as an indictment of that country’s
government for its inability or unwillingness to prevent perse-
cution.  States may also use the provision to explicitly broad-
cast their ideology by extending protections to those who share
their ideological commitments, thereby making asylum an in-
strument in the legal and political battles between states.
Thus, a constitutional asylum provision can be an attractive
and useful tool of foreign policy, independent of its humanita-
rian purposes.
When surveying the world’s constitutions, we find evidence
that asylum provisions are at times explicitly used for foreign
policy.  While some countries frame asylum as a right for all
those in need, others appear to use the right first and foremost
as an instrument to broadcast their ideology and cast judg-
ments on the ideological views and policies of other states.
Consider, for example, the Soviet constitution of 1977 pro-
claiming that “[t]he USSR grants the right of asylum to foreign-
ers, persecuted for defending the interests of the working
people and the cause of peace, for participating in revolution-
ary or national liberation movements, or for progressive socio-
political, scientific, or other creative activities.”20  The purpose
of this provision, seemingly, was to condemn Western policies
and to extend a welcome to those who shared the Soviets’ so-
cialist ideology.  At the same time, we find that this particular
usage of the asylum provision has been in decline and that the
past two decades have witnessed a “humanitarization” of the
right.21
All asylum provisions can further state interests; when
they are not used to overtly condemn or condone particular
ideologies, they can be employed to cast judgments on other
countries’ human rights records.  In addition, the constitution-
alization of the right to asylum can generate other political and
economic benefits.  Specifically, our statistical analysis reveals
that a high age-dependency ratio22—that is, a large aging pop-
19 See infra notes 157–61 and accompanying text. R
20 KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 38.
21 See infra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. R
22 See Age-Dependency Ratio, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. HEALTH, 23 (Wilhelm
Kirch ed., 2008) (“The age-dependency ratio is a summary measure of age compo-
sition in a population that incorporates specific assumptions about ‘productive’
and ‘unproductive’ groups.  Age-dependency ratios represent the relative num-
bers of dependents to supporters in the population.  The child dependency ratio
compares the population of children (0–14 years) to the working age (15–64 years)
population, while the aged dependency ratio compares those aged 65 years and
over to the same working-age reference group.  The total age-dependency ratio
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ulation relative to the diminishing size of the work force—is
correlated with the adoption of the right.23  A high age-depen-
dency ratio implies that a larger workforce is needed to sustain
the aging population and that refugees might be a welcome
addition to the declining labor force.24  Indeed, it is striking
that within the EU, Germany has been both the most welcom-
ing country to refugees and one with the highest age-depen-
dency ratios, meaning that it can gain more from admitting
refugees than can most other nations.25  Similarly, we find that
countries with net refugee outflows are more likely to include
asylum rights in their constitution.26  In countries where refu-
gee outflows exceed inflows, promising asylum is relatively
cheap as there is little demand to reside in the country.  In
such cases, constitutionalizing the right might serve as an im-
primatur on the practices of other countries accepting refu-
gees, seemingly legitimizing the fact that many of a country’s
own citizens pursue asylum elsewhere.
Thus, our core finding is that constitutional asylum rights
are predicated upon the political and economic benefits for the
host nations, not merely the moral or humanitarian justifica-
compares the combined youngest and oldest population to the intermediate work-
ing age group.”).
23 See infra Part V.
24 See, e.g., U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., U.N. Sales
No. E.01.XIII.19, REPLACEMENT MIGRATION: IS IT A SOLUTION TO DECLINING AND AGEING
POPULATIONS? 1–5 (2001), http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/mi-
gration/migration.htm [https://perma.cc/XAK7-4FDS] (finding that migration to
a country can be used to hinder the decline or aging of a population based on the
examination of eight industrialized countries); see also Christa Simon et al., Mini-
mizing the Dependency Ratio in a Population with Below-Replacement Fertility
Through Immigration, 82 THEORETICAL POPULATION BIOLOGY 158, 164 (2012) (model-
ing data on an optimal immigration age to increase birth rates in the host nation).
25 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., ATTITUDES ABOUT AGING: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 24,
30 (2014), http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/01/30/attitudes-about-aging-a-
global-perspective [https://perma.cc/4K9L-J2PH] (“[T]o prevent [its] population[ ]
from decreasing, Germany would have to roughly double its annual intake of
immigrants between now and 2050 . . . .  Some countries that are already among
the oldest in the world—Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan—may find that their
old-age dependency ratio has doubled by 2050 . . . .”); see also Robert Peston,
Why Germany Needs Migrants More than UK, BBC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2015) http://
www.bbc.com/news/business-34172729 [https://perma.cc/PW64-UKCV]
(“[T]he UK’s population is rising fast, whereas Germany’s is falling fast . . . [and]
the dependency ratio (the proportion of expensive older people in the population
relative to able-bodied, tax-generating workers) is rising much quicker in Ger-
many than in the UK.”); Age Invaders, ECONOMIST (Apr. 26, 2014), http://
www.economist.com/news/briefing/21601248-generation-old-people-about-
change-global-economy-they-will-not-all-do-so [https://perma.cc/FE5F-ZUX9]
(discussing how rich countries, like Germany, will see an “old-age dependency
ratio” that is proportionally “much higher” than the average).
26 See infra Part V.
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tion of providing sanctuary to persecuted persons.  We are not
necessarily the first to advance this claim; others have made
similar observations about the international legal framework
dealing with refugees.27  Yet, to our knowledge, we are the first
to systematically show its empirical basis by drawing upon
global data. At a time when progress on international legal
efforts to protect refugees has stalled,28 we are shifting the
attention to the legal refugee protections in constitutional
documents.
The remainder of this Article unfolds as follows.  Part I
traces the institution of asylum throughout history.  It illus-
trates that, in contrast to other rights which only recently en-
tered the human rights arena, “[t]he concept of asylum has
been in existence for at least 3,500 years and is found, in one
form or another, in the texts and traditions of many different
ancient societies.”29  The purpose of the historical inquiry is to
show that, across history and civilizations, the institution of
asylum often appeared to serve the interests of the nation or
society granting it.
Parts II and III explore the right to asylum in international
and constitutional law respectively.  Part II explores asylum in
international law and notes that, because international law
does not ultimately require states to grant asylum, there exists
substantial confusion about the contours and the substance of
this right.  Part III focuses on asylum as a constitutional right
and notes that constitutions can, and often do, go beyond in-
ternational law in vesting the right to asylum in the hands of
those seeking it.  What is more, constitutionalizing asylum in-
sulates the right from changing political tides and encourages
governments to honor their commitments even when doing so
lacks popular support.  While it is relatively easy for states to
revoke their treaty obligations,30 it is usually more difficult to
27 See Hathaway, supra note 12, at 133 (arguing in the context of refugee R
crises that “the pursuit by states of their own well-being has been the greatest
factor shaping the international legal response to refugees since World War II”).
28 See Phil Cole, What’s Wrong with the Refugee Convention?, E-INTERNATIONAL
REL. (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.e-ir.info/2015/11/06/whats-wrong-with-the-
refugee-convention [https://perma.cc/V2SU-WF9F] (“What the current crisis has
shown is that the UN Refugee Convention and the rights and obligations which
flow from it are inadequate and need to be fundamentally revised.”).
29 UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES 1993: THE CHALLENGE OF PRO-
TECTION 33 (1993) [hereinafter THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION].
30 See Lucas Kowalczyk, Note, The Nuclear Option: Domestic Treaty With-
drawal Mechanisms, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2017) (finding that it is typi-
cally relatively easy to withdraw from treaties).  Note that dualist systems can
simply decide not to pass implementing legislation, and that in many monist
systems, international law is inferior to domestic law. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier
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amend their constitutions.31  We therefore note that, as states
begin to engage in the contentious debate on solutions in-
tended to address the current crisis, their constitutional com-
mitments should be of great interest.
Part IV presents our original data on the constitutional
right to asylum and uses it to document the trajectory of the
right in the world’s constitutions.  It shows that there are two
distinct versions of the right to asylum: one that overtly serves
states’ foreign policy interests by promising asylum to those
who share the state’s ideological commitments, and one that is
seemingly motivated solely by human rights considerations.
We document a “humanitarization” of asylum provisions,
meaning that a growing number of states have adopted the
latter version.  Part V presents an empirical analysis identifying
the correlates of right to asylum provisions.  While the analysis
is merely exploratory and cannot be used to make causal
claims, it reveals that high age-dependency ratios and a large
number of citizens that reside as refugees abroad are both
positively associated with the adoption of constitutional asy-
lum provisions.
The Article concludes on an optimistic note.  It notes that,
in the realm of human rights enforcement, self-interest is not
necessarily alarming, surprising, or even unwanted.  A body of
literature suggests that when rights commitments align with
national interests, governments are much more likely to up-
hold them.32  While this Article does not explore the impact of
constitutional asylum provisions directly, we suggest that the
self-interested motivations for enshrining rights actually in-
crease the prospects of the right to asylum being more than
just empty or aspirational promises.33
I
THE RIGHT TO ASYLUM IN HISTORY
Mass migrations, refugees, and torn-apart countries forc-
ing people to seek refuge in another place are not new.  The
& Mila Versteeg, International Law in National Legal Systems: An Empirical Investi-
gation, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 514, 518 (2015).
31 See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMEND-
MENT 237, 260–62 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
32 See infra notes 354–60 and accompanying text. R
33 See generally David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF.
L. REV. 863, 871 (2013) (finding that a substantial portion of the world’s constitu-
tions can be characterized as “sham constitutions,” in that their promises are not
upheld).
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institution of asylum is not new either.  As one commentator
observed, “[a]sylum for political refugees is an ancient practice,
privilege and problem” that “has shown a remarkable capacity
for institutional survival, albeit with accommodations, in the
vicissitudes of changing international relations.”34  Although
the study of the scale and complexity of the problem of dis-
placed individuals was not fully undertaken until 1951 when
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR) was founded,35 domestic systems even before
then often compelled themselves to define the obligations and
responsibilities toward foreign nationals.  In fact, prior to the
establishment of nation-states and the national laws and con-
stitutions that recognize the right to asylum, the idea was
found in the religious laws, traditions, and practices of many
societies, making it a “remarkably constant feature of human
history.”36
One of the noteworthy features of many of the early asylum
cases is that it often appeared to serve the interest of the nation
granting it.  From antiquity to the mid-twentieth century, asy-
lum was the right of a nation or society to disobey the requests
of another sovereign to return its escaping refugees.  It was an
expression of one’s sovereignty—the right to defy the will of
another country by refusing to send back a refugee was a mani-
festation of autonomy, self-determination, independence, and
even military fearlessness.  In other instances, however, the
right appeared at least on the surface to be more selfless in
character and motivated by humanitarian purpose.  While a
full historical review of the right to asylum is beyond the scope
of this Article, the purpose of this Part is to illustrate that the
dual nature that characterizes asylum provisions today, alter-
nating between self-interest and apparent selflessness, can be
found throughout history.37
34 Otto Kirchheimer, Asylum, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 985, 985 (1959).
35 See FIFTY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION, supra note 10, at 13–22 (cataloging R
the few international efforts to solve refugee issues prior to the creation of the
UNHCR and defining one of its primary functions as “to seek permanent solutions
to the problem of refugees”).
36 UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES 2006: HUMAN DISPLACEMENT IN
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 31 (Nada Merheb et al. eds., 2006).
37 Also note that there are important differences between the early cases and
the current legal protections that are not brought out in our analysis.
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A. Ancient Greece and Rome
The word “asylum” traces back to Ancient Greece.38  It
comes from the Greek sylao, and translates literally to mean
“without capture, without violation, without devastation.”39
The idea of asylum was indeed prevalent in Ancient Greek his-
tory.  Herodotus describes, for instance, the case of Adrastus
who, after unwittingly killing his brother, sought refuge in Sar-
dis where he was welcomed and courteously received by King
Croesus, who offered him protection.40
Ancient Greek theater and literature also referred to asy-
lum in its storylines.  In Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, the mytholog-
ical hero, Oedipus, after solving the Sphinx riddle, frees the
town of Thebes and assumes its throne only to later seek refuge
in Athens due to persecution.  Athenian King Theseus grants
Oedipus protection, as he, too, was forced to hide in foreign
lands to escape his enemies.41  Similarly, the protection and
proper treatment of strangers is a recurring theme of Homer’s
Odyssey.42
The concept of refuge also received attention from Plato
who, emphasizing the humanitarian dimension of asylum,
wrote that “[t]he foreigner, isolated from his fellow countrymen
and his family should be the subject of greater love on the part
of men and of the Gods.”43  Thus understood, for Plato, “the
protection of the foreigner was based on his defenselessness, a
consequence of his isolation from his people, from his family.
The moral justification of protecting the foreigner provides the
basis for asylum.”44  Later, in other texts, as exemplified in
38 However, references to asylum have also been found in cultures and early
societies in the Middle East, such as Assyrians, Hittites, and the ancient Egyp-
tians.  The earliest known refugee treaty, the Treaty of Kadesh from the thirteenth
century B.C., was between the Hittites King Hatusil III and Egypt’s ruler Pharaoh
Rameses II. See Gil-Bazo, supra note 16, at 20.  In the Treaty of Kadesh, the R
Hittite king declared that “when a refugee comes from [the Egyptian] land into
mine, he will not be returned to [Egypt].  To return a refugee from the land of the
Hittites is not right.” DARREN J. O’BYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 343
(2003).  The Egyptian ruler indeed later offered asylum to a displaced Hittite king,
Urhi–Teshup. THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION, supra note 29. R
39 Waldo Villalpando, Asylum in History, in AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE: FOR
FORTY YEARS, UNHCR ALONGSIDE REFUGEES 33, 36 (Lionello Boscardi et al. eds.,
1991); see ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ASYLUM, ENTRY AND SOJOURN 3 (1972).
40 See 2 J. TALBOYS WHEELER, THE LIFE AND TRAVELS OF HERODOTUS IN THE FIFTH
CENTURY BEFORE CHRIST 254–55 (1856).
41 See Villalpando, supra note 39, at 34–35. R
42 See THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER (Richmond Lattimore trans., Harper & Row
1967); Villalpando, supra note 39, at 34–35. R
43 Villalpando, supra note 39, at 44. R
44 Id.
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Oedipus Rex, the “basis is ascribed to obligation to recipro-
cate.”45  When Oedipus asks for asylum, Theseus acquiesces,
proclaiming that he, too, grew up in a foreign land.46  As such,
in these early accounts from Ancient Greece, the concept of
asylum was understood as a privilege granted upon strangers,
justified as a moral obligation, regardless of any economic and
political benefits.  Under what conditions asylum was actually
granted, and for what reasons, is a separate question beyond
the scope of our inquiry.  Noteworthy for our purposes are the
ancient roots of this moral obligation.
B. The Judeo-Christian Tradition
The right to asylum is also found in the Judeo-Christian
tradition.  In fact, the Hebrew tradition is founded upon the act
of hospitality, when Abraham, the biblical patriarch, is visited
by three pilgrims.  Abraham washes the pilgrims’ feet, offers
them bread, milk, and his best calf for a meal.  Unbeknownst to
Abraham, the strangers are two angels and God himself, who
tell Abraham that Sarah, his elderly wife, would give birth to a
son.  The following year, Sarah, despite nearing her 100th
birthday, gave birth to Isaac, one of the three patriarchs of the
Israelites.47  “It is not surprising therefore that Mosaic Law
contains various precepts concerning the protection of the for-
eigner, whether by asylum or by the granting of hospitality.”48
Indeed, in the Old Testament, the command to provide refuge
comes directly from God.  In the Book of Numbers, God orders
Moses to select six cities as places of sanctuary “for the chil-
dren of Israel, and for the stranger, and for the sojourner
among them . . . .”49
The Bible is replete with other illustrations.  Leviticus com-
mands: “Do not mistreat foreigners who are living in your land.
Treat them as you would a fellow Israelite, and love them as
you love yourselves.  Remember that you were once foreigners
in the land of Egypt.”50  Deuteronomy is even more forceful
when it proclaims that “[i]f a slave runs away from his owner
and comes to you for protection, do not send him back.  He may
45 Id.
46 Id.; see SOPHOCLES, Oedipus at Colonus, in SOPHOCLES I, at 77, 79, 106
(David Grene & Richmond Lattimore eds., 2d ed. Univ. of Chi. Press 1991).
47 Genesis 21:1–3 (King James).
48 Villalpando, supra note 39, at 40. R
49 Numbers 35:9–15 (King James).
50 Leviticus 19:33–34 (Good News).
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live in any of your towns that he chooses, and you are not to
treat him harshly.”51
The Hebrew tradition considers providing asylum to be a
responsibility originating from God.52  Indeed, “[s]cholars agree
that while there are early records of asylum provided by secular
authorities, the origins of the concept lie in the religious realm.
It was assumed that there were areas which stood under the
special protection of divine authority and upon which human
beings must therefore not infringe.”53
The idea that a special, religiously commanded duty was
owed to displaced foreigners, regardless of any material bene-
fits derived from it, is similarly enshrined in the Christian tra-
dition, where one of the conditions for salvation is to provide
help to a stranger.54  At Final Judgment, God is depicted as
blessing the virtuous, proclaiming: “I was a stranger, and ye
took me in . . . .”55  When God destroyed the city of Sodom, he
spared only the few righteous men who had offered refuge and
protection against the threats of the locals to the two angels
visiting the city.56  Indeed, the concept of persecution and seek-
ing belonging is deeply ingrained in the Bible.  Christ was him-
self a refugee.  His family fled to Egypt to avoid persecution by
the tyrannical King Herod.57  Later in life, Jesus was again
displaced while preaching the Gospel, had “no place to lay his
head,”58 and was rejected in his hometown of Nazareth.59
Just as in Ancient Greece, the obligation to reciprocate
emerged as justification of offering protection to strangers.
Moses, for instance, reminds the Hebrew people that “you also
were foreigners in Egypt” and compels them to accept refu-
gees.60  While a full exploration of asylum during this period is
beyond the scope of this Part, and we have little information on
how the right played out in practice, the ideal of asylum in the
Judeo-Christian tradition appears to be influenced by humani-
tarian concerns.  It was further motivated by reciprocity: the
grant of asylum to strangers in need was a recognition of the
51 Deuteronomy 23:15–16 (Good News).
52 See SCHUSTER, supra note 16, at 91–92 n.15; Psalms 146:9 (King James). R
53 W. GUNTHER PLAUT, EIGHT DECADES: THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF W. GUNTHER
PLAUT 341 (2008).
54 See, e.g., Genesis 19:1–12 (recounting a story of God sparing men who
offered refuge to visiting angels).
55 Matthew 25:35–40 (King James).
56 See Genesis 19:8 (King James).
57 See Matthew 2:12–16 (King James).
58 Matthew 8:20 (New International).
59 See Luke 1:14–31 (King James).
60 Villalpando, supra note 39, at 44. R
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uncertainty of the world where those providing shelter today
may be forced to seek refuge tomorrow.
C. The Islamic Tradition
The early period of the Muslim faith begins with an exiled
prophet.  Soon after the beginnings of Islam, Mohammed and
his followers fled persecution by opponents of the new religion.
The escape from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D., known as the
Hijra, denotes the inaugural year in the Islamic calendar.  Al-
though the prophet eventually returned to Mecca, “his remains
still lie in the city which granted him asylum.”61
The Quran clearly delineates the sanctity of extending asy-
lum by proclaiming that “[t]hose that have embraced the Faith
and fled their homes and fought for the cause of God, and those
that have sheltered them and helped them—they are the true
believers.”62  Indeed, Allah comforted the exiled Mohammed
with the reassurances:
[t]he life to come holds a richer prize for you than this present
life . . . .  Did He not find you an orphan and give you shelter?
Did He not find you in error and guide you?  Did He not find
you poor and enrich you?  Therefore do not wrong the or-
phan, nor chide away the beggar.  But proclaim the goodness
of your Lord.63
In these accounts, the concept and grant of asylum ap-
peared to be tied more closely to the identity of those seeking
protection.  Thus, in the Islamic tradition, asylum is expressed
not as the right of the protection-seeking individual but rather
as a religious instrument, much like a political tool, dispensed
to protect people of similar affiliation, political ideology and
aspirations, or, as in this case, religious sentiments.64  While
we lack information on how the right played out in practice, the
Islamic case shows how more instrumental justifications for
asylum began to emerge.
D. Toward Modernity
The granting of sanctuary in ancient times was primarily
the purview of religious institutions; over time, it gradually
61 Id. at 42.
62 THE KORAN 8:74 (N. J. Dawood trans., 50th Anniversary ed. Penguin Books
2006).
63 Id. at 93:3–11.
64 See, e.g., id. (showing Allah reassuring Mohammed and telling him to
provide shelter and aid to others as it had been provided to himself).
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shifted to the realm of kings and monarchs.65  A parallel shift
occurred from asylum as a reflection of the faith-based com-
mandment to provide refuge to outsiders in need to an expres-
sion of sovereignty, and, on occasion, defiance.66  For instance,
in the sixteenthth century, King Henry VIII of England estab-
lished seven “cities of refuge” to replace the previously existing
Church-operated sanctuaries.67  At that time, the Reformation
forced both the Huguenots from France and Protestants from
Belgium to flee, seeking protection.68  For Britain, which ac-
cepted the fleeing masses, the political turmoil offered practical
and material economic benefits.  Britain saw the incoming for-
eigners “as a source of skills and capital” and provided them
with sanctuary.69  Shortly thereafter, the revocation of the
Edict of Nantes in 1685 forced thousands of Protestants to flee
France in hopes of finding shelter in Prussia and Branden-
burg.70  For Brandenburg’s ruler Frederick William, the incom-
ing foreigners were invaluable as a source of “expertise,
mercantile skills[,] and manpower.”71
With the emergence of the nation-state system following
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, countries began to forge a
system of international relations.72  Its bedrock was the recog-
nition of truly independent sovereigns, and the power to grant
asylum became inevitably tied to nations’ efforts to proclaim
their sovereignty and legitimacy.73  In the context of countries’
often futile demands for extradition of political asylees, it be-
came apparent that asylum would forever become a source of
tension and an instrument of political posturing, capable of
strengthening one sovereign at the expense of another.74
The identity of refugees changed over time, as “the category
of refugees fleeing political rather than religious persecution
65 See, e.g., THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION, supra note 29, at 33 (noting that R
King Henry VIII replaced Church-operated sanctuaries with “cities of refuge” in
the 16th century).
66 See id. at 33 (“As the power of the monarchy grew, the right to grant asylum
increasingly became the prerogative of the state and the inviolability of internal
asylum in holy places declined correspondingly.”).
67 Id.
68 See SCHUSTER, supra note 16, at 74. R
69 Id.
70 See O’BYRNE, supra note 38, at 343. R
71 SCHUSTER, supra note 16, at 76. R
72 See id. at 74–75.
73 See id. at 75.
74 Id. at 76 (“[S]tates which granted asylum were threatened with war, for
granting asylum was regarded as a hostile act, in which the asylum-granting state
undermined the sovereignty of the prosecuting state, while at the same time
granting asylum was seen as a way of asserting sovereignty.”).
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began to gain prominence” after the French Revolution.75
Soon, legal scholars began to recognize that “a right to refuge
creates demands on one state by another, as a refugee from one
is protected in another, thereby restricting that power of states
to prosecute.”76  Others pointed out that “it is unjust that an
individual state, by allowing unrestricted freedom of residence
and action to dangerous revolutionaries, endangers many
other states.”77  Thus, the debate revolved around asylum as a
political tool and its international implications.  At the same
time, in 1848, however, British Lord Palmerston, in a letter to
Russian and Hungarian ambassadors, emphasized for the first
time that “the granting of asylum was tied to the demands of
humanity.”78  Nevertheless, scholars continued to frame asy-
lum from the perspective of the granting state, rather than as a
self-standing subjective right for the individual.79  In fact, asy-
lum’s shift from a policy instrument wielded by a nation to a
human right held by those seeking sanctuary did not occur
until the beginning of the twentieth century.80
E. The American Experiment
Although the United States has never recognized a right to
asylum in its constitution, it unarguably has itself been an
asylum and its history has been intertwined with the concept of
sanctuary since the discovery of the New World.  During the
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, against the back-
drop of British colonial mercantilism, the North American colo-
nies became a place of refuge for “the very scum of the earth.”81
As the British Crown sought to build a vast empire, it remained
anxious that the New World would drain Britain’s human capi-
tal of the most productive and skilled of men, causing depopu-
lation.  As such, the United States became a solution to the
Crown’s pressing problem at home—the influx of French and
75 THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION, supra note 29, at 33. R
76 AUGUST VON BULMERINCQ, DAS ASYLRECHT IN SEINER GESCHICHTLICHEN
ENTWICKLUNG BEURTHEILT VOM STANDPUNKTE DES RECHTS UND DESSEN VO¨LKERRECH-
TLICHE BEDEUTUNG FU¨R DIE AUSLIEFERUNG FLU¨CHTIGER VERBRECHER 7–8 (1853).
77 ROBERT VON MOHL, REVISION DER VO¨LKERRECHTLICHEN LEHRE VOM ASYLE 1–11
(1853).
78 SCHUSTER, supra note 16, at 79. R
79 See, e.g., ANDREAS WEDER, ZUR BEHANDLUNG DER POLITISCHEN VERBRECHER IM
INTERNATIONALEN STRAFRECHT 16 (1887) (“Just as life is the most important right of
the individual, so its sovereignty, its existence, is the foremost right of the state.
The political [refugee] is, from the perspective of states, a priori unforgivable.”).
80 See THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION, supra note 29, at 33. R
81 MARILYN C. BASELER, “ASYLUM FOR MANKIND”: AMERICA, 1607–1800, at 32
(1998) (quoting CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL SERIES, 1574-1660, at 155 (W.
Noel Sainsbury ed., 1964)).
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German Protestants fleeing religious persecution and hard-
ship.  In an effort to supply the colonies with much-needed
laborers, the Crown decided to relocate to the New World its
“people not her own,”82 who the Crown felt drained Britain’s
resources at home, such as beggars, felons, poor children, va-
grants, immigrants, and African slaves.
These “undesirables” were offered refuge in the United
States, which became since then, in Thomas Paine’s words, the
“asylum for mankind.”83  The American colonies, angered by
Britain’s immigration policies, attempted to limit the influx of
convicts and slaves by local laws, which Britain quickly ve-
toed.84  The colonies then turned to measures intended to en-
tice the immigration of wealthier and more skilled groups of
people. Such attempts were struck down by England as well.
In fact, in 1773, royal colonial governors were directed by the
Crown to not acquiesce to any bills allowing for the naturaliza-
tion of, or any land grants to, foreigners.85  As a consequence,
the Declaration of Independence accused the British of at-
tempting to “to prevent the population of these states; for that
purpose obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners,
refusing to pass others to encourage their immigration
thither.”86
That time instilled America’s image as asylum for the relig-
iously persecuted, dispossessed, and poor, and “the best poor
man’s country.”87  The colonies were built upon the political,
economic, and religious oppression of their early citizens, and
the memory of the British colonial asylum never faded.  After
the American Revolution, the colonies saw themselves as
torchbearers of liberty, and American asylum, now greatly ex-
panded, was an expression thereof.88  Asylum was imbued with
political significance.  For the colonies, “a nation’s wealth and
power expanded along with its population”;89 new settlers were
needed to cultivate land, strengthen the borders, battle the
Native Americans, and balance out the substantial African-
82 Id. at 34–38 (quoting WALTER ALLEN KNITTLE, EARLY EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
PALATINE EMIGRATION: A BRITISH GOVERNMENT REDEMPTIONER PROJECT TO MANUFACTURE
NAVAL STORIES 27 (1937)).
83 TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763–1776, at lxvi (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1966) (citing Thomas Paine as proclaiming, “O! receive the fugitive and prepare in
time an asylum for mankind”).
84 BASELER, supra note 81, at 124–25. R
85 Id. at 125.
86 Id. at 126 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
87 Id. at 88.
88 Id. at 331.
89 Id.
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American population.  Although asylum was born out of a phil-
osophical principle, it was later rooted in a political and eco-
nomic exigency for the early colonies.  The continuous addition
of new labor allowed the emerging country to grow and flourish.
Soon, the enthusiasm for the incoming masses turned to
ambivalence and the United States slowly began to consider
measures to curb the influx—a change that clashed with its
image as a world haven.  The first national legislation imposing
restrictions on immigration, the Alien Act, was passed in 1798,
although individual states began to deal with the issue much
earlier.90  In 1782, Georgia passed a bill mandating “that no
Person a Native of Scotland, shall be permitted or allowed to
emigrate into this State with intent to Settle within the same.”91
Limiting the immigration of foreigners perceived as a threat to
the unity of the emerging American nation became a priority.
In sum, British asylum was an instrument of state and
economic power, ensuring the continuity of a vast empire while
remedying a brewing domestic problem; it was a pragmatic
device serving the state more than it served the involuntary
refugees.92  Later, Americans embraced the idea of asylum,
which they recognized as offering military and economic advan-
tages for the growing colonies, and encouraged immigration
with low taxes, free land, and inheritance rights for aliens.  It
was still, nevertheless, a device to bolster a state’s economic
growth and stand up against British subjectship.  Thus, British
immigration policy during the colonial period and the American
asylum were both political devices.  Although for post-revolu-
tionary thinkers asylum stemmed from the deeply entrenched
notions of liberty and freedom from an oppressor upon which
America was built, contrary impulses slowly emerged.  Once
the immediate goals of the colonies were achieved and the in-
flux of new immigrants no longer served a clear economic or
political purpose, the wariness about foreigners grew and im-
migration restrictions expanded.93
90 Id. at 13, 147.
91 Id. at 147.
92 See id. at 70–71.
93 For instance, the Naturalization Act of 1790 limited asylum to whites only.
See 1790 Naturalization Act, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795,
ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414.
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II
THE RIGHT TO ASYLUM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The international law literature is characterized by sub-
stantial confusion over the contours and substance of the right
to asylum.94  The confusion appears to stem at least in part
from the fact that, while international law grants various pro-
tections to refugees, it does not directly provide a right for
refugees to be granted asylum, that is, to enjoy long-term legal
protections in the host country.95  Since the right to be granted
asylum is not found in international law itself, any attempt to
define its content draws from various legal systems, which may
themselves lack clear definitions of the right, or from moral
principles.  This Part will describe the status of asylum in inter-
national law and summarize the various attempts in the litera-
ture to define its content.  Doing so will set the stage for moving
our inquiry to national constitutions in Part III.
A. International Legal Obligations Toward Refugees
Over the past decades, international law has placed a ro-
bust set of obligations on states to grant certain protections to
certain groups of non-citizens under certain circumstances.96
When refugees reach foreign shores, these international legal
obligations tend to be a natural focal point for activists seeking
to remind states of their humanitarian commitments.  Indeed,
much of the debate in the current refugee crisis has played out
with reference to the main international legal documents: the
Refugee Convention and its Refugee Protocol, as well as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.97  Because
international law tends to be the starting point for analyzing
states’ legal obligations toward refugees, it is also the starting
point for our analysis.
The legal status of the right to asylum in international law
was famously described by Professor Grahl-Madsen as consist-
94 See Kay Hailbronner, Refugees and Asylum: The West German Case, 8
WASH. Q. 183, 183 (1985) (suggesting that the right to asylum has been one of the
most difficult rights to define); Paul Weis, Recent Developments in the Law of
Territorial Asylum, 1 HUM. RTS. J. 378, 378 (1968) (“[T]he loose use of the term
‘right of asylum’ leads to confusion . . . .”).
95 See supra and infra notes 82–120 and accompanying text. R
96 For an overview, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms and
Migration: A Report, in MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 1 (T. Alexander
Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail eds., 2003).
97 See, e.g., E. Tendayi Achiume, Syria, Cost-sharing, and the Responsibility
to Protect Refugees, 100 MINN. L. REV. 687 (2015); Andrew I. Schoenholtz, The New
Refugees and the Old Treaty: Persecutors and Persecuted in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81 (2015).
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ing of three distinct components: (1) the right of a state to grant
asylum; (2) the right of an individual to seek asylum; and (3)
the right of an individual to be granted asylum.98  The first
aspect, the right to grant asylum, is inherent in state sover-
eignty.99  It is a well-established principle of international law
that each sovereign state has complete and independent con-
trol over its admission policies, conditions, and their justifica-
tions.  As part of this, “every sovereign state has the right to
grant or deny asylum to persons located within its
boundaries.”100
The second aspect, the right of an individual to seek asy-
lum and, as such, leave his home state with the intention to
obtain refuge in another country, is enshrined in numerous
international and regional legal instruments.  For instance, Ar-
ticle 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights pro-
claims that “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country,
including his own.”101  Similarly, Article 12(2) of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that
“[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his
own.”102  The essence of this right is the notion that “a State
may not claim to ‘own’ its nationals or residents.”103
The third facet of the right of asylum, undeniably most
crucial, is the right of an individual to receive asylum.  Cur-
rently, international law does not recognize a person’s right to
be granted asylum; rather, this is a decision ultimately left to
the sovereign state.104  While the Refugee Convention places
the obligation upon states to extend certain protections to
those who meet the definition of refugee, there is no interna-
tional legal obligation to grant asylum.105
This omission is not an oversight.  The drafting history of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reveals as much.
Although the original draft of Article 14 of the Universal Decla-
98 See ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 2 (1980).
99 See id. at 23.
100 Boed, supra note 16, at 3. R
101 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, ¶ 2, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
102 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, ¶ 2, Dec. 16,
1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171, 176.
103 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 39, at 26. R
104 See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 12, at 149. R
105 See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 39, at 2; DANIE´LE JOLY, REFUGEES: ASYLUM IN R
EUROPE? 16 (1992) (“[I]t is the sole prerogative of the recipient state to recognize
refugees and grant them asylum on its territory.”); Hailbronner, supra note 94, at R
183–84 (noting that the “right of asylum” is understood as the right of a State to
grant asylum, where a state “remain[s] under no obligation to grant asylum . . . to
refugees”).
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ration of Human Rights stated that “[e]veryone has the right to
seek and be granted, in other countries, asylum from persecu-
tion,” after objections by Australian, British, and Saudi Ara-
bian representatives, the provision was amended to vest the
right entirely within the state.106  The new Article 14 does not
oblige the states to grant asylum; rather, it removes the phrase
“to be granted” and substitutes the benign words “to enjoy,”
depriving Article 14 of any pledges, guarantees, or obligations
toward an individual by nations.107  Even more emphatically,
Article 1, paragraph 3 of the 1967 United Nations Declaration
on Territorial Asylum vests in each state the authority “to eval-
uate the grounds for the grant of asylum.”108
The primary international instruments concerned with ref-
ugees, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refu-
gees109 and its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees,110 likewise do not provide a right to be granted asy-
lum.111  These documents do offer important, albeit temporary,
protections to refugees.112  For example, they require that
states not send refugees back to a country where they would be
in danger (the principle of non-refoulement),113 not impose
106 Draft International Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Draft Res. 3/285
Rev.1, U.N. Doc. A/C. 3/285/Rev.1, at 1 (Oct. 30, 1948) (emphasis added); see
Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 327, 336–37 (1949).
107 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14, ¶ 1, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); see Morgenstern, supra note 106, at 336–37. R
108 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, art. 1, ¶ 3, G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR,
22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6912 (Dec. 14, 1967); see also Paul
Weis, The Draft United Nations Convention on Territorial Asylum, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 151, 152 (1981) (explaining that the intent behind Article 14(1) was “to make it
clear that asylum was not a right of the individual but the right of States to grant
asylum”).
109 Refugee Convention, supra note 13. R
110 Refugee Protocol, supra note 13. R
111 UNHCR, HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETER-
MINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELAT-
ING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 8 (2011) (“[T]he granting of asylum is not dealt with
in the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol.”).
112 See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 56–57 (“The right to engage in employ- R
ment, broad access to the housing market, and the right to public assistance or
social security, for example, apply only to refugees lawfully staying in the coun-
try—i.e., those who have received some type of durable residence rights.  Merely
proving that one meets the refugee definition does not give a refugee any entitle-
ment to lawful residence . . . .  States retain discretion under the Convention to
bestow or withhold both lawful status and residence rights.”); Stephen B. Young,
Between Sovereigns: A Reexamination of the Refugee’s Status, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT’L
LEGAL STUD. 339, 346–47 (1982) (“The conventions themselves do not provide
either for automatic refuge or permanent resettlement.”).
113 Refugee Convention, supra note 13, art. 33, at 6267; see also Convention R
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
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penalties upon refugees for illegal entry,114 provide administra-
tive assistance to refugees, and provide them with identity pa-
pers and travel documents,115 among other things.  These
conventions, moreover, require states to provide refugees with
the privileges and protections of the right of association similar
or equal to those “accorded to nationals of a foreign country, in
the same circumstances,”116 as well as the “right to engage in
wage-earning employment.”117  Finally, they require states to
treat refugees similarly to “nationals” with respect to freedom of
religion,118 access to court,119 elementary education120 and so-
cial security,121 amongst other things.  Notwithstanding these
legal obligations, the state retains the right to decide whether to
offer the refugee permanent legal status in the country; that is,
to grant asylum.122  Short of that, all of these protections are
only temporary; when a person ceases to be a refugee, they lose
the protections under the Refugee Convention.123
Like the Refugee Convention, various regional instruments
similarly do not impose on the states any obligation to grant
asylum.  For instance, the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man states in Article 27: “Every person has the
right, in case of pursuit not resulting from ordinary crimes, to
seek and receive asylum in foreign territory, in accordance with
ment, art. 3, ¶ 1, 3(1) G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., at 197, U.N. Doc.
A139/51 (1984).
114 Refugee Convention, supra note 13, art. 31. R
115 Id. art. 27–28.
116 Id. art. 15.
117 Id. art. 17(1).
118 Id. art. 4.
119 Id. art. 16.
120 Id. art. 22.
121 Id. art. 24.
122 See Martin, supra note 14, at 1255 (explaining that the Refugee Conven- R
tion does not guarantee asylum “even for those duly adjudged to be refugees
under its provisions”); Paul Weis, Legal Aspects of the Convention of 25 July 1951
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 478, 481 (1953) (explain-
ing in relation to the Refugee Convention that in “international law as at present
constituted, the so-called right of asylum is a right of States, not of the individ-
ual”); see also Morten Kjærum, Article 14, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 220 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 1992) (“[Generally,] States
have been unwilling to pledge themselves in international conventions to the
individual’s right to asylum.”).
123 See Joan Fitzpatrick & Rafael Bonoan,Cessation of Refugee Protection, in
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON IN-
TERNATIONAL PROTECTION 491, 493–94  (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003), http://
www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/419dbce54.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARC6-WSPT];
Joan Fitzpatrick, The End of Protection: Legal Standards for Cessation of Refugee
Status and Withdrawal of Temporary Protection, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 348–49
(1999).
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the laws of each country and with international agree-
ments.”124  Likewise, Article 22, paragraph 7 of the American
Convention on Human Rights provides that “[e]very person has
the right to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in
accordance with the legislation of the state and international
conventions.”125  Similarly, neither the European126 nor the
African127 regional instruments legally obligate states to guar-
antee asylum; the decision to grant protection remains vested
with the state.  Thus, while these documents place legal obliga-
tions upon states to offer protections to refugees, they give full
discretion to states on whether to grant them permanent legal
status.
Because international law does not impose on the states
the obligation to grant asylum, there is a “gap between the
individual’s right to seek asylum and the state’s discretion in
providing it.”128  Presently, the discretion to prescribe the crite-
ria and conditions for the grant of asylum remains with the
state.129  As John Bassett Moore observed in 1908, “the right to
grant asylum ‘is to be exercised by the government in the light
of its own interests, and of its obligations as a representative of
social order.’”130  To the extent there is a right to asylum, its
contours are defined in domestic legal systems, not interna-
tional law.
B. The Substance of the “Right to Asylum”
Since international law does not protect the right to be
granted asylum, the right has “no clear or agreed meaning”131
and is surrounded by confusion about what substantive legal
124 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. 27, May 2,
1948, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/III 23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948).
125 American Convention on Human Rights art. 22, ¶ 7, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
126 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
amended by Protocol Nos. 11 and 14 and supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6,
7, 12 and 13, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
127 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, art. II, ¶ 1, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 193, 195 (“States . . . shall
use their best endeavors consistent with their respective legislation to receive
refugees.”).
128 THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION, supra note 29, at 32. R
129 See SCHUSTER, supra note 16, at 1 (“Asylum is a right of states, not of R
individuals, whose only right is to request and to enjoy asylum once it is
granted . . . .”).
130 GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 12, at 356 (quoting 2 JOHN BASSETT R
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 757 (1906)).
131 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 98, at 50. R
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obligations are entailed by it.132  Some scholars have used the
existing international legal obligations of states toward refu-
gees to give content to the right to asylum.  For example, Pro-
fessor Schuster suggests that asylum is merely “the absence of
extradition than an active protection of an individual.”133  Pro-
fessor Clark provides a more extensive list of obligations, which
include the obligation “to admit a person to the territory of the
State, to allow the person to remain there, to refuse to expel
[the person], to refuse to extradite [the person] and not to pros-
ecute, punish, or otherwise restrict the person’s liberty.”134
These obligations, however, are already enshrined within the
Refugee Convention.135 Thus, for these scholars, the substance
of the right to asylum equates the rights that refugees enjoy
under international law.  The idea here is that the imparting of
refugee status under the Refugee Convention approximates an
asylum grant.136  As Professor Boed puts it, “Permission to so-
journ in a country without a formal grant of asylum provides
the individual with refuge, which amounts to de facto
asylum.”137
Others have suggested that the substance of the right to
asylum goes beyond what is provided by international law.138
After all, if international law does not provide a right to be
granted asylum, then a right to asylum entails something not
currently provided by international law.  According to a num-
ber of commentators, what distinguishes the right to asylum
from refugee protections under international law is a certain
132 See Hailbronner, supra note 94, at 183 (arguing that the right of asylum R
has been one of the most difficult human rights to define); Weis, supra note 94, at R
378;.
133 SCHUSTER, supra note 16, at 90. R
134 Tom Clark, Human Rights and Expulsion: Giving Content to the Concept of
Asylum, 4 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 189, 190 (1992).
135 See generally Refugee Convention, supra note 13 (detailing the protections R
afforded to refugees).
136 See, e.g., Susan M. Akram & Terry Rempel, Temporary Protection as an
Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees, 22 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 1, 2–3 (2004) (“Temporary protection is widely regarded as an interna-
tional legal norm now obligatory in certain circumstances on states with regard to
their treatment of a mass influx of refugees, or of persons fleeing situations of
armed conflict or civil strife.  As a recognized status, it is the most recent of the
three major possibilities for protection of refugees a state can offer—the other two
being the now-universal obligation of non-refoulement (non-return) and the non-
obligatory protection of political asylum.” (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted)).
137 Boed, supra note 16, at 11 n.58. R
138 See David A. Martin, The Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics, and the
Careful Use of a Scarce Resource, in REFUGEE POLICY: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
30, 32–33 (Howard Adelman ed., 1991).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN502.txt unknown Seq: 27 26-JUL-17 10:10
2017] RIGHT TO ASYLUM 1245
degree of permanence.139  Specifically, the obligations provided
under international law are conditioned upon refugee status.
When a person ceases to be a refugee, the host state is no
longer obliged to offer these protections and can even return
the person to his home state.140  Once asylum is granted, how-
ever, a person’s legal status transitions from that of a refugee
under international law to that of an asylee governed by domes-
tic law.141
Once asylum is granted, the asylee is permitted to take up
permanent residence in a country.142  Refugees, although pro-
tected by non-refoulement and granted conditional stay, will
always be refugees, living in a state of legal and existential
limbo, with rights defined by that label.  Asylum, by contrast,
allows the unconditional access to all domestic rights and, in
reality, a conversion from a refugee into a de facto citizen liter-
ally unconfined by the barbed wire of the refugee camp.143  The
grant of asylum thus ensures access to national rights, obliga-
tions, and privileges, such as the ability to work legally, to
settle in any place in the host nation, to receive training and
education, to have property rights, and, eventually, to vote and
decide the course of that country.144
Thus defined, the granting of asylum acts as a gateway to a
new set of rights.  As one commentator notes, the right to asy-
lum “aims at reinstating civil rights on individuals or smaller
social groups of persons who have lost citizenship in their
countries of origin.”145  Indeed, it is often the lack of those
fundamental rights that triggers emigration in the first place.
Therefore, as another commentator notes, the right to asylum
is the embodiment of the “general principle of human rights
139 See, e.g., id. (characterizing the right of asylum as “an indefinite right to
stay”).
140 See A. Roman Boed, Comment, Past Persecution Standard for Asylum Eligi-
bility in the Seventh Circuit: Bygones Are Bygones, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 147, 176–77
(1993).
141 See Martin, supra note 14, at 1256 (stating that most Western countries R
have domestic asylum adjudication systems with the discretionary power to grant
asylum status); see also Boed, supra note 140, at 158 (explaining that in the R
United States, the grant of asylum is entirely within the discretion of the U.S.
Attorney General).
142 See, e.g., Boed, supra note 140, at 152–53 (describing the process for U.S. R
asylees to apply for permanent resident status).
143 See Martin, supra note 138, at 32. R
144 This definition is closest to an attempted definition by Professor David
Martin who characterized the right of asylum as “an indefinite right to stay,
accompanied by a range of other rights that will facilitate a reasonably normal life
in the new land.”  Martin, supra note 138, at 32. R
145 Heuser, supra note 17, at 5. R
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policy that there shall be no human being who is not the sub-
ject of civil rights,”146 bridging civil and human rights.  While
different countries employ different administrative measures to
provide legal residence, the key feature is that the asylee is
allowed to permanently settle in a country and receives full
access to citizenship rights.
III
ASYLUM AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Although international law requires the state to extend cer-
tain temporary protections to refugees, it leaves the non-obliga-
tory protection of asylum within the realm of state sovereignty.
At the same time, international law does not prevent states
from limiting their own discretion to create adjudicatory sys-
tems with the discretionary power to grant asylum to some
persons under domestic law.  Thus, a version of the right to
asylum that goes beyond the compulsory temporary refugee
protections and acts as a gateway to civil rights may be found
in the provisions of domestic law embodied in constitutional or
statutory schemes.147
This Part explores the distinctive features of asylum as a
constitutional right.  It shows that constitutions can, and often
do, offer protections that go beyond those mandated by inter-
national law and that their entrenchment makes them impervi-
ous to changing political tides.  At the same time, we explain
that constitutionalizing asylum rights can serve a purpose
other than merely providing sanctuary to refugees: it can fur-
ther a state’s social, economic, and foreign policy goals.  It is
therefore important to view constitutional asylum rights not
only as mechanisms for protection but also as instruments of
state power.
A. Constitutionalizing the Right to Asylum
International law does not stipulate how and when states
should grant asylum to refugees.  Yet, many states have taken
it upon themselves to do so under domestic law.  Many limit the
146 Id. at 7 (“[T]he right of asylum can be an integral part of a global political
practice with the objective that nobody shall live in the state of exception.”).
147 See Gil-Bazo, supra note 16, at 11 (citing Professor Grahl-Madsen as stat- R
ing that “[t]he idea that States might agree on a binding convention guaranteeing
the individual a right to be granted asylum is not entirely utopian.  As a matter of
fact, in many countries there are provisions of municipal law laying down a more
or less perfect right of asylum for individuals . . . .  In some countries such
provisions are embodied in the national constitutions; in others they are of statu-
tory character.” (quoting GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 98, at 24)). R
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pool of eligible asylum-seekers by providing detailed guidelines
on the right to asylum in administrative law.  For example,
Israeli asylum law is governed by an internal directive issued in
2002 by the Minister of the Interior entitled “Regulations Re-
garding the Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Israel,”148 which,
in conjunction with other immigration laws,149 denies any pos-
sibility of immigration to Palestinians and citizens of several
other Arab countries.  The United States laid down guidelines
for asylum in its Immigration and Nationality Act, passed in
1952 and amended repeatedly since, which delineates eligibil-
ity requirements, procedures, exceptions, and burdens of
proof, among other things, governing the grant of asylum by
the Secretary of Homeland Security or Attorney General.150
Poland’s administrative scheme concerning asylum is similarly
authorized by a parliamentary act, which prescribes the gen-
eral conditions for granting asylum.151  Many other countries
have likewise adopted detailed administrative guidelines on
how and when asylum can be granted.
Importantly, when the requirements for asylum are defined
in ordinary law, the state retains a large amount of flexibility to
alter its policies in the face of changing refugee flows.  Statu-
tory rights limit the discretion of immigration officers; yet, they
can be amended by a simple majority of the legislature.152
Thus, when faced with an influx of refugees, the legislature can
repeal or modify any statutory rights that grant asylum to refu-
gees without much difficulty.  Regulatory schemes are even
more flexible and can be altered when the executive changes
course.  Unsurprisingly, many states will prefer one of these
148 See ANAT BEN-DOR & RAMI ADUT, ISRAEL—A SAFE HAVEN?  PROBLEMS IN THE
TREATMENT OFFERED BY THE STATE OF ISRAEL TO REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS 68–71
(2003) (reprinting the regulations in Annex A).
149 See The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision)
5763–2003, art. 2 (2003) (prohibiting the grant of citizenship or any legal status in
Israel to all persons from Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, and Palestine, no matter
the merits of their claim of persecution).
150 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012).
151 Ustawa z dnia 12 grudnia 2013 r. o cudzoziemcach, Dziaøl I, Przepisy
ogo´lne, Poz. 1650, Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Pol.).
152 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J.
1215, 1215–16 (2001) (arguing that some statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act or
the Sherman Antitrust Act, dubbed “super-statutes,” play a role analogous to that
of constitutional amendments and, although not enshrined in the constitution,
are nevertheless invulnerable to the electoral process and changing political coali-
tions); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 26 (2010) (naming the Voting Rights Act of 1965
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 as examples of super-statutes).
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approaches as it gives them the flexibility to respond to unpre-
dictable waves of forced migrants.
By contrast, where a right to asylum is constitutionalized,
a state pre-commits to granting asylum to certain groups and
makes it harder for future popular majorities to renege on
these commitments when political sentiments change.  In al-
most all legal systems, constitutional law is supreme to ordi-
nary law and impervious to changes by a simple majority of the
legislature.153  In federal systems, the assent of the majority of
states is required.154  A growing number of countries, including
Australia, Colombia, and Brazil, amend their constitutions
through a national referendum and citizen input.155  Although
amendment practices vary across states, almost all erect some
boundaries against relatively easy change, thereby separating
constitutional law from ordinary law.156  Thus, where a right to
asylum is constitutionalized, states effectively restrict their
ability to make their response to refugees dependent on pre-
vailing political sentiments.
Constitutional asylum rights thus provide a defense
against changing political preferences, especially in the face of
153 See, e.g., Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment,
88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 360–65 (1994) (analyzing the constitutional amend-
ment process of thirty-two countries).  But while most countries make it harder to
change the constitution than ordinary law, most states made their constitutional
systems more flexible than the U.S. Constitution. See Mila Versteeg & Emily
Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitu-
tional Design, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657, 662–64 (challenging that entrenchment
is the defining feature of modern constitutionalism).
154 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution,
or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid
to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by
the Congress . . . .”).
155 See Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 IND. L.J. 1133, 1144
fig.2 (2014) (showing graphically the growth of the number of countries that
require the constitution to be ratified by referendum).
156 See, e.g., Dieter Grimm, Types of Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98, 111 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andra´s Sajo´ eds.,
2012) (discussing various countries’ heightened requirements for constitutional
amendments); Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amend-
ment Rule Matter at All?  Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring
Amendment Difficulty, 13 INT’L J. CON. L. 686, 688 (2015) (explaining the concept
of constitutional flexibility); Lutz, supra note 153, at 360–65 (analyzing the consti- R
tutional amendment process of thirty-two countries).
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a looming refugee crisis.157  Indeed, “The fear of a deluge of
poor and alien people overwhelming prosperous and relatively
homogenous societies is an old one . . . .”158  The international
pressure to accept political refuges may engender xenophobia,
exclusionary attitudes, and even fears of loss of national iden-
tity159—sentiments expressed by many European countries
and the United States in response to the Syrian migration cri-
sis.160  While constitutional provisions are unlikely to change
such sentiments, the constitutional pre-commitment to the
right of asylum has the potential to guarantee that, as statu-
tory rights and regulatory schemes are restricted, expanded,
debated, and tested, the commitment to grant admission to
those in need remains effective and largely immune from the
swinging pendulum of the political process.161  As such, the
constitutionalization of asylum has the potential to protect the
rights of minorities from democratic majorities that might be
hostile to refugees.162
Of course, constitutional protections are not impenetrable.
Each of the mechanisms shoring up constitutions as pre-com-
mitment devices, such as judicial oversight163 or creating a
demanding amendment process,164 can be either overcome or
circumvented.165  When the political will to do so is large
157 THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION, supra note 29, at 32 (“Like many forms of R
altruism, however, [asylum] is vulnerable in times of trouble, when individuals
and states tend to become preoccupied with their own interests.”).
158 Id. at 38.
159 Id. (“[I]n many countries, there are individuals and political parties eager to
exploit such anxieties, and to direct confusion and insecurity into the path of
xenophobia.”).
160 See, e.g., Achiume, supra note 97, at 735 (discussing Swedish xenophobic R
discrimination against Syrian refugees).
161 Cf. Lutz, supra note 153, 360–65 (illustrating that constitutions are usu- R
ally more difficult to amend than legislation).
162 Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Consti-
tutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 673–75 (2011) (“An oft-cited benefit
of constitutionalism is that it enables us to commit to normatively preferred
policies in order to stand firm during moments when pathological politics might
undermine these policies.”).
163 Cf. Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the Social
and Political Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL & POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONS 3, 20 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013) (describing
judicial review as a form of “political insurance” that gives authority to non-
legislative bodies).
164 See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism
Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1671–72 (2014) (describing amendment rates
in the world’s constitutions and in state constitutions and noting that many
countries manage to update their constitutions frequently).
165 Cf. Levinson, supra note 162, at 682–83 (suggesting that many social sci- R
ence theories on precommitment do not actually explain why constitutional con-
straints endure in the future).
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enough, amendments can be passed.  And when fear of terror-
ism is large enough, judges may defer to executives or their
rulings might be ignored.  Nonetheless, each of these mecha-
nisms imposes significant costs on a government seeking to
restrict or abolish constitutional promises.  Ignoring judges
may set off popular protests166 or undermine the independence
of the court.167  Likewise, passing constitutional amendments
requires substantial time and resources, especially when a ref-
erendum for the approval of constitutional reforms is re-
quired.168  Thus, these costs and burdens are intended to serve
as guarantors of constitutional commitments, making them
more credible and durable than promises enshrined in ordi-
nary law or policy.
B. Motivations for Constitutionalizing Asylum
Because constitutional provisions often go beyond interna-
tional law in limiting states’ discretion to grant asylum, these
provisions are of particular interest to asylum-seekers.  The
existence of these provisions, however, raises the question
about powerful sovereigns’ intentions in adopting laws that
restrict their ability to respond to refugee flows, especially
when admitting refugees is economically costly and politically
unpopular.169  While it is possible that states, at least to some
extent, are concerned with global welfare,170 we have to enter-
tain the possibility that it is in countries’ own interest to do so.
Particularly, constitutionalizing the right to asylum may bring
certain benefits that outweigh the costs associated with its con-
166 Cf. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through
Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 91, 100 (2000) (describing courts as fire alarms that can alert the public to
violations).
167 Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS and the New
Institutionalism 100, 101–02 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989)
(noting that a constitution “establishes conventions” that “make it easier for us to
cooperate and to coordinate”).
168 See Mila Versteeg, The Politics of Takings Clauses, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 695,
702 (2015) (discussing how various precommitment mechanisms ultimately
merely increase the costs of noncompliance).
169 See generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 97–99 (2004) (discussing the intentions
that sovereigns may have for constitutionalization).
170 See David Golove, The American Founding and Global Justice: Hamiltonian
and Jeffersonian Approaches, VA. J. INT’L L (forthcoming 2017) (suggesting that
the American Founders were not only concerned with domestic interests, but also
with global welfare); Eyal Benvenisti & Mila Versteeg, The External Dimensions of
Constitutions, VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2017) (describing self-interest and global
welfare as possible motivations for extending constitutional protections to people
beyond the nation’s border).
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stitutional recognition.  This subpart describes four possible
motivations for constitutionalizing the right to asylum: (1) asy-
lum can serve as a foreign policy tool through which states can
cast judgment on the rights practices of other states, (2) asy-
lum can be used to support opposition groups abroad by pro-
viding them with exit options, (3) asylum can boost the
economy in countries with an aging workforce, and (4) asylum
can be used to broadcast a certain image of the state to the
outside world, especially in the face of large migration outflows.
1. Condemning Foreign States
Perhaps the most obvious way in which the right to asylum
can further a state’s self-interest is by serving as a foreign
policy tool.  In this sense, the right to asylum is a unique right,
capable of injecting itself onto the arena of international and
foreign relations.  Specifically, the act of granting rights to the
citizens of a foreign nation can serve as a verdict on the rights
practices or ideology of that nation.  By granting asylum, a
state can review and ultimately criticize the lack of access to
basic human rights in another state.  Indeed, where states
grant asylum to citizens of foreign countries, they directly in-
fringe upon the law-enforcing capabilities of those countries
because asylum often protects the refugee from the reach of the
persecutor, and often the prosecutor, of a foreign nation.  The
grant of asylum, therefore, can constitute an encroachment
into the domestic adjudicatory prerogative of another state.
Thus understood, asylum recognizes the often-inevitable rever-
sal of roles: a citizen’s own country, which is the traditional
provider fundamental rights, occasionally becomes the one
from which the international community, or a particular for-
eign country, must protect.171
Asylum can serve as a means to condemn foreign govern-
ments regardless of how it is phrased.  When asylum provisions
are framed in ideological terms, and the right is granted to
those who share the state’s ideological goal, the instrumental
value is apparent from the provision itself.  In this case, states
condemn other states that do not share their ideology, while
supporting those who resist the foreign ideology.  Consider the
right to asylum in the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union,
which was granted to “foreigners[ ] persecuted for defending the
interests of the working people and the cause of peace, for
171 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 48–49 (1983); James C. Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human
Rights Protection, 4 J. REFUGEE STUD. 113, 122–23 (1991).
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participating in revolutionary or national liberation move-
ments, or for progressive socio-political, scientific, or other cre-
ative activities.”172  Here, the Soviet Union particularly sought
to condemn those states not committed to the interest of the
working people, meaning its capitalist adversaries.
Yet, even when asylum is phrased as a broad human right
for all, rather than a protection only for those who share the
state’s ideology, asylum can be employed to condemn the prac-
tices of other states.  Consider, again, the example of Russia.
By 1993, the newly-adopted constitution of the Russian Feder-
ation included a revised version of the right and stated that
“[t]he Russian Federation shall grant political asylum to foreign
nationals and stateless persons according to the universally
recognized norms of international law.”173  Ostensibly, this
provision appears to serve a humanitarian purpose and no
longer served to condemn those who do not share Russia’s
ideology.  Yet, when Edward Snowden was labeled a traitor by
the United States and requested asylum in Russia, the provi-
sion turned out to be a helpful foreign policy tool to condemn
the actions of a long-standing adversary.174
As another example, consider the post-WWII German Con-
stitution.  In the 1960s, Germany, which at the time featured
one of the broadest formulations of the right to asylum in its
constitution,175 frequently accepted refugees in order to show-
case the moral bankruptcy of the nations from which they were
fleeing.176  This was the case when Germany granted asylum to
172 KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 38.
173 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 63, ¶ 1
(Russ.).
174 Jennifer Fraczek, Whistleblowers Go Far to Find Asylum, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(June 14, 2013), http://dw.com/p/18p5d [https://perma.cc/F6PM-WNRE] (“The
fact that states which, according to human rights groups, themselves have a
limited freedom of opinion are declaring that they could take Snowden in is partly
down to the political message that such a step would send . . . .  ‘[N]ormally
democratic states grant asylum to political refugees from places like China, My-
anmar, Russia, and elsewhere,’ [said] Sylke Tempel of the German Council on
Foreign Relations . . . .  ‘If they take in fugitives from the US, it means they want to
say, “Look, Americans, apparently your freedom isn’t that great either, because
you pursue political refugees too.”’”).
175 GRUNDGESETZ  [GG] [Basic Law], 1949, art. 16, cl. 2 (Ger.), translation at
http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/7fa618bb-604e-4980-
b667-76bf0cd0dd9b/publishable_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZKV-CP5S] (“The
politically persecuted shall enjoy the right of asylum.”).
176 See Patrice G. Poutrus, Asylum in Postwar Germany: Refugee Admission
Policies and Their Practical Implementation in the Federal Republic and the GDR
Between the Late 1940s and the Mid–1970s, 49 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 115, 120–21
(2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN502.txt unknown Seq: 35 26-JUL-17 10:10
2017] RIGHT TO ASYLUM 1253
anti-communist refugees in the 1960s,177 and later, in the
1970s, when it welcomed Chilean refugees after their failed
military plot against the Chilean government.178  In fact, ever
since the development of its Basic Law immediately after World
War II, Germany has tinkered with restrictions on its grant of
the right to asylum; at times, it provided the right liberally, at
others, Germany’s practice amounted to restriction and exclu-
sion.179  Two faces of the right of asylum—a device that neces-
sarily pits the human rights of those seeking refuge against the
obligations and restrictions of the right-granting state—appear
woven into the constitutional developments shaping the right
to asylum in Germany.
2. Strengthening Foreign Opposition Groups
The second way in which asylum may further state inter-
ests is as a reassurance, assistance, and invigoration mecha-
nism for oppressed political groups.  Specifically, in
condemning the policies of foreign governments, states can
lend support to an embattled political opposition by offering
safe exile.  This is especially true in cases of dysfunctional
states where civil disobedience depends critically on the availa-
bility of refuge for potential defectors.  As such, the mere exis-
tence of asylum in one country may aid political competition in
another.  To use Hirschman’s famous metaphor of “Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty,” giving opposition groups an exit option may
strengthen their voice and resolve.180  As one former African
National Congress (ANC) rebel observed, the Soviet Union’s of-
fer of asylum for ANC activists fighting the apartheid regime
emboldened them in their struggle.181  Likewise, Russia’s pro-
177 See id. at 123 (“[T]he admission of Hungarian and Czechoslovakian refu-
gees [by West Germany] can be seen as a reflection of the overwhelmingly anti-
communist leanings of Cold War asylum policy in the Federal Republic.”).
178 Irmtrud Wojak & Pedro Holz, Chilenische Exilanten in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (1973–1989), in EXILE IM 20: JAHRHUNDERT 168, 168–90 (Claus-Dieter
Krohn et al. eds., 2000).
179 See Poutrus, supra note 176, at 115 (explaining that between the late R
1940s and the mid–1970s, “In West Germany, the right to political asylum was
permanently the subject of conflicts and new interpretations based on contradic-
tions between a liberal constitutional law of political asylum and a restrictive
institutional practice of migration policy.”).
180 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 83 (1970) (“[T]he effectiveness of the voice mech-
anism is strengthened by the possibility of exit.  [Although] [t]he willingness to
develop and use the voice mechanism is reduced by exit . . ., the ability to use
[voice] with effect is increased by [the availability of exit].”).
181 Interview with Heinz Klug, Evjue-Bascon Professor in Law, Univ. of Wis-
consin Law Sch., Cambridge, U.K. (Sept. 2016).
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tection of Edward Snowden may incentivize future
whistleblowers to expose corruption or other wrongdoing, who
will then seek to shield themselves from prosecution by seeking
refuge.  Julian Assange, the head of WikiLeaks, has also bene-
fited from a grant of asylum following his organization’s release
of thousands of classified United States military documents
and diplomatic cables.182  Fundamentally, then, the willing-
ness of some states to offer sanctuary to defectors, revolution-
aries, political nonconformists, or displaced political groups
may directly affect the internal politics and domestic conflicts
in other countries.
3. Supplementing a Shrinking Workforce
Economic considerations may also push states toward
constitutionally recognizing asylum.  Specifically, in countries
with declining or aging populations, a shrinking workforce can
be supplemented through the inflow of international migration.
In many countries today, as the population ages due to de-
creasing levels of fertility or increasing emigration of native
working-age people, filling the demands of the labor market
may become challenging.183  As the United Nations’ Population
Division observes, “These changes have profound conse-
quences and far-reaching implications, especially for pension
schemes, heath-care systems, education programmes and
housing plans, as well as for the economic vitality and growth
of a country.”184  In countries with high proportions of older
persons, international migration might prove to be a solution to
ameliorate the decreasing population.  Thus, such countries
may seek to formulate their immigration policies, including ac-
cess to the right of asylum, to attract foreigners to shore up the
domestic workforce.  Indeed, a nation’s economic sustainability
might well depend on its ability to increase international migra-
182 Steven Erlanger & David E. Sanger, Ecuador Cuts Internet of Julian As-
sange, WikiLeaks’ Founder, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/10/19/world/europe/julian-assange-embassy.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/YMG7-BKZ3].
183 See, e.g., David E. Bloom et al., Implications of Population Ageing for Eco-
nomic Growth, 26 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 583, 583 (2010) (“Population ageing
will tend to lower both labour-force participation and savings rates, thereby rais-
ing concerns about a future slowing of economic growth.”); Klaus Prettner, Popu-
lation Aging and Endogenous Economic Growth, 26 J. POPULATION ECON. 811, 812
(2013) (“[S]upport ratios will decline such that fewer and fewer workers will have
to carry the burden of financing more and more retirees.”).
184 U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/
SER.A/206, REPLACEMENT MIGRATION: IS IT A SOLUTION TO DECLINING AND AGEING
POPULATIONS? 11 (2001).
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tion.185  Accepting refugees, especially those with the agency
and skills to make the treacherous journey to reach the shores
of a foreign country, may thus be attractive to states with high
age-dependency ratios.186
4. Broadcasting Good Intentions
The grant of the right to asylum may also prove beneficial
to countries desiring to project themselves as safe havens for
refugees, especially when their actual human rights record
suggests otherwise.  Where more people seek to leave a country
than enter it, constitutionally protecting asylum is relatively
inexpensive, as there are few foreigners willing to take the
country up on its offer to provide refuge.  But while the costs
are low, the potential benefits are substantial: granting a broad
right to asylum might serve as a signal to domestic and inter-
national audiences alike that the nation is prosperous, desired,
and one that provides shelter to people in need.  As such, the
inclusion of the right of asylum in the constitution gives the
government and the people of the right-granting state license to
celebrate prosperity, real or feigned.187  In this vein, Professor
Landau suggests that the large number of Colombians dwelling
abroad as refugees motivated the drafters of the 1991 Colom-
bian Constitution to include the right to asylum.188  Likewise,
some of the smallest and poorest African nations grant the
right to asylum, possibly for political posturing or because they
genuinely aspire to offer sanctuary for foreigners in need, even
185 Several studies support the notion that migration might indeed alleviate
the effects of an aging population. See, e.g., id. at 15–33 (highlighting the impact
that various levels of immigration would have on population size and population
aging in eight low-fertility countries in the 1995–2050 period); Simon et al., supra
note 24, at 160–65 (detailing mathematically “optimal immigration profiles” for a R
fixed number of immigrants); see also Michele Waslin, States Will Need Immi-
grants to Counter Aging of the Labor Force, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL: IMMIGR. IMPACT
(June 1, 2016), http://immigrationimpact.com/2016/06/01/aging-of-the-labor-
force [https://perma.cc/7T2N-K3DY] (noting that immigration may be necessary
to offset declining populations of working age adults in parts of the United States).
186 See Markus Dettmer et al., German Companies See Refugees as Opportu-
nity, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Aug. 27, 2015, 3:22 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/interna
tional/germany/refugees-are-an-opportunity-for-the-german-economy-a-1050
102.html [https://perma.cc/XM39-8PUY] (discussing the hurdles some success-
ful refugees have faced in reaching Germany and their immediate contribution to
the aging German workforce).
187 See Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 10–11 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., 2014).
188 See generally David Landau, Constitutional Design, International Law and
Vulnerable Insiders: The Victims of Internal Armed Conflict in Colombia, VA. J. INT’L
L. (forthcoming 2017) (discussing Colombia’s massive net outflow of refugees in
light of its generous policies toward foreign refugees).
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if those aspirations remain unfulfilled.  To illustrate, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, a country with net negative immigration, provides that
“[a]ny person persecuted for reason of his political, religious,
[or] philosophical convictions, or of his ethnic identity can ben-
efit from the right of asylum in the territory of the Republic of
Coˆte d’Ivoire, under the condition of conforming to the laws of
the Republic.”189  Considering the large number of Ivorians
seeking admission elsewhere, we have to consider the possibil-
ity that the provision seeks to remedy the reputational damage
associated with the refugee and immigration outflows.
More generally, constitutional asylum provisions allow gov-
ernments to project a certain image of themselves to the
outside world.190  When the provision is framed in ideological
terms, it allows the government to broadcast its ideology.  Con-
sider, again, the example of the right to asylum in the 1977
Constitution of the Soviet Union, which was granted to “for-
eigners, persecuted for defending the interests of the working
people and the cause of peace, for participating in revolution-
ary or national liberation movements, or for progressive socio-
political, scientific, or other creative activities.”191  This provi-
sion allowed the Soviet Union to broadcast its ideology and
extend a welcome to those who shared it.  Using the right to
asylum is a particularly visible way of doing so.192  It repre-
sented cheap advertisement for the Soviet Union to portray
itself as protecting the interests of the working classes by pro-
viding a home for all those who struggle.  As we will show in
Part IV, other states have likewise used the right to advertise
their political ideologies.
Also when the right to asylum is phrased in humanitarian
language, it can be used to project a particular image of the
state.  According to Professor Landau, this was part of the ex-
planation for why the constituent assembly that drafted the
Colombian Constitution of 1991 opted to enshrine the right in
the Constitution.193  As Landau explains, a broad right was
added not only because many Colombians resided abroad but
189 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE DE COˆTE D’IVOIRE [CONSTITUTION] 2000, art. 12
(Coˆte d’Ivoire).
190 Ginsburg & Simpser, supra note 187, at 6–15 (describing that “[b]eyond R
serving as operating manuals, constitutions can play several other roles that [the
authors] characterize as billboards, blueprints, and window dressing,” that act as
“advertisements . . . seek[ing] to provide information to potential and actual users
of their provisions” (footnote omitted)).
191 KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 38.
192 Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 87 (2002)
(describing rights as particularly visible signals to foreign audiences).
193 Landau, supra note 188, at 1. R
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also because “the country’s international and domestic public
image had suffered” and “needed to be restored through send-
ing signaling that it would now play by the rules of a ‘good’
state.”194
IV
ASYLUM IN THE WORLD’S CONSTITUTIONS
A comprehensive analysis of why countries adopt a right to
asylum requires us to collect data that captures which states
feature the right in their constitutions.  To collect such data, we
analyzed every national constitution written between 1781 and
today, established whether a right to asylum was included, and
quantified this information.195  Doing so allows us to present
what we believe to be the first systematic and comprehensive
account of the evolution of the right to asylum in national
constitutions.196
We initially analyzed the text of each constitution to deter-
mine whether the right to asylum was included.  Each instance
of the right was then coded.  As a general rule, the right had to
be mentioned explicitly in order to be counted as part of the
constitution.  In addition to coding constitutions containing an
express “right to asylum,” or the availability of “asylum,” we
also included constitutions guaranteeing “protection” or “sanc-
tuary” for “foreigners” or “outsiders.”  The general approach to
coding national constitutions is provided in Professor Ver-
steeg’s earlier work.197
We initially coded simply whether or not a constitution
included an asylum provision.  For each country, the presence
or absence of the right was coded.  Upon closer inspection of
each constitutional text, however, we found that there ap-
peared to be two distinct versions of the right: one as a broad
194 Id.
195 This data has been collected in a repository of all written constitutions,
maintained by the Cline Center for Democracy at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. CLINE CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY, http://production.clinecenter.
illinois.edu/cgi-bin/login [https://perma.cc/7KNC-YRX4].  The Comparative
Constitutions Project (CCP) has collected similar data. See COMP. CONSTS. PRO-
JECT, http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/R96X-
Y39V].
196 A potential shortcoming of this data is that it does not rely on information
found in ordinary legislation, case law, executive and administrative documents,
and secondary sources.  As such, it captures only the text of the constitution,
excluding any of its judicial interpretations.
197 See Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The Diffusion of Constitutional
Rights 39 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 4–5 (2014); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The
Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163,
1187–94 (2011).
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human right and one as a more narrowly circumscribed ideo-
logical statement.  We therefore coded, for each constitution
that dealt with asylum, whether (1) it was phrased as a broad
human right, or (2) whether asylum was conditioned upon
shared ideologies.  As an example of the former, consider the
1946 constitution of France, which stated that “[a]ny man per-
secuted in virtue of his actions in favour of liberty may claim
the right of asylum upon the territories of the Republic.”198  An
example of the latter is the Cuban constitution of 1976, which
proclaimed that:
The Republic of Cuba grants asylum to [those persons] perse-
cuted by virtue of the struggle for the democratic rights of the
majorities; for national liberation; against imperialism, fas-
cism, colonialism and neocolonialism; for the suppression of
racial discrimination; for the rights and demands of workers,
peasants and students; for their progressive political, scien-
tific, artistic and literary activities; for socialism and for
peace.199
Appendix A provides the full list of all the asylum provisions
that we found in national constitutions.
We coded the asylum as a broad human right when the
provision contained some or all of the following attributes: (1) it
plainly concerns itself with human rights protections and
places the right in the hands of the asylum-seeking individual;
(2) given its all-encompassing scope and breadth, the right can-
not be expanded any further; (3) it does not, on its face, involve
or mention national interests or power; (4) it shows impartiality
and neutrality and; (5) its relief is not predicated upon any
specific conditions.  We coded asylum as a more narrowly cir-
cumscribed ideological tool when the provision contained some
or all of the following attributes: (1) it uses descriptive terms
and references to certain political activities or events, making
the availability of the right predicated upon those activities or
limiting it because of other activities; (2) it leaves room for the
expansion of its reach to additional categories of people or cir-
cumstances; (3) the right is provided only within a limited legal
space and within specific parameters; (4) it does not appear on
its face to concern itself with a protective function.
198 1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.), translation at http://www.conseil-constitution-
nel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst3.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UU6M-PM3S].
199 CONSTITUCIO´N DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA [CONSTITUTION] 1976, ch. 1, art. 13
(Cuba), translated by Anna I. Vellve´ Torras in HEINONLINE WORLD CONSTITUTIONS
ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., 2010).
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Of course, the distinction is not ironclad.  After all, on their
face, all asylum provisions concern themselves with protecting
those in need, and whether they are phrased in a Western
human rights language or in a socialist terminology may be
largely irrelevant from the perspective of the asylum seeker.
Yet, we believe that there are important differences between
these two types of the rights.  First, they seem to serve different
purposes: one is a seemingly humanitarian provision con-
cerned with all those in need; the other is a foreign policy tool
that allows the state to broadcast their ideology and condemn
those who do not share that ideology.  Second, they differ in the
scope of their protection.  To gauge this latter difference, it is
useful to contrast these two types of provisions with the defini-
tion of a refugee provided in the Refugee Convention, which
holds that the term “refugee” applies to
[a] person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.200
A comparison of the constitutional and international pro-
tections reveals that the provisions that we coded as human
rights broaden the definitional reach and scope of the Refugee
Convention.  That is, they offer asylum to all and extend be-
yond the limitations enshrined in international law, which
guarantees sanctuary only to those persecuted for “reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.”201  By contrast, the provisions that
we classified as ideologically circumscribed narrow the interna-
tionally-mandated definition by tying asylum and its grant to
ideological causes.  While we recognize that our coding may not
fully take into account the multiple reasons that may motivate
200 Refugee Convention, supra note 13, ch. I, art. 1, § A, ¶ 2. R
201 Id.  The narrow definition of “refugee” in the refugee convention has been
heavily criticized for not protecting environmental refugees, women, or those es-
caping starvation. See, e.g., Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a
Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 357–58 (2009); Schenk, supra note 14, at 307–11 (1994). R
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the distinction, we do believe that the difference between the
two types of provisions is significant and analytically useful.202
A. The Global Spread of Constitutional Asylum Provisions
Constitutional asylum provisions have become more popu-
lar over time.  Figure 1 shows that, in the wake of World War II,
only eleven percent of all constitutions provided a right to asy-
lum.  The solid line depicts all instances of asylum, while the
dotted lines denote asylum as a broad human right and as an
ideologically circumscribed policy tool, respectively.  The graph
reveals an initial increase in the post-WWII years: from four
percent in 1940 to eleven percent in 1946 to nineteen percent
by 1950.  The graph moreover shows a substantial increase in
the proportion of constitutions that contain the right to asylum
in the 1990s.  During this period, we also see that the narrower
ideological version of asylum declines, while its formulation as
a human right takes off, thus revealing a humanitarization of
the right to asylum.  Today, no less than thirty-five percent of
all countries contain an asylum provision in their constitution,
most of which frame it as a human right.  Figure 2 shows the
countries with asylum provisions on a world map.  It shows
that the right is fairly evenly distributed geographically and can
be found in all corners of the globe.
202 Of course, there were a few judgment calls to make in this coding scheme.
In some instances, the humanitarian aspect could not be separated from the
political one.  Instances that appeared to embrace both ideologies were neverthe-
less coded as foreign policy tools because the right, although purported to be
offered on humanitarian grounds, was always predicated upon other political
considerations or conditions limiting its scope and reach. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION
DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE ALGE´RIENNE DE´MOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE [CONSTITUTION] 1963, art.
21 (Alg.) (“The Algerian Republic guarantees the right of asylum to all who fight for
liberty.”).  In other instances, we coded a few countries as not possessing the right
to asylum altogether when the constitutional language indicated that asylum was
not a right and its grant was discretionary. See, e.g., THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL
CHARTER OF THE SOMALI REPUBLIC [Constitution] 2004, art. 23, cl. 2 (“The state may
grant political asylum to a person and his close relatives who flee his or another
country on grounds of political, religious, and cultural persecution unless such
asylum seeker(s) have committed crime(s) against humanity.”).
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To better gauge the logic of constitutional asylum provi-
sions, it is useful to examine the first instances of its adoption.
The very first nation to include the right to asylum was Colom-
bia, which adopted the right in 1811.203  Colombia’s Article 39
203 CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 39 (1811) (“In pursuance of
the system of peace and amity with all nations which do not try to commit hostili-
ties against us and which respect our rights,  we give asylum in our ports and
interior Provinces to all aliens who wish to live peacefully among us, subjecting
themselves to the laws of the Union and of the Province wherein they reside,
especially if in addition to their good intentions they bring among us  some useful
trade by which they may make their living, obtaining for this purpose a letter of
naturalization or permission from Congress, before whom they shall prove the
above circumstances, principally in times when unrestricted immigration would
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was not only intricate and progressive for the time but also
contained a high level of detail.  The relevant provision declared
that it recognized asylum in pursuance of a “system of peace
and amity” with “all nations.”204  The right was granted “to all
aliens who wish to live peacefully among us, subjecting them-
selves to the laws of the Union,” although the burden of proof to
“prove the above circumstances” fell on the asylum seeker,
who, by “permission from Congress,” was to receive “a letter of
naturalization.”205  Colombia encouraged the granting of the
right especially to those who have a “useful trade by which they
may make their living.”206  Colombia reaffirmed its commit-
ment to the protection of foreigners in its subsequent constitu-
tions.  For instance, Article 11 of the 1863 constitution does
not explicitly mention the right to asylum but rather allowed
“[p]ersons fleeing to a State after committing illegal acts against
the government of another State” to be “kept at such distance
from the frontier as will prevent further acts of hostility.”207
However, the right disappeared from the 1886 constitution,
only to reappear in 1991.208
The next country to feature asylum in its constitution was
another Latin American nation, Nicaragua.209  Article 9 of the
1893 Constitution proclaims, “The Republic of Nicaragua is a
sacred asylum to all persons taking refuge in its territory.”210
Title III of the 1893 Constitution moreover stipulated that pro-
tected foreigners acquired property and civil rights.211  Internal
law was to establish the conditions for approval and rejection of
entry by foreigners.212  The constitution did, however, delineate
the reach of the protection Nicaragua was willing to offer, “The
be dangerous”).  An early provision could be found in the 1793 French Constitu-
tion, which stated that, “The French people shall offer asylum to those banished
from their countries in the cause of liberty; it shall refuse it to tyrants.” Yet this
provision never entered into force. See John Bell, External Dimensions of the
French Constitution, VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2017).
204 CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 39 (1811).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 11 (1863).
208 CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] (1886); CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE
COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 36 (1991).
209 CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DE LA REPU´BLICA DE NICARGUA [CN.] tit. III, art. 9, LA
GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] 10 Dec. 1893, as amended by Ley No. 330, Jan. 18,
2000, Reforma Parcial a la Constitucio´n Polı´tica de la Repu´blica de Nicaragua,
L.G. Jan. 19, 2000.
210 Id.
211 Id. at tit. III, art. 11; id. tit. III, art. 12.
212 Id. at tit. III, art. 17.
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dispositions of this Title do not modify the Treaties in force
between Nicaragua and other countries.”213
Constitutional asylum provisions next appeared in the
constitutions of Eastern European countries, with Hungary
adopting the right in its 1919 constitution,214 followed by the
Soviet Union215 and its 1936 constitutional guarantee to “of-
fer[ ] the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for de-
fending the interests of the working people, or for their
scientific activities, or for their struggle for national
liberation.”216
The early 1940s witnessed a further proliferation of the
right throughout Latin America.  Cuba217 and El Salvador218
adopted it in 1940, while Guatemala219 did so in 1945.  The
diffusion of the right among neighboring Latin American coun-
tries may be a result of the shared constitutional trajectory of
Latin American countries.220  More surprising, perhaps, is that
the right appeared in Mongolia’s 1940 constitution.221  How-
ever, given the resemblance of the Mongolian provision to that
213 Id. at tit. III, art. 19.
214 MAGYARORSZA´G ALAPTO¨RVE´NYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY],
ALAPTO¨RVE´NY art. 13 (1919).
215 This may not be that surprising because, although
[t]he Soviet Union was a dictatorship, . . . the concept of rights
always structured the theoretical edifice of political life . . . .  Soviet
rights bore the imprint of the international context. The rights revo-
lutions of the 1940s and 1970s influenced Soviet jurisprudence and
social policy.  On an international scale, human rights assumed
rhetorical power during and immediately after the Second World
War . . . .
Mark B. Smith, Social Rights in the Soviet Dictatorship: The Constitutional Right to
Welfare from Stalin to Brezhnev, 3 HUMANITY 385, 385 (2012).
216 KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1936) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 129,
translation at http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons04.
html [https://perma.cc/D6VF-TMHJ].
217 CONSTITUCIO´N DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA [CONSTITUTION] 1940, ch. 1, art. 31.
218 CONSTITUCIO´N DE REPU´BLICA DE EL SALVADOR [CONSTITUTION] 1945, tit. II, art.
11, cl. 1.
219 CONSTITUCIO´N DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA [CONST.] 1945, art. 26.
220 See Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, Transnational Constitutions: A Con-
ceptual Framework, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 103, 104
(Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013) (suggesting that constitutional
rights diffuse among “countries that share the same legal origins, the same relig-
ion, a common colonizer, and a common aid donor”); see also Zachary Elkins,
Constitutional Networks, in NETWORKED POLITICS: AGENCY, POWER, AND GOVERNANCE
43, 43 (Miles Kahler ed., 2009) (“Constitutions are famously unoriginal docu-
ments.  Legend has it that some Latin American constitutions in the 1800s shared
not only the same provisions but also the same typographical errors.”).
221  [CONSTITUTION] 1940, art. 88 (Mong.) (“The
Mongol People’s Republic affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted
for defending the interests of the workers, or for their struggle for national
liberation.”).
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of the constitution of the Soviet Union, the presence of the right
in the neighboring Mongolia is perhaps less unexpected and
reflects the Soviet Union’s power over the country.222
In the aftermath of WWII, the right appeared in Western
Europe.  France, the first Western European country to adopt
the right, included it in the preamble to its 1946 constitu-
tion;223 Italy224 and Germany225 followed shortly thereafter.
These instances of adoption were undoubtedly inspired by the
horrors of WWII and the stream of refugees it produced.226
Eastern Europe, Albania,227 Yugoslavia,228 Bulgaria,229 and
Romania230 all adopted the right within a two-year time span.
Perhaps less expectedly, the (not so) Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea adopted the right in 1948, proclaiming that
“[t]he [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] affords the right
of asylum to foreign nationals persecuted for fighting for demo-
cratic principles or national liberation movements, or for the
interests of the working people or for freedom of scientific and
cultural activities.”231  While the spread of the right had al-
ready begun in East Asia with Mongolia’s inclusion of the right
in its 1940 constitution, the diffusion of the right to North
Korea, shortly after its partition from Korea following the end of
World War II, may have its roots in the shared ideological com-
222 See generally Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin’s Great Terror and the Asian Nexus,
66 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 775, 775 (2014) (“Stalin’s Great Terror of 1937–1938 did not
stop at the Soviet borders: under Moscow’s explicit instructions, it extended to
Asia, particularly to the People’s Republic of Mongolia and to Xinjiang or Chinese
Turkestan.”); see also George Ginsburgs, Mongolia’s “Socialist” Constitution, 34
PAC. AFF. 141, 141 (1961) (describing the Soviet Union’s influence on Mongolian
constitution-making).
223 1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.).
224 Art. 10 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.).
225 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], 1949, art. 16 (Ger.)
226 See, e.g., Auffarth, supra note 17, at 194 (Germany’s right to asylum “was R
motivated by the experiences of the mothers and fathers of constitutional law
because many of them had enjoyed protection from Nazi tyranny themselves”).
The late 1940s was a period of mass remigration of displaced war prisoners and
survivors, mass resettlements of Germans expellees from countries formerly occu-
pied by Hitler, immigration of Jews beyond their native lands, and movement by
other international wanderers.  Overall, nearly 60 million Europeans became ref-
ugees either during or directly after the World War II period.  Chauncy D. Harris &
Gabriele Wu¨lker, The Refugee Problem of Germany, 29 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 10, 10
(1953).
227 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKE¨S SE¨ SHQIPE¨RISE¨ [CONSTITUTION] 1946, art. 40 (Alb.).
228 USTAV SOCIJALISTICKE FEDERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE [CONSTITUTION]
1946, art. 31 (Yugoslavia).
229 , 1947 [CONSTITUTION]
1947, art. 84 (Bulg.).
230 CONSTITUT¸IA REPUBLICII POPULARE ROMAˆNE [CONSTITUTION] 1948, art. 35 (Rom.).
231  [CONSTITUTION] 1948, art. 26 (N. Kor.).
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mitment to Communism of both North Korea and its three
regional neighbors: the Soviet Union, China, and Mongolia.
In the 1950s and 60s the right continued to proliferate in
the three regions already delineated.  In Latin and South
America, Cuba recognized the right to asylum in its constitu-
tion in 1959,232 so did Venezuela two years later,233 followed by
Ecuador234 and Paraguay235 in 1967.  In Europe, the right
spread to Poland.236  In East Asia, the 1954 constitution of
China featured the right.237  The first African country to adopt
the right to asylum, Somalia, enshrined it in its 1960 constitu-
tion.238  Rwanda239 and Algeria240 followed soon thereafter.
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the adoption of asylum provi-
sion in the Middle East, with Iraq241 and Egypt242 adopting the
right within a year apart, followed shortly by Syria243 in 1973
and Iran244 in 1979.245
The 1990s witnessed a particularly large increase in the
proportion of constitutions containing the right to asylum.
This development was driven mainly by adoption of the right to
asylum among African countries, including some of the world’s
232 CONSTITUCIO´N DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA [CONSTITUTION] 1959, ch. 1, art. 31
(Cuba).
233 CONSTITUCIO´N [CONSTITUTION] 1961, tit. III, ch. 6, art. 116 (Venez.).
234 CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA [CONSTITUTION] 1967, tit. IV, ch. 7, art. 80 (Ecuador).
235 CONSTITUCIO´N [CONSTITUTION] 1967, ch. 5, art. 122 (Para.).
236 KONSTYTUCJA POLSKIEJ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ LUDOWEJ [CONSTITUTION] 1952, art.
75 (Pol.).
237 XIANFA art. 99 (1954) (China).
238 CONSTITUTION 1960, art. 19, no. 2 (Som.).
239 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE RWANDAISE [CONSTITUTION] 1962, art. 15
(Rwanda).
240 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE ALGE´RIENNE DE´MOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE [CON-
STITUTION] 1963, tit. II, art. 21 (Alg.)
241 Article 34, al-Dustuˆr al-’Iraˆqıˆ al-Mu’aqqat [The Interim Iraqi Constitution]
of 1970.
242 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971 art. 53, as
amended, 22 May 1980, 25 May 25 2005, 26 Mar. 2007.
243  [CONSTITUTION] 1973, art. 34 (Syria).
244 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC RE-
PUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1979] art. 155.
245 Other instances of adoption of this right include, in Africa: People’s Repub-
lic of the Congo, CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DU CONGO [CONSTITUTION]
1969, art. 15 (People’s Republic of the Congo); Mozambique, CONSTITUIC¸A˜O DA
REPU´BLICA POPULAR DE MOC¸AMBIQUE [CONSTITUTION] 1975, art. 25 (Mozam.); and
Chad, CONSTITUTION DE LAW RE´PUBLIQUE DU TCHAD [CONSTITUTION] 1989, art. 57
(Chad).  In Europe: Bulgaria,  [CONSTITU-
TION] 1971, art. 65 (Bulg.); and Portugal, CONSTITUIC¸A˜O DA REPU´BLICA PORTUGUESA
[CONSTITUTION] 1976, art. 22 (Port.).  In East Asia: Vietnam,  [CONSTITU-
TION] 1980, art. 81 (Viet.).  In South America: Brazil, CONSTITUIC¸A˜O FEDERAL [C.F.]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 4(x) (Braz.).
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poorest countries246 such as Burundi,247 Burkina Faso,248
Coˆte d’Ivoire,249 Mali,250 and Democratic Republic of Congo,251
as well as some of the smallest countries,252 such as Sa˜o Tome´
and Prı´ncipe253 and Cape Verde.254  According to our data,
Libya became the latest African country to adopt the right to
asylum in 2011.255  Europe also experienced a significant in-
crease in the number of countries adopting the right to asylum
in their constitutions in the 1990s.  Those primarily included
countries with some of the lowest gross domestic product per
capita in Europe,256 such as Macedonia,257 Belarus,258
Moldova,259 Georgia,260 Serbia and Montenegro261 (and later,
the Republic of Serbia262), and the Ukraine.263  Notably, it was
exclusively Eastern and Central European countries that
adopted the right between 1990 and 2012.264  In South
America, only one new country, Peru, adopted the right.265 In
246 GDP Per Capita, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.PCAP.CD [https://perma.cc/TY8Z-Z982] (showing data in current U.S.
dollars).
247 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI [CONSTITUTION] 1992, art. 24
(Burundi).
248 CONSTITUTION DU BURKINA FASO [CONSTITUTION] 1991, art. 9 (Burk. Faso).
249 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE DE COˆTE D’IVOIRE [CONSTITUTION] 2000, art. 12
(Coˆte d’Ivoire).
250 LA CONSTITUTION [CONSTITION] 1992, art. 12 (Mali).
251 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE DE´MOCRATIQUE DU CONGO [CONSTITUTION]
2006, art. 35  (Dem. Rep. Congo).
252 See The World Factbook: Country Comparison, Area, CIA, https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html
[https://perma.cc/8ZSE-WG4C].
253 CONSTITUIC¸A˜O DA REPU´BLICA DEMOCRA´TICA DE SA˜O TOME´ E PRI´NCIPE [CONSTITU-
TION] 1990, art. 40 (Sa˜o Tome´ & Prı´ncipe).
254 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE DU CAP VERT [CONSTITUTION] 1992, art. 36
(Cape Verde).
255  [PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION], 2011, art. 10
(Libya).
256 WORLD BANK, supra note 246. R
257  [CONSTITUTION] 1991, art. 29 (Maced.).
258  [CONSTITUTION] 1996,  art. 12
(Belr.).
259 CONSTITUTIA REPUBLICII MOLDOVA [CONSTITUTION] 1994, art. 19 (Mold.).
260  [CONSTITUTION] 1995, art. 47 (Geor.).
261  [CONSTITUTION] 2003, art. 38 (Serb. &
Montenegro).
262  [CONSTITUTION] 2006, art. 57 (Serb.).
263 [CONSTITUTION] 1996, art. 26 (Ukr.).
264 Others include, Slovenia, USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE [CONSTITUTION] 1991,
art. 48 (Slovn.); Slovak Republic, U´STAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION]
1992, ch. II, art. 53 (Slovk.); Czech Republic, U´stavnı´ za´kon e`. 43/1993 Sb.,
U´stava C˘eske´ Republiky [Constitution of the Czech Republic]; and Croatia, USTAV
REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE [CONSTITUTION] 1990, art. 33 (Croat.).
265 CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DEL PERU´ [CONSTITUTION] 1993, tit. I, ch. 3, art. 36
(Peru).
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the Middle East, Saudi Arabia adopted the right in 1992.266  In
Asia, the countries, again, included some of the poorest in the
region,267 such as Tajikistan,268 Kyrgyz Republic,269 Azerbai-
jan,270 Indonesia,271 Laos,272 and Timor-Leste.273
B. The Dual Nature of the Right
The dual nature of asylum, as a broad human right and as
an ideologically circumscribed foreign policy tool, developed
early on.  In many of the constitutions we examined, the right
to asylum was unmistakably phrased in ideological terms.  As
explained earlier, frequently the texts of the constitutions re-
vealed certain features, such as references to political activities
or limitations on the granting of the right, which appeared to
remove asylum from the realm of a protective humanitarian
function, turning it instead into a political device, often carry-
ing a clear and overt ideological message.
The most prominent examples of such constitutional provi-
sions could be found in self-declared socialist states.274  Such
states greatly limited the applicability of the right to asylum to
include only certain categories of people or political causes.275
The earliest example, Hungary’s 1919 constitution, limited
266  [CONSTITUTION] 1992, art. 42 (Saudi Arabia).
267 WORLD BANK, supra note 246. R
268 [CONSTITUTION] 1994, art. 16
(Taj.).
269  [CONSTITUTION] 1993, art. 19
(Kyrg.).
270 Azerbaycan Respublikasi Konstitusiyasi [CONSTITUTION] 1995, art. 70
(Azer.).
271 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTION] 2002, art.
28G (Indon.).
272 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE DE´MOCRATIQUE POPULAIRE LAO [CONSTITUTION]
1991, art. 38 (Laos).
273 CONSTITUIC¸A˜O DA REPU´BLICA DEMOCRA´TICA DE TIMOR-LESTE [CONSTITUTION]
2002, art. 10 (Timor-Leste).
274 See generally ISTVA´N KOVA´CS, NEW ELEMENTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIALIST
CONSTITUTION (1968) (offering a comparative theoretical study of socialist constitu-
tionalism, focusing on the features of socialist constitutional texts).
275 Kirchheimer, supra note 34, at 990 (“Constitutions within the Communist R
orbit are more specific in naming—as a propaganda device—the intended benefi-
ciaries [of the right to asylum].”); see also Smith, supra note 215, at 385 (“[W]ritten R
into the [Soviet] constitution and its formal system of rights was the probability of
violence, a probability that derived from its functions of dividing and cataloging
the population, of using the legitimacy of mass politics to assign different values
to different social groups . . . and entirely to exclude specific classes of people from
normal society by depriving them of rights.  Lenin argued that ‘violence in the
name of the interests and rights of the majority of the population . . . tramples on
the rights of the exploiters.’” (third alteration in original)).
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asylum to “foreign revolutionist[s].”276  Similarly, China’s 1975
and 1978 constitutions granted the right to foreigners “taking
part in revolutionary movements.”277  The constitution of the
Soviet Union from 1977 also reserved the right to those “partic-
ipating in revolutionary or national liberation movements,”278
among others.
The motif of struggles and the fight for liberty (or liberation)
is also ever-present throughout the texts of the provisions of
the right to asylum in socialist constitutions.279  Algeria’s 1963
constitution declared simply that “[the] Republic guarantees
the right of asylum to all who fight for liberty.”280  Albania
limited its asylum to those “persecuted on account of their
activity in favor of democracy, of the struggle for national liber-
ation, of the rights of working people or in favor of the freedom
in scientific and cultural work.”281  So did Bulgaria,282
276 MAGYARORSZA´G ALAPTO¨RVE´NYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY],
ALAPTO¨RVE´NY art. 13 (1919).
277 XIANFA art. 29 (1975) (China); XIANFA art. 59 (1978) (China).
278 KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 38.
279 Kirchheimer, supra note 34, at 990 (“Constitutions belonging to the same R
spiritual [socialist] family modify their promises [concerning the right to asylum]
in detail only.”).
280 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE ALGE´RIENNE DE´MOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE [CON-
STITUTION] 1963, tit. II, art. 21 (Alg.).  That same constitution declares in its pream-
ble that “the democratic and popular Algerian Republic will direct its activities
toward the construction of the country in accordance with the principles of social-
ism . . . .” Id. pmbl.
281 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKE¨S SE¨ SHQIPE¨RISE¨ [CONSTITUTION] 1946, art. 40 (Alb.).
282  [CONSTITUTION] 1947, art. 84 (Bulg.)
(“In the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, foreigners enjoy the right of sanctuary when
they are prosecuted for defending democratic principles, for struggling for their
national liberation, for the rights of the workers, or for the freedom of scientific
and cultural activity.”).
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Cuba,283 Romania,284 Poland,285 Republic of Congo,286 and
North Korea.287  Mozambique’s 1975 constitution granted the
right to asylum to those fighting for “social liberation”;288 Yugo-
slavia to those supporting “social emancipation;”289 Vietnam to
foreigners struggling for “national independence, socialism, de-
mocracy and peace, and scientific work.”290
Notably absent from many of the aforementioned constitu-
tional provisions are references to persons who might seek asy-
lum based on deprivation of basic human rights or persecution
on account of race, sex, religion, ethnicity or nationality, or
membership in a particular social group.  Instead, as was com-
monly a dominant theme in socialist states, the interests of the
workers were of the utmost priority.  As such, Mongolia granted
asylum to those “foreign citizens persecuted for defending the
interests of the workers.”291  Cuba elaborated even further, de-
283 CONSTITUCIO´N DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA [CONSTITUTION] 1976, ch. 1, art. 13
(Cuba) (“The Republic of Cuba grants asylum to [those persons] persecuted by
virtue of the struggle for the democratic rights of the majorities; for national
liberation; against imperialism, fascism, colonialism and neocolonialism; for the
suppression of racial discrimination; for the rights and demands of workers,
peasants and students; for their progressive political, scientific, artistic and liter-
ary activities; for socialism and peace.”).
284 CONSTITUT¸IA REPUBLICII POPULARE ROMAˆNE [CONSTITUTION] 1948, art. 35 (Rom.)
(“The People’s Republic of Rumania grants the right of refuge to all foreigners
persecuted for their democratic activities, for their struggle for national liberation,
for their scientific or cultural activities.”); CONSTITUT¸IA REPUBLICII POPULARE ROMAˆNE
[CONSTITUTION] 1952, art. 89 (Rom.) (“The Rumanian People’s Republic affords the
right of asylum to foreign citizens prosecuted for defending the interests of the
working people, or for scientific activity, or for participating in the struggle for
national liberation or the defence of peace.”).
285 KONSTYTUCJA POLSKIEJ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ LUDOWEJ [CONSTITUTION] 1976, art.
88 (Pol.) (“The Polish People’s Republic shall grant asylum to nationals of other
countries persecuted in connection with defending the interests of the working
people, the struggle for social progress, activities in defence of peace, the struggle
for national liberation, or as a result of scientific activities.”).
286 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DU CONGO [CONSTITUTION] 1979, art.
14 (People’s Republic of Congo), translated by Haidee Celaya in CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1980)
(“The People’s Republic of the Congo provides asylum in its territory to foreign
nationals pursued as a result of their actions in favor of democracy, of their
struggle for national liberation, for liberty in cultural and scientific work and for
the defense of the rights of the working people.”).
287 CONSTITUTION] 1948, art. 26 (N. Kor.) (“The D.P.R.K. affords the
right of asylum to foreign nationals persecuted for fighting for democratic princi-
ples or national liberation movements, or for the interests of the working people or
for freedom of scientific and cultural activities.”).
288 CONSTITUIC¸A˜O DA REPU´BLICA POPULAR DE MOC¸AMBIQUE [CONSTITUTION] 1975,
art. 25 (Mozam.).
289 USTAV SOCIJALISTICKE FEDERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE [CONSTITUTION]
1963, art. 65 (Yugoslavia).
290  [CONSTITUTION] 1992, art. 49 (Viet.) (amended 2013).
291  [CONSTITUTION] 1940, art. 88 (Mong.).
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claring that it “grants asylum to [those persons] persecuted by
virtue of the struggle . . . against imperialism, fascism, colonial-
ism and neocolonialism; for the suppression of racial discrimi-
nation; [and] for the rights and demands of workers, peasants
and students.”292
Narrowly crafted asylum provisions were not unique to so-
cialist countries.  Constitutions of Islamic countries offer fur-
ther insight into asylum as a right circumscribed and
overshadowed by a nation’s political and domestic considera-
tions.  For instance, Saudi Arabia grants political asylum “pro-
vided it is in the public interest.”293  Iran’s constitution
declares that asylum is available to all foreigners “except[ ]
those who are known . . . [by] Iran[ ] to be traitors and
criminals.”294
Most countries in our dataset, however, feature a form of
the right of asylum in their constitutions that purports to re-
flect the state’s genuine humanitarian concern.  Many states
simply recognize the right and do not predicate its granting
upon any specific conditions, characteristics of the asylum-
seeker, or the furthering of any ideology.  Peru, for instance,
declares simply that “[t]he State recognizes political asy-
lum.”295  So do Venezuela296 and Albania.297  Rwanda’s 1978
constitution also states tersely that “[t]he right of asylum shall
be recognized under the conditions prescribed by law.”298  Asy-
292 CONSTITUCIO´N DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA [CONSTITUTION] 1976, ch. 1, art. 13
(Cuba) (first alteration in original).
293 [CONSTITUTION] 1992, art. 42 (Saudi Arabia).
294 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC RE-
PUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1979] art. 155.
295 CONSTITUCIO´N POLI´TICA DEL PERU´ [CONSTITUTION] 1993, tit. I, ch. 3, art. 36
(Peru) (“The State recognizes political asylum. It accepts the status of asylee
[asilado] granted by a host government.  In case the asylee is expelled, he is not to
be returned to the country whose government persecutes him.”).
296 CONSTITUCIO´N [CONSTITUTION] 1999, tit. III, ch. 4, sect. 1, art. 69 (Venez.)
(“The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela recognizes and guarantees the right of
asylum and refuge.  Extradition of Venezuelans is prohibited.”).
297 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKE¨S SE¨ SHQIPE¨RISE¨ [CONSTITUTION] 1998, art. 40 (Alb.).
(“Foreigners have the right of refuge in the Republic of Albania according to law.”).
298 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE RWANDAISE [CONSTITUTION] 1978, art. 15
(Rwanda) (“The right of asylum shall be recognized under the conditions pre-
scribed by law.  Extradition shall be authorized only within the limits provided by
law.”).
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lum provisions in the constitutions of Burundi,299 Chad,300
Georgia,301 Macedonia,302 Paraguay,303 post-Communist Po-
land,304 Romania,305 and Russia,306 among others, are
analogous.
299 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI [CONSTITUTION] 2005, art. 50
(Burundi) (“The right of asylum is recognized in the conditions specified by the
law.  Extradition is only authorized within the limits specified by the law.  No
Burundian may be extradited abroad except if they are prosecuted by an interna-
tional penal jurisdiction for crime of genocide, crime of war or other crimes against
humanity.”).
300 CONSTITUTION DE LAW RE´PUBLIQUE DU TCHAD [CONSTITUTION] 1996, art. 46
(Chad) (“The right to asylum is granted [accorde´] to foreign nationals [ressortis-
sants] within the conditions determined by the law.  The extradition of political
refugees is prohibited.”).
301  [CONSTITUTION] 1995, art. 47 (Geor.) (“1. Aliens
and stateless persons living in Georgia shall have the rights and obligations equal
to those of the citizens of Georgia except as provided for by the Constitution and
law.  2. Georgia shall grant asylum to aliens and stateless persons according to
universally recognised rules of international law, as determined by law.  3. No
asylum seeker shall be transferred to another state if he/she is persecuted for
his/her political creed or an action not considered a crime under the legislation of
Georgia.”).
302  [CONSTITUTION] 1991, art. 29 (Maced.)
(“Foreign subjects enjoy freedoms and rights guaranteed by the Constitution in
the Republic of Macedonia, under conditions regulated by law and international
agreements.  The Republic guarantees the right of asylum to foreign subjects and
stateless persons expelled because of democratic political convictions and activi-
ties.  Extradition of a foreign subject can be carried out only on the basis of a
ratified international agreement and on the principle of reciprocity.  A foreign
subject cannot be extradited for political criminal offences.  Acts of terrorism are
not regarded as political criminal offences.”).
303 CONSTITUCIO´N [CONSTITUTION] 1967, ch. 5, art. 122 (Para.)  (“The right of
asylum is recognized, under the conditions and with the requirements established
by the laws and the standards of international law, in favor of any person who for
political reason or offense may be the object of persecution or find himself in
danger of being persecuted.”).
304 KONSTYTUCJA POLSKIEJ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ LUDOWEJ [CONSTITUTION] 1997, art.
56 (Pol.) (“1. Foreigners shall have a right of asylum in the Republic of Poland in
accordance with principles specified by statute.  2. Foreigners who, in the Repub-
lic of Poland, seek protection from persecution, may be granted the status of a
refugee in accordance with international agreements to which the Republic of
Poland is a party.”).
305 CONSTITUT¸IA REPUBLICII POPULARE ROMAˆNE [CONSTITUTION] 1991, art. 18 (Rom.)
(“1. Aliens and stateless persons residing in Romania shall enjoy the general
protection of persons and property guaranteed by the Constitution and other
laws.  2. The right to asylum is granted and withdrawn under conditions of the
law, observing the international conventions and treaties to which Romania is a
party.”).
306 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 63 (1993)
(Russ.) (“The Russian Federation shall grant political asylum to foreign nationals
and stateless persons according to the universally recognized norms of interna-
tional law.  2. In the Russian Federation it shall not be allowed to extradite to
other States those people who are persecuted for political convictions, as well as
for actions (or inaction) not recognized as a crime in the Russian Federation.  The
extradition of people accused of a crime, and also the handover of convicts for
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Other countries’ constitutions perceive the right of asylum
through the prism of protections of human rights and show
greater attention to the individual and her safety.  Indonesia’s
2000 amendment to the constitution put the right to obtain
asylum in the context of a person’s “right to protection of his/
herself, family, honour, dignity, and property, and . . . the right
to feel secure against and receive protection from the threat of
fear to do or not do something that is a human right.”307  The
Kyrgyz Republic grants “asylum under the procedure estab-
lished by law to foreign citizens and stateless persons perse-
cuted for political reasons.”308  In Egypt’s 1971 constitution,
the right to asylum belongs to “any foreigner who has been
persecuted for having defended the interests of the people or
the rights of man, peace or justice.”309  The asylum provision in
the constitutions of Timor-Leste,310 Bulgaria,311 Slovak Repub-
lic,312 Slovenia,313 and Tajikistan314 reflect the same
sentiment.
In other instances, the breadth of the right points to its use
as a humanitarian device.  Mongolia’s most recent 1992 consti-
tution grants the right to “persons persecuted for their convic-
tions, political or other activities in pursuit of justice.”315
Namibia grants “asylum to persons who reasonably fear perse-
cution on the ground of their political beliefs, race, religion or
membership of a particular social group.”316  Similarly, Ser-
bia’s constitutional provision is most concerned with “prosecu-
tion based on his race, gender, language, religion, national
origin or association with some other group, political opin-
ions.”317  The Democratic Republic of Congo specifies even fur-
ther that the right to asylum is aimed to provide sanctuary to
serving sentences in other States shall be carried out on the basis of the federal
law or the international agreement of the Russian Federation.”).
307 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTION] 2002, art.
28G (Indon.).
308  [CONSTITUTION] 2007, art. 19
(Kyrg.).
309 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971 art. 53, as
amended, 22 May 1980, 25 May 2005, 26 Mar. 2007.
310 CONSTITUIC¸A˜O DA REPU´BLICA DEMOCRA´TICA DE TIMOR-LESTE [CONSTITUTION]
2002, art. 10 (Timor-Leste).
311  [CONSTITUTION] 1991, art. 27 (Bulg.).
312 U´STAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION] 1992, ch. II, art. 53 (Slovk.).
313 USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE [CONSTITUTION] 1991, art. 48 (Slovn.).
314 [CONSTITUTION] 1994, art. 16 (Taj.).
315  [CONSTITUTION] 1992, art. 18, cl. 4 (Mong.).
316 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA [CONSTITUTION] 1990, art. 97
(Namib.).
317  [CONSTITUTION] 2006, art. 57 (Serb.).
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“foreign nationals, prosecuted or persecuted, notably, for their
opinion, their belief, their racial, tribal, ethnic, linguistic affilia-
tion or their action in favor of democracy and for the defense of
the Rights of Man and of Peoples.”318
Overall, the world’s constitutions have undoubtedly wit-
nessed a trend toward the “humanitarization” of the right of
asylum over time.319  Some countries, especially a number of
the later adopters, frame asylum as a right from the outset.  In
other cases, we notice the reenactment of existing asylum pro-
visions rephrased to reflect a human rights dimension.  We
observed specific efforts to change the text of the constitutional
provisions, often eliminating any references to revolutionaries,
struggles for liberation, or other politically charged phraseol-
ogy.  For instance, Congo’s constitutional asylum provision
from 1979 addressed foreigners “struggl[ing] for national liber-
ation, for liberty in cultural and scientific work and for the
defense of the rights of the working people.”320  By 1992,
Congo’s constitutional provision expanded.  While it still con-
tained references to “national liberation,” it now also specifi-
cally referenced “the fight against racism and apartheid, the
freedom of scientific and cultural work and for the defense of
Human Rights.”321  Only a decade later, Congo’s constitutional
provision recognizing the right of asylum stated simply: “The
right of asylum is accorded to foreigners under conditions de-
termined by law.”322
Needless to say, even if the text of the right to asylum on its
face appears to emphasize a humanitarian dimension, there
still could be different underlying motivations for adoption or
recharacterization of the right.  Moreover, when asylum is
phrased as a right, it still allows states to condemn the rights
records of others.  In addition, there can be obvious economic
benefits for countries interested in admitting asylum-seekers,
such as attracting much-needed workers in the face of an aging
population, supplementing a declining population, or gaining
labor skills in short national supply.323
318 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE DE´MOCRATIQUE DU CONGO [CONSTITUTION]
2006, art. 33 (Dem. Rep. Congo).
319 See supra fig.1.
320 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DU CONGO [CONSTITUTION] 1979, art.
14 (People’s Republic of the Congo).
321 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE DU CONGO  [CONSTITUTION] 1992, art. 51
(Congo).
322 CONSTITUTION DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE DU CONGO [CONSTITUTION] 2002, art. 15
(Congo).
323 See supra subpart III.B.
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V
WHAT PREDICTS THE ADOPTION OF THE RIGHT TO ASYLUM?
In the preceding Parts, we developed a number of conjec-
tures that lend themselves to empirical testing.  We suggested
that, in various ways, asylum provisions may further state in-
terest.  Specifically, for countries with net refugee outflows, it is
tempting to pay lip service to the right and improve their inter-
national reputation without incurring any of the costs associ-
ated with integrating refugees into their society.324  In addition,
we suggested countries with high age-dependency ratios stand
most to benefit from the right, as they need to expand the size
of their workforce.
At the same time, the descriptive exploration in Part IV
revealed that there are deep historic roots to the right, whereby
some legal systems have long included the provision.  We found
an especially strong link between the adoption of asylum and
socialism, with socialist countries serving as early adopters
and the right diffusing among socialist states.  Even today, the
right is still common in former socialist systems, although it
has been recast in a humanitarian language.  By contrast, our
descriptive analysis revealed that the right is notably absent
from common law systems.  These impressions are consistent
with a body of literature that suggests that legal origins tend to
have a lasting effect on a country’s legal system—both because
of path dependency and subsequent constitutional borrowing
among countries that share the same tradition.325  It is possi-
ble, therefore, that a country’s legal tradition is the only mean-
ingful determinant of constitutional asylum rights adoption.
The use of regression analysis allows us to explore the
empirical validity of these conjectures and to test them against
each other.  Specifically, regression analysis allows us to ex-
amine what variables predict the adoption of a right to asylum,
while holding constant other factors.  Of course, we ought to be
cautious in making causal claims with cross-country data.
While an important advantage of regression analysis is that we
can hold other variables constant, we cannot control for all
relevant factors.  Specifically, there are differences among
324 See id.
325 See, e.g., Goderis & Versteeg, supra note 197, at 14–15 (finding empirically R
that countries borrow constitutional provisions from countries within the same
legal tradition); Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families
and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813, 1844–51 (2010)
(suggesting that there are important networks within each legal tradition through
which legal ideas and innovations spread).
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countries that cannot be captured by numerical data and
therefore are not fully accounted for.  When such factors are
correlated with variables that are included in the model, we
may wrongfully attribute the impact of the omitted factors to
the variables included in the model.  Nonetheless, exploring
which factors are correlated with the adoption of asylum provi-
sions sheds light on the plausibility of certain relationships
and can usefully supplement our theories and impressions de-
veloped in the preceding Parts.326
To explore the predictors of the right to asylum, we esti-
mate a logit model that exploits variation in adoption patterns
both across countries and across time to explain why countries
adopt the right to asylum in some form.327  In this model, the
dependent variable takes the value of zero prior to the year of
adoption, the value one in the year of adoption, and becomes
missing after adoption.  The aim of this model, which is known
as an “onset model,” is to explain why countries adopt the right
to asylum rather than to explain why they retain the right post-
adoption.328
This model includes a number of variables that allow us to
explore the plausibility of our main conjectures, along with a
number of control variables.  To explore the possibility that
some states benefit more from asylum because of their demo-
graphic composition, we include: (1) a variable that captures
countries’ age-dependency ratio.  This variable, taken from the
World Development Indicators, captures the ratio of people
younger than fifteen or older than sixty-four to the working-age
326 See Anne Meuwese & Mila Versteeg, Quantitative Methods in Comparative
Constitutional Law, in PRACTICE AND THEORY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 230, 230 (Maurice
Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2012) (elaborating these caveats in the realm of
constitutional right adoption).
327 A linear probability model is an ordinary least squares model for a binary
dependent variable. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A
MODERN APPROACH 243–49 (Thomson South-Western ed., 2d ed. 2003) (describing
the basic assumptions underlying the linear probability model).  The fact that we
are analyzing panel data that has repeated country observations over time called
for a number of methodological refinements.  In particular, the model is estimated
with robust standard errors that are both corrected for problems of heteroscedas-
ticity that are common to panel data and clustered at the country level to allow for
serial correlation over time. See also Tom Ginsburg et al., When to Overthrow
Your Government: The Right to Resist in the World’s Constitutions, 60 UCLA L. REV.
1184, 1229 (2013) (adopting a similar approach); Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg,
Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 587,
597–600 (2014) (adopting a similar approach).
328 The onset model is also used by Goderis & Versteeg, supra note 197, at 15 R
and Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra note 327, 598 n.10, who also use it to analyze R
constitutional characteristics.  In our baseline model, we observe twenty-four
onsets, meaning that we explain twenty-four instances of adoption.
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population.329  The higher the age-dependency ratio, the higher
number of elderly dependent on an active work force, and the
more foreign workers may be needed.  Thus, a higher age-de-
pendency ratio should increase the probability that a country
enshrines the right to asylum in its constitution.
To explore the possibility that countries’ refugee outflows
affect the likelihood of constitutionally protecting asylum, we
include (2) a variable that captures the natural log of the total
number of refugees from each country that reside abroad as
refugees.330  We expect that when countries have negative refu-
gee flows, or a large number of their citizens reside abroad as
refugees, they are more likely to adopt a right to asylum in their
constitution to project an image of a desirable and prosperous
nation, even when their actual record suggests otherwise.
We also account for the more permanent effect of a state’s
legal tradition.  Specifically, we include two variables that cap-
ture (3) whether a country has socialist legal origins, meaning
that its legal system was shaped by socialist influences, and (4)
whether a country has a common law legal system.  Both vari-
ables were created by Professors LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, and are commonly used in the influential
economics literature on the impact of legal origins.331  The civil
law tradition is omitted as a reference category for interpreta-
tion.332  We expect that countries with socialist legal origins are
more likely to adopt the right and that common law countries
are less likely to adopt it.
The model includes a number of control variables.  First,
we control for (5) the level of democracy.  A body of empirical
research has shown that democracies are generally more re-
spectful of human rights, which might also make them more
329 Specifically, we use the variable “SP.POP.DPND” from the 2015 edition of
the World Development Indicators.  Data are shown as the percentage of depen-
dents per 100 working-age population. WORLD BANK, supra note 4. R
330 Specifically, we use the variable “SM.POP.REFG.OR” from the 2015 edition
of the World Development Indicators.  This variable captures the total refugee
population.  To account for outliers, we use the natural log of this variable. Id.
331 See Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
222, 222 (1999).  For an overview of the literature, see Rafael La Porta et al., The
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008).
332 Professors La Porta et al. create two smaller groups of countries, those with
German legal origins and Scandinavian legal origins. See id.  Both of these are
also omitted from the model, meaning that we have to interpret any effect of
socialist legal origins or common law legal origins, as compared to the civil law
tradition in addition to the German and Scandinavian law tradition (both of which
are commonly considered to be of, or closely related to, the civil law tradition).
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likely to adopt an asylum right.333  To account for this possibil-
ity, we include a country’s level of democracy as measured
numerically in the political science literature.334  Second, we
include (6) the natural log of a country’s level of GDP per capita.
The empirical human rights literature has shown that wealthy
countries tend to be more respectful of rights, as more re-
sources allow states to better protect rights.335  As a result,
they may also be more inclined to add rights protections to
333 See, e.g., Christian Davenport & David A. Armstrong II, Democracy and the
Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976–1996, 48 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 538, 551 (2004) (“[T]here is a threshold of domestic democratic peace.  Below
certain values, the level of democracy has no discernible impact on human rights
violations, but after a threshold has been passed . . . democracy decreases state
repression.”); Christian Davenport, Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition,
43 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 92, 96–97 (1999) (“[M]oves toward democracy decrease
political repression . . . [because] changes in the level of democracy increase
political tolerance of decision makers who are held accountable, and increased
democracy decreases the willingness and influence of coercive agents to push for
repressive applications [of law] because of their altered state with the government
as well as the citizenry.”); Christian Davenport, State Repression and the Tyranni-
cal Peace, 44 J. PEACE RES. 485, 500 (2007) (“[S]ingle-party governments possess
some of the characteristics of democracies that reduce state repression . . . [but]
facilitate[ing] democracy within these autocracies . . . entails an even greater
reduction in repressive behavior.”); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., When Do
Governments Resort to Election Violence?, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 149, 174 (2013)
(explaining that where institutional democracy is absent, “incumbent leaders are
more likely to resort to repression – specifically violence – against political opposi-
tion candidates, voters or citizens when they fear losing power”); Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita et al., Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human
Rights, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 439, 456 (2005) (“[T]he path to greater respect for integ-
rity rights appears to involve all of the dimensions of democracy, albeit to varying
degrees . . . .”); Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to
Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853, 866
(1994) (“[D]emocracy . . . [is] associated with a decreased incidence in [state]
repression . . . .”); David L. Richards, Perilous Proxy: Human Rights and the
Presence of National Elections, 80 SOC. SCI. Q. 648, 649 (1999) ([D]emocracies are
more protective of physical integrity rights than any other type of government.”);
David L. Richards & Ronald D. Gelleny, Good Things to Those Who Wait?  National
Elections and Government Respect for Human Rights, 44 J. PEACE RES. 505, 519
(2007) (“[I]nstitutional democracy provides protection for physical integrity rights
and, perhaps, other types of human rights as well.”).  This insight is sometimes
referred to as the “democratic civil peace.” See, e.g., Ha˚vard Hegre et al., Toward a
Democratic Civil Peace?  Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War,1816–1992,
95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 44 (2001) (“There is a democratic civil peace . . . .”).
334 The measure of a country’s level of democracy is the “polity2” variable from
the Polity IV data set, which is widely used by political scientists.  This variable
ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to –10 (strongly autocratic). See The Polity
IV Project: About Polity, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, http://www.systemicpeace.org/
polityproject.html [https://perma.cc/Y5VS-887D].
335 See Poe & Tate, supra note 333, at 866–67 (finding that wealthier countries R
are more respectful of human rights).  The measure of gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita comes from the Penn World Table. Penn World Table, CTR. FOR
INT’L DATA, http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/pwt.html [https://perma.cc/VER3-
XQ8L].
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN502.txt unknown Seq: 60 26-JUL-17 10:10
1278 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1219
their constitution. What is more, Professors Cox and Posner
argue that wealthy countries are generally better able to absorb
shocks of immigrants and refugees than poor countries, thus
making it more likely that they offer generous asylum protec-
tions.336  Third, we control for (7) the natural log of the coun-
try’s population size because population size generally affects
human rights performance337 and because larger countries
also have a larger capacity to accept refugees.338  Fourth, we
control for (8) whether countries have ratified the Refugee Con-
vention and its Optional Protocol.  While the Convention does
not require countries to constitutionally entrench their inter-
national legal obligations and does not provide refugees with a
right to be granted asylum, some states may nonetheless opt to
constitutionally protect the right to asylum when implementing
their treaty commitments.339  On the other hand, it is also
possible that ratification makes it less likely that states will
constitutionally address asylum because the constitutional
commitments and the treaty commitments serve as substitutes
for one another.340
To control for permanent differences between different re-
gions, we include a set of regional variables that capture
whether a state is located in (9) Sub-Saharan Africa, in (10)
Western Europe or Northern America, in (11) Latin America or
the Caribbean, in (12) Northern Africa or the Middle East, in
(13) Southern Asia, and in (14) East Asia and the Pacific, re-
spectively.  Finally, (15) to control for the possibility that the
336 Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration
Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 834 (2007) (“Wealthy, populous countries are buffered
against security and economic shocks to a much greater extent than poor and
thinly populated countries are.  Given an identical shock, a large country would
gain less from removing noncitizens (as labor competitors, or threats) than a small
country would.  Thus, we predict that larger and wealthier countries provide
greater ex post protections to migrants than smaller and poorer countries do,
holding constant the proportion of migrants in the population.”).  Professors
Chilton and Posner explore this work further, empirically, by studying the rela-
tionship between the protection a country provides and the investment a non-
citizen makes specifically to live in that country.  Adam S. Chilton & Eric A.
Posner, Country-Specific Investments and the Rights of Non-Citizens, VA. J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming 2017).
337 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 33, at 922 (noting the relationship between R
rights violations and population size).
338 See Chilton & Posner, supra note 336, at 834. R
339 See Mila Versteeg, Law Versus Norms: The Impact of Human-Rights Treaties
on National Bill of Rights, 171 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 87, 98–100
(2015) (exploring the notion that treaty commitments may be reflected in the
constitution but finding only limited support for this hypothesis).
340 See id. (suggesting that treaties and constitutions can serve as substitutes
and complements, and finding evidence that, at least in some cases, they serve as
substitutes).
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right to asylum simply becomes more prevalent over time, we
include a set of time trends, known as cubic splines.341
Some variables in our model have better availability than
others.  Indeed, the variables we use vary in their availability
both across countries and across time.  Most notably, the vari-
able that captures the natural log of the refugee population
abroad only becomes available in the 1990s, while the other
variables in the model are available from the 1960s onward.
Without addressing these issues of coverage, there are only a
few instances of asylum adoption that our model can explain.
What is more, research suggests that when missing values in
the data are not random, results might be biased.342  For these
reasons, we use a data imputation procedure (known as “Ame-
lia”) that uses non-missing data from all the other variables in
the model to predict the values of the missing data points.343
This procedure is commonly used in the quantitative political
science literature.344  Importantly, however, our results are
similar when we do not use the Amelia imputation
procedure.345
Table 1 reports the results from our logit onset model.  It
reports odds ratios instead of coefficients, as these lend them-
selves to easier interpretation.  The reported odds ratios cap-
ture the change in the odds of adopting the right to asylum
given a one-unit increase on the independent variable.  An odds
ratio of one denotes that the odds stay the same; an odds ratio
341 We added a linear time trend, a squared time trend, and a cubed time
trend.  Doing so is considered to be best practice in dealing with time dependency
in models with binary dependent variables. See David B. Carter & Curtis S.
Signorino, Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data, 18 POL.
ANALYSIS 271, 282–83 (2010).
342 See James Honaker & Gary King, What to Do About Missing Values in Time-
Series Cross-Section Data, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 561, 563 (2010).
343 We use the Amelia II package in R. See James Honaker et al, Amelia II: A
Program for Missing Data, 45 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1, 1–3 (2011).  We only imputed
values for the following variables: (1) the natural log of the refugee population
abroad, (2) the age-dependency ratio, (3) the log of the country’s GDP per capita,
(4) the log of the country’s population size, and (5) the country’s democracy score.
We did not input the other variables because they have extensive coverage.  We
followed the standard procedure of imputing five datasets but because our match-
ing procedure cannot use multiple values for a single variable, we used the aver-
age values of the imputed datasets for our matching procedure.  As is common in
the literature, we included a polynomial term to allow for the possibility of trends
in these variables over time (“polytime = 2”).  This approach is similar to the one
taken by Chilton & Versteeg, see Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, The Failure of
Constitutional Torture Prohibitions, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 417, 434 (2015).
344 See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make a
Difference?, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 575, 582 (2015) (utilizing the Amelia imputation
procedure).
345 See infra note 351 and accompanying text. R
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of higher than one denotes an increase in the odds, and an
odds ratio of smaller than one denotes a decrease in the odds.
In Table 1, three stars (***) indicate confidence at the 99% level,
two stars (**) confidence at the 95% level, and one star (*)
confidence at the 90% level.
Figure 3 reports a subset of the same results graphically.
To ease interpretation, it depicts the effect of the continuous
variables only, for which the odds ratios are comparable.346  In
Figure 3, the circles represent the best estimate of the odds
ratio for each variable, holding the other variables constant.
The lines to either side of each point denote the 90% confidence
interval for the coefficient’s value.  We can say with 90% cer-
tainty that the coefficient’s true value falls within this range.
Where the intervals do not cross one, we can say with 90%
certainty that there is a statistically significant increase in the
odds of adopting the right to asylum.
The results reveal that, by far, the most important predic-
tor of asylum adoption is the socialist legal tradition.  For coun-
tries with socialist legal origins, the odds of adopting the right
to asylum are twelve times higher than for those with origins in
civil law (the reference category for interpretation), an effect
that is statistically significant at the one percent level.  Con-
versely, the odds that common law countries adopt the right
are about six times lower than for civil law countries, an effect
that is also statistically significant at the one percent level.
Yet, the results also show that legal origin is not the sole
predictor of asylum adoption.  Instead, we find that age-depen-
dency ratios and refugee outflows also have explanatory power,
even when we control for legal origins.  The impact of a high
age-dependency ratio is fairly substantial: a one-point increase
on the age-dependency ratio (which is measured as a percent-
age and ranges from sixteen to 122) leads to a five percent
increase in the odds that countries will adopt a right to asylum.
This variable is statistically significant at the one percent level.
In addition, we find that countries that have more citizens as
refugees abroad are more likely to adopt a right to asylum.
Because the variable is log transformed, the interpretation is a
bit more complicated.  A 2.718 increase in the total number of
refugees abroad produces a 14.3 percent increase in the odds
346 When depicting the odds ratios of all variables graphically, the effect of the
socialist legal tradition dwarfs the others, which are hard to make out in Figure 3.
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of adopting the right to asylum.347  This means that if the num-
ber of refugees abroad were to double, the odds of adopting the
right to asylum would increase by 9.7 percent.348  At the same
time, it is worth noting that this variable is statistically signifi-
cant only at the ten percent level.
Some of our control variables are also statistically signifi-
cant predictors of the right to asylum.  Democracy is positively
associated with the constitutional right to asylum.  Specifically,
a one-point increase in a country’s democracy score, increases
the odds of adopting the right to asylum by ten percent, an
effect that is statistically significant at the one percent level.
Larger countries also are more likely to adopt the right to asy-
lum.  Specifically, a doubling of a country’s population size
(which is also a log transformed variable) leads to a twenty-four
percent increase in the odds of adopting the right to asylum, an
effect that is statistically significant at the five percent level.349
Ratification of the Refugee Convention is negatively associated
with the right to asylum adoption, suggesting that the interna-
tional protections and the constitutional protections serve as
substitutes rather than supplements.  Specifically, the odds
that parties to the Refugee Convention or its optional protocol
adopt the right to asylum are 2.67 times lower than for non-
parties.  GDP per capita (logged), the time variables, and most
of the regional variables are not statistically significant
predictors of adopting the right to asylum.350
347 If a variable is natural log transformed, then its odds ratio is the odds ratio
associated with scaling up the original variable (the total number of asylum seek-
ers abroad) by a factor of e=EXp(1), which is about 2.7182818.
348 This is calculated using the formula kb = 20.13 = 1.097, whereby k is the
factor by which the number of asylum seekers abroad increases, and b is the beta
coefficient on this variable in a logit regression (whereby the coefficients are not
presented as odds ratios).
349 This is calculated using the formula, kb = 20.31 = 1.241, whereby k is the
factor by which the number of asylum seekers abroad increases, and b is the beta
coefficient on this variable in a logit regression.
350 The regional variables reveal that the odds that countries in East Asia and
the Pacific adopt the right to asylum are about sixteen times lower.
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TABLE 1: PREDICTORS OF THE RIGHT TO ASYLUM
(1)
logit model
age dependency ratio 1.049***
(0.019)
refugees abroad (log) 1.143*
(0.090)
refugee convention ratification 0.375**
(0.156)
democracy 1.102***
(0.033)
GDP per capita (log) 1.146
(0.249)
population size (log) 1.367**
(0.182)
socialist legal origins 12.413***
(9.319)
common law legal origins 0.163***
(0.102)
year 0.719
(0.472)
year squared 1.005
(0.009)
year cubed 1.000
(0.000)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.810
(0.747)
Western Europe/North America 0.230
(0.238)
Latin America Caribbean 0.370
(0.291)
North Africa Middle East 0.590
(0.581)
East Asia Pacific 0.075***
(0.058)
Observations 6,607
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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FIGURE 3
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These results are robust to a number of alternative specifi-
cations.  First, when we drop the Amelia data imputation pro-
cedure, a similar impression emerges, even though the number
of observations is substantially smaller.351  Second, if we esti-
mate a random effects logit model, which further allows us to
account for unobserved cross-country differences, we find that
the age-dependency ratio and socialist legal origins are still
statistically significant predictors of asylum adoption (both at
the one percent level), while the number of refugees abroad
loses statistical significance.  Third, if we fully account for all
non-time varying country specific factors in a fixed-effects lin-
ear probability model, the age-dependency variable remains a
351 Because we are working with a much smaller number of observations, we
estimate two models: (1) a model that has all of our variables but excludes the
number of refugees abroad, since that variable is available from the 1990s only;
and (2) a model that includes all of our variables.  In model (1), our variables of
interest generally are similar in terms of size and signs.  All findings are generally
slightly less statistically significant, which is not surprising considering the
smaller sample size.  Socialist legal origins is now statistically significant at the 5
percent level (instead of the 1 percent level) and the age dependency ratio now has
a p-value of 0.11, thus just falling outside conventional levels of statistical signifi-
cance.  In model (2), the number of refugees abroad has a similar size and sign
and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  In this model, however,
which only includes cases of adoption since the 1990s, socialist legal origins and
the age-dependency ratio are no longer statistically significant.  Together, these
findings suggest that recent instances of adoption are driven by refugees abroad
and not socialist legal heritage or age dependency ratios.
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statistically significant predictor of asylum adoption, while the
number of refugees abroad just falls outside conventional
levels of statistical significance.352  In this model, the legal ori-
gins variables drop out because the country fixed-effects al-
ready control for permanent country characteristics.  Overall,
these robustness checks show that our results are fairly robust
to alternative specifications and give us confidence that our
findings are not merely an artifact of how we specified our
model.
CONCLUSION
To our knowledge, this Article is the first to systematically
explore the origins and evolution of the right to asylum in the
world’s constitutions.  Our analysis reveals that the right is a
reflection of underlying political economy motivations and in-
centives.  Some countries are particularly forthright about their
self-interest and openly use the right to proclaim their prevail-
ing ideology and to reach out to people who share this ideology.
Others, by contrast, frame it as a humanitarian tool that pro-
vides sanctuary to all.  Yet, as more and more countries choose
to adopt a version of the constitutional right to asylum under-
pinned by humanitarian concerns, the right to asylum can
nevertheless become beneficial for the state in the face of
changing demographic and economic circumstances.  Indeed,
we find that the right to asylum is more likely to appear in
countries with a relatively small percentage of the population in
the labor force and countries with net refugee outflows.
While our analysis might seem cynical, we end on a posi-
tive note.  Although we do not provide an answer to the ques-
tion whether the right to asylum is effective, the apparently
self-serving motivations for including asylum rights are not
necessarily detrimental for asylum-seekers nor do they neces-
sarily undermine the right.353  Asylum’s economic and political
352 We use a linear-probability model because a fixed effects logit model suf-
fers from the so-called “incidental parameters” problem, causing the estimates for
the fixed effects to be inconsistent.  In the fixed-effects linear probability model,
the age dependency ratio is still statistically significant at the 10 percent level,
while the variable that captures the number of refugees abroad falls just outside
conventional levels of statistical significance.
353 The pursuit of national interests, after all, can be a political necessity and a
moral duty. See Hans J. Morgenthau, The Mainsprings of American Foreign Pol-
icy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 833, 854
(1950).  Indeed, aiding refugees may be both compatible and desired by domestic
interests, and governments may readily take into account the plight of foreign
stakeholders when shaping their national policies. See Eyal Benvenisti, Sover-
eigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stake-
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benefits, such as potentially alleviating the effects of an aging
population by filling the demands of a declining labor force,
may actually help ensure that countries will uphold their con-
stitutional promises more readily.
A body of empirical literature has shown that human rights
commitments are frequently under-enforced, regardless of
whether they are rooted in constitutional law or international
law.354  It is commonly suggested that human rights commit-
ments fail to improve human rights practices because they lack
an external, super-state enforcement authority capable of co-
ercing political actors to comply with the law.355  Sovereign
states can easily ignore commitments that are inconvenient,
unless doing so would set off popular protests or carry other
holders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 314 (2013) (“Although sovereigns are entitled to
prioritize their citizens’ needs, they must weigh the interests of other stakeholders
and consider internalizing them into their balancing calculus.  The obligation to
weigh the interests of foreign stakeholders does not necessarily imply an obliga-
tion to succumb to those interests, and does not even require full legal responsi-
bility for ultimately preferring domestic interests in balancing various opposing
claims . . . .  What it does imply as a minimum, however, is that sovereigns . . . give
due respect to those foreign and global interests.”).
354 Recent empirical studies on the impact of constitutional rights have found
that only some rights make a difference. See Chilton & Versteeg, supra note 344, R
at 582–85; Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, supra note 343, at 420.  The litera- R
ture on human rights treaty effectiveness has found that human rights treaties
make an impact only under certain circumstances but not others. See, e.g., Kevin
L. Cope & Cosette D. Creamer, Response, Disaggregating the Human Rights Treaty
Regime on The Influence of History on States’ Compliance with Human Rights
Obligations, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2016).  For an overview of the literature on
human rights treaties, see id.; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, International Regimes for
Human Rights, 15 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 265, 267 (2012); Beth Simmons, Treaty
Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 273, 288–91 (2010).
355 When it comes to ordinary law—such as codes, statutes, and other rules
that apply to private actors within a state—the state is the source of law, and it
has power to enforce it against its private subjects.  In constitutional law and
international law, however, the state is not only the source of law but also its
subject, meaning that the only actor empowered to enforce law against the state is
the state itself. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: Interna-
tional Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1794 (2009)
(observing that constitutional law lacks an “enforcement authority capable of
coercing powerful political actors to comply with unpopular decisions” and con-
ceptualizing both international law and constitutional law as “law for states”); see
also Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as Coordinating De-
vices, in INSTITUTIONS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGACY OF
DOUGLASS NORTH 121, 122 (Sebastian Galiani & Itai Sened eds., 2014) (“[N]o exter-
nal agent exists to enforce the constitution.”); Hardin, supra note 167, at 102 R
(contrasting constitutions with private contracts that “are generally backed by
external sanctions”); Levinson, supra note 162, at 662 (noting that constitutions R
lack “any external constitutional enforcer”); Martin Shapiro, The European Court
of Justice: Of Institutions and Democracy, 32 ISR. L. REV. 3, 5 (1998) (noting the
absence of a “superior enforcing authority” and offering “the appeal to God or the
right of revolution” as “uncertain and extreme remedies”).
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costs.356  Yet, an important insight from this literature is that
where rights commitments align with national interests, gov-
ernments are much more likely to uphold them.357
When providing protection to persecuted foreigners in the
form of an enshrined right to asylum provides states with valu-
able benefits domestically, this “coincidence of interest”358 may
aid compliance.359  With the prospect of millions seeking new
homes in the coming decades, the exploration of the protec-
tions offered by states, which presumably consider it in their
interest to grant asylum to outsiders in need, might help ascer-
tain the true contours and substance of the right of asylum.
Appealing to self-interest, rather than self-sacrifice or humani-
tarian ideals, might prove more effective in motivating states to
ensure adequate protection for the enjoyment of human
rights.360
356 See Levinson, supra note 162 (reviewing various costs and how they can R
induce compliance).
357 Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 355, at 1826. R
358 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27–28
(2005).
359 See e.g., Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 355, at 1825 (“If much of what R
passes for international law compliance is nothing more than states acting in
their immediate self-interest, or the coincidence of international law tracking
these interests because powerful states influence its content or because interna-
tional law reflects the common private interests of all (or most) nations, then there
is no puzzle of compliance to be solved.”).
360 Ian Martin, Foreword to DANIE´LE JOLY, REFUGEES: ASYLUM IN EUROPE? vii, vii
(1992) (“Governments . . . are more often motivated by self-interest than by con-
siderations of humanity, and this provides a further reason for those seeking to
combat human rights violations to insist upon the right of asylum.”).
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APPENDIX A361
Country Constitution Full Text of the Relevant Provision(s) 
Albania 1946 
Article 40. The People’s Republic of Alba-
nia grants the right to asylum in its terri-
tory to foreign citizens persecuted on ac-
count of their activity in favor of democra-
cy, of the struggle for national liberation, 
of the rights of the working people or in 
favor of the freedom in scientific and cul-
tural work. 
Albania 1976 
Article 64. The right of sanctuary in the 
People’s Socialist Republic of Albania can 
be granted to foreign citizens who are per-
secuted on account of their activity in fa-
vour of the revolution and socialism, of 
democracy and national liberation, or the 
progress of science and culture. 
Albania 1991 
Article 28, cl. 16. The following are the 
main competences of the president of the 
Republic . . . .  He grants the right for po-
litical asylum. 
Albania 1998 
Article 40. Foreigners have the right of 
refuge in the Republic of Albania according 
to law. 
Algeria 1963 
Article 21. The Algerian Republic guaran-
tees the right of asylum to all who fight for 
liberty. 
Algeria 1976 
Article 70. In no case may a political refu-
gee, legally benefiting from the right of asy-
lum, be delivered up or extradited. 
Algeria 1989 
Article 66. In no case may a political refu-
gee legally benefitting from the right of asy-
lum, be delivered up or extradited. 
Algeria 1996 
Article 69. In no case may a political refu-
gee legally benefiting from the right of asy-
lum, be delivered up or extradited.  
Angola 
1975 
(Amended 
in 1992) 
Article 26. Any foreign or expatriate citizen 
shall be guaranteed the right to ask for 
asylum in the event of persecution for po-
litical reasons, in accordance with the laws 
in force and international instruments.  
Article 27.  1. The extradition or expulsion 
of Angolan citizens from the nations terri-
tory shall not be permitted.  2. The extradi-
tion of foreign citizens for political motives 
or for charges punishable by the death 
penalty under the laws of the applicant 
county shall not be permitted.  3. In ac-
cordance with the law, Angolan courts 
shall know the charges made against citi-
361 Italicized country names denote nations no longer in existence.
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Country Constitution Full Text of the Relevant Provision(s) 
zens whose extradition is not permitted 
under the foregoing clauses of the present 
Article.  
Angola 2010 
Article 71. 1. All foreign or expatriate citi-
zens shall be guaranteed the right to asy-
lum in the event of persecution for political 
reasons, namely those involving serious 
threat or persecution as a result of their 
work for democracy, national independ-
ence, peace amongst different peoples, lib-
erty and human rights, in accordance with 
the laws in force and international instru-
ments.  2. The law shall define the status 
of political refugees.  
Article 70.  1. The deportation or extradi-
tion of Angolan citizens from national terri-
tory shall not be permitted.  2. The extradi-
tion of foreign citizens for political motives, 
for charges punishable by the death penal-
ty or in cases where it is justifiably recog-
nised that extradition may lead to the tor-
ture, inhumane or cruel treatment of the 
individual concerned or will result in irre-
versible damage to their physical integrity 
under the law of the state applying for ex-
tradition, shall not be permitted.  3. In 
accordance with the law, the Angolan 
courts shall know the charges made 
against citizens whose extradition is not 
permitted, in accordance with the provi-
sions contained in the previous points in 
this Article.  4. The expulsion from nation-
al territory of foreign citizens or stateless 
persons with authorisation to reside in the 
country or those who have requested asy-
lum shall only be determined by a judicial 
ruling, except when an authorisation has 
been revoked, under the terms of the law. 
5. The law shall regulate the requirements 
and conditions for the extradition and ex-
pulsion of foreigners. 
Azerbaijan 1995 
Article 70. According to the universal in-
ternational legal norms the Azerbaijan Re-
public shall grant political asylum to for-
eign citizens and persons without citizen-
ship.  Extradition to another State Persons 
persecuted for their political convictions 
and deeds which are not considered crimes 
in the Azerbaijan Republic shall not be 
authorized. 
Belarus 
1994 
(Amended 
Article 12. The Republic of Belarus may 
grant the right of asylum to persons perse-
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Country Constitution Full Text of the Relevant Provision(s) 
in 1996) cuted in other states for political or reli-
gious beliefs or their ethnic affiliation.  
Benin 1990 
Article 7. The rights and the duties pro-
claimed and guaranteed by the African 
Charter of the Rights of Man and of Peo-
ples adopted in 1981 by the Organization 
of African Unity and ratified by Benin on 
20 January 19861 are made an integral 
part of this Constitution and of Beninese 
law.  
Brazil 1988 
Article 4. The international relations of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil are governed 
by the following principles:  . . .  granting 
of political asylum.  
Bulgaria 1947 
Article 84. In the People’s Republic of Bul-
garia, foreigners enjoy the right of sanctu-
ary when they are prosecuted for defend-
ing democratic principles, for struggling for 
their national liberation, for the rights of 
the workers, or for the freedom of scientific 
and cultural activity. 
Bulgaria 1971 
Article 65. The People’s Republic of Bul-
garia grants the right of asylum to foreign-
ers persecuted for defending the interests 
of the working people, for participating in 
the national-liberation struggle, for pro-
gressive political, scientific and artistic 
activity, for fighting racial discrimination 
or in defence of peace. 
Bulgaria 1991 
Article 27. 1. Foreigners who legally reside 
in the country may not be expelled from it 
or extradited to other countries against 
their wills, other than under the conditions 
and procedures defined by the law.  2. The 
Republic of Bulgaria grants asylum to for-
eigners persecuted for their convictions or 
activities in defense of internationally rec-
ognized rights and freedoms.  3. The con-
ditions and procedures for granting asy-
lum are established by law. 
Burkina Faso 
1991 
(Amended 
in 2015) 
Article 9. The free circulation of persons 
and of assets, the free choice of residence 
and the right of asylum, are guaranteed 
within the order of the laws and regula-
tions in force. 
Burundi 1992 
Article 24. The right of asylum shall be 
recognized under conditions defined by 
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Country Constitution Full Text of the Relevant Provision(s) 
law. Extradition shall be authorized only 
within the limits provided by law.  No Bu-
rundian may be extradited to a foreign 
land . 
Burundi 1998 
Article 26. The right of asylum is recog-
nized under conditions defined by the law. 
Extradition is authorized only within the 
limits specified by law.  No Burundian may 
be extradited to a foreign land (l’étranger). 
Burundi 2004 
Article 50. The right of asylum is recog-
nized in the conditions defined by the law. 
Extradition is authorized only within the 
limits specified by law.  No Burundian may 
be extradited abroad except if he is prose-
cuted by an international criminal jurisdic-
tion for a crime of genocide, a war crime or 
other crimes against humanity. 
Burundi 2005 
Article 50. The right of asylum is recog-
nized in the conditions specified by the 
law.  Extradition is only authorized within 
the limits specified by the law.  No Burun-
dian may be extradited abroad except if 
they are prosecuted by an international 
penal jurisdiction for crime of genocide, 
crime of war or other crimes against hu-
manity. 
Cape Verde 
1980 
(Amended 
in 1992) 
Article 23. 1. The aliens and stateless per-
sons who reside or sojourn in the national 
territory, shall enjoy the same rights, liber-
ties and guarantees and be subject to the 
same duties as the Capeverdean citizens, 
with exception of the political rights and 
the rights and duties reserved, constitu-
tionally or by law, to national citizens. 
Article 36.  1. Aliens or stateless persons 
persecuted for political reasons or serious-
ly threatened of persecution on account of 
their activity in favor of national liberation, 
democracy or the respect for human 
rights, shall be granted the right of asylum 
in the national territory.  2. The law will 
define the statute [sic] of the political refu-
gee.  
Chad 1989 
Article 57. L’extradition des réfugiés poli-
tiques est interdite.  Les conditions du 
droit d’asile aux étrangers poursuivis, en 
raison de leurs activités en faveur de la 
liberté, de la paix, des droits de l’homme 
sont définies par la loi. 
Chad 1993 
Article 26. La République du Tchad ac-
corde le droit d’asile, sur son territoire, 
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aux ressortissants étrangers dans les con-
ditions déterminées par la loi.  - Aucun 
ressortissant étranger ne peut être extradé 
s’il est poursuivi pour délit d’opinion.  
Chad 1996 
Article 46. The right to asylum is granted 
[accordé] to foreign nationals [ressortis-
sants] within the conditions determined by 
the law.  The extradition of political refu-
gees is prohibited. 
China 1954 
Article 99. The People’s Republic of China 
grants the right of asylum to any foreign 
national persecuted for supporting a just 
cause, for taking part in the peace move-
ment or for engaging in scientific activity. 
China 1975 
Article 29. The People’s Republic of China 
grants the right of residence to any foreign 
national persecuted for supporting a just 
cause, for taking part in revolutionary 
movements or for engaging in scientific 
activities. 
China 1978 
Article 59. The People’s Republic of China 
grants the right of residence to any foreign 
national persecuted for supporting a just 
cause, for taking part in revolutionary 
movements or for engaging in scientific 
work. 
China 1982 
Article 32. The People’s Republic of China 
protects the lawful rights and interests of 
foreigners within Chinese territory, and 
while on Chinese territory foreigners must 
abide by the law[s] of the People’s Republic 
of China.  The People’s Republic of China 
may grant asylum to foreigners who re-
quest it for political reasons. 
Colombia 1811 
Article 39. In pursuance of the system of 
peace and amity with all nations which do 
not try to commit hostilities against us and 
which respect our rights, we give asylum 
in our ports and interior Provinces to all 
aliens who wish to live peacefully among 
us, subjecting themselves to the laws of 
the Union and of the Province wherein 
they reside, especially if in addition to their 
good intentions they bring among us some 
useful trade by which they may make their 
living, obtaining for this purpose a letter of 
naturalization or permission from Con-
gress, before whom they shall prove the 
above circumstances, principally in times 
when unrestricted immigration would be 
dangerous. 
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Colombia 1832 
Article 209. All aliens of whatever nation-
ality shall be admitted to New Granada; 
they shall be entitled to the same protec-
tion of person and property as is extended 
to Granadines provided they respect the 
laws of the Republic. 
Colombia 1863 
Article 11. Persons fleeing to a State after 
committing illegal acts against the gov-
ernment of another State must be sent to 
the interior and kept at such distance from 
the frontier as will prevent further acts of 
hostility should such action be demanded 
of the asylum State by the government of 
the other State. 
Colombia 1886 
Article 19. The authorities of the Republic 
are established to protect all persons re-
siding in Colombia in their lives, honor, 
and property, and secure the mutual re-
spect of all natural rights, by preventing 
and punishing crimes. 
Colombia 1991 
Article 36. The right of asylum is recog-
nized within the terms provided by the law. 
Congo,  
Dem. Rep. 
2003 
Article 35. The right of sanctuary is recog-
nized.  The Republic accords, subject to 
national security, sanctuary on its territory 
to foreigners prosecuted or persecuted due 
in particular to their opinions, beliefs, 
their allegiance to a racial, tribal, ethnic, 
linguistic group or their action in favor of 
democracy and the defense of Human and 
People’s rights, in accordance with appli-
cable laws and regulations.  It is forbidden 
for any person legally enjoying a right of 
sanctuary to undertake a subversive activ-
ity against their country of origin or 
against any other country from the territo-
ry of the Democratic Republic of the Con-
go.  The law sets the rules for exercising 
this right.  
Congo,  
Dem. Rep. 
2006 
Article 33. The right to asylum is recog-
nized.  The Democratic Republic of the 
Congo grants, under reserve of national 
security, asylum on its territory to foreign 
nationals, prosecuted or persecuted, nota-
bly, for their opinion, their belief, their ra-
cial, tribal, ethnic, linguistic affiliation or 
for their action in favor of democracy and 
for the defense of the Rights of Man and of 
Peoples, in accordance with the laws and 
regulations in force.  It is forbidden that 
any person regularly in enjoyment of the 
rights of asylum undertake any subversive 
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activity against their country of origin or 
against any other country, from the terri-
tory of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.  Refugees may neither be remitted 
to the authority of the State where they are 
prosecuted nor sent back to the territory of 
the latter.  In no case may a person be 
turned over to the territory of a State in 
which they risk torture, [or] cruel, degrad-
ing or inhuman punishment or treatment. 
The law establishes the modalities of the 
exercise of this right. 
Congo,  
People’s Rep. 1969 
Article 14. All citizens of the People’s Re-
public of the Congo have the duty to con-
form to the Constitution and the other 
laws of the Republic, to pay their taxes 
and to fulfil [sic] their social obligations. 
Congo,  
People’s Rep. 
1973 
Article 14. La République Populaire du 
Congo accorde le droit d’asile sur son terri-
toire aux ressortissants étrangers pour-
suivis en raison de leur action en faveur de 
la démocratie, de la lutte de libération na-
tionale, de la liberté du travail scientifique 
et culturel et pour la défense des droits du 
peuple travailleur.  
Congo,  
People’s Rep. 
1979 
Article 14. The People’s Republic of the 
Congo provides asylum in its territory to 
foreign nationals pursued as a result of 
their actions in favor of democracy, of their 
struggle for national liberation, for liberty 
in cultural and scientific work and for the 
defense of the rights of the working people. 
Congo, Rep. 1992 
Article 51. The State shall accord the right 
of asylum, on its territory to foreign exiles 
persecuted by reason of their action in fa-
vor of democracy, the fight for national 
liberation or the fight against racism and 
apartheid, the freedom of scientific and 
cultural work and for the defense of Hu-
man Rights and the Rights of Peoples con-
forming to laws and regulations in force. 
Immigration shall be submitted to the law. 
Congo, Rep. 2002 
Article 15. The right of asylum is granted 
to foreign nationals within the conditions 
determined by the law. 
Costa Rica 1949 
Article 31. The territory of Costa Rica will 
be [an] asylum to anyone persecuted for 
political reasons.  If because of [a] legal 
imperative their expulsion is decreed, they 
can never be sent to the country where 
they are persecuted.  Extradition will be 
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regulated by the law or by international 
treaties and will never proceed in cases of 
political crimes or [crimes] connected [con-
exos] to them, according to Costa Rican 
qualification.  
Côte d’Ivoire 2000 
Article 12. No Ivorian may be forced into 
exile.  Any person persecuted for reason of 
his political, religious, [or] philosophical 
convictions, or of his ethnic identity can 
benefit from the right of asylum in the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, un-
der the condition of conforming to the laws 
of the Republic 
Croatia 1990 
Article 33. Foreign citizens and stateless 
persons may obtain asylum in Yugoslavia,2 
unless they are persecuted for 
non-political crimes and activities contrary 
to the basic principles of international law. 
No alien who legally finds himself on the 
territory of the Republic shall be banished 
or extradited to another state, unless a 
decision made in accordance with a treaty 
or law is to be enforced. 
Cuba 1940 
Article 31. The Republic of Cuba offers 
and recognizes the right of asylum to those 
politically persecuted [perseguidos politi-
cos], as long as those taking refuge in it 
respect the national sovereignty and Laws. 
Cuba 1959 
Article 31. The Republic of Cuba offers 
and recognizes the right of asylum for po-
litical refugees, provided that those who 
accept it respect the national sovereignty 
and laws.  The State will not authorize the 
extradition of persons guilty of political 
crimes nor will it attempt to obtain extradi-
tion of Cubans guilty of such crimes who 
take refuge in foreign territory.  Whenever 
the expulsion of an alien is proper in ac-
cordance with the Fundamental Law and 
the law, the expulsion shall not be effect-
ed, in the case of a political exile, to the 
territory of the State that may claim him.  
Cuba 1976 
Article 13. The Republic of Cuba grants 
asylum to [those persons] persecuted by 
virtue of the struggle for the democratic 
rights of the majorities; for national libera-
tion; against imperialism, fascism, coloni-
alism and neocolonialism; for the suppres-
sion of racial discrimination; for the rights 
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and demands of workers, peasants and 
students; for their progressive political, 
scientific, artistic and literary activities; for 
socialism and for peace. 
Czechoslovakia 1960 
Article 33. The Czechoslovak Socialist Re-
public shall grant the right of asylum to 
citizens of a foreign state persecuted for 
defending the interests of the working peo-
ple, for participating in the national libera-
tion movement, for scientific or artistic 
work, or for activity in defense of peace. 
Czech Republic 1993 
Article 43 (of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Basic Freedoms, which is part 
of the constitutional order of the Czech Re-
public).  The Czech and Slovak Federal Re-
public shall grant asylum to aliens who are 
being persecuted for the assertion of their 
political rights and freedoms.  Asylum may 
be denied to a person who has acted con-
trary to fundamental human rights and 
freedoms. 
Ecuador 1967 
Article 80. The State, in accordance with 
the law and with international agreements, 
guarantees Ecuadorians the right to seek 
asylum in case of prosecution for other 
than commun [sic] crimes.  Extradition of 
an Ecuadorian shall never be granted; his 
trial shall be subject to the laws of Ecua-
dor.  
Article 84.  In accordance with the law and 
with international agreements, the State 
guarantees to foreigners the right of asy-
lum in case of prosecution for other than 
common crimes. 
Ecuador 1978 
Article 17. In accordance with the law and 
with international agreements, the state 
guarantees foreigners the right of asylum. 
Ecuador 1984 
Article 17. Con arreglo a la ley y a los con-
venios internacionales, el Estado garantiza 
a los extranjeros el derecho de asilo.  
Article 43. Los ecuatorianos perseguidos 
por delitos políticos tienen derecho de 
asilo, que lo ejercerán de conformidad con 
la ley y los convenios internacionales vi-
gentes. 
Ecuador 1993 
Article 17. Con arreglo a la ley y a los con-
venios internacionales, el Estado garantiza 
a los extranjeros el derecho de asilo.  
Ecuador 1996 
Article 17. Con arreglo a la Ley y a los con-
venios internacionales, el Estado reconoce 
a los extranjeros el derecho de asilo.  
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Article 27. Los ecuatorianos perseguidos 
por delitos políticos tienen derecho de 
asilo, que lo ejercerán de conformidad con 
la Ley y los convenios internacionales. 
Ecuador 1997 
Article 17. In accordance with the Law and 
with international agreements, the State 
recognizes the right of asylum for foreign-
ers.  
Article 27.  Ecuadorans persecuted for po-
litical crimes have the right of asylum, 
which they may exercise in accordance 
with the Law and international agree-
ments. 
Ecuador 1998 
Article 29. Ecuadorans persecuted for po-
litical crimes shall have the right to solicit 
asylum and exercise that right in conform-
ity with the law and international agree-
ments.  Ecuador recognizes foreigners’ 
right to asylum. 
Ecuador 2008 
Article 41. Their rights to asylum and 
sanctuary are recognized, in accordance 
with the law and international human 
rights instruments.  Persons who have 
been granted asylum or sanctuary shall 
benefit from special protection guarantee-
ing the full exercise of their rights.  The 
State shall respect and guarantee the 
principle of non-return, in addition to hu-
manitarian and legal emergency assis-
tance.  Persons requesting asylum or sanc-
tuary shall not be penalized or prosecuted 
for having entered the country or for re-
maining in a situation of irregularity.  The 
State, in exceptional cases and when the 
circumstances justify it, shall recognize 
the refugee status of a collective group, in 
accordance with the law. 
Egypt 1971 
Article 53. The State grants the right of 
political asylum to any foreigner who has 
been persecuted for having defended the 
interests of the people or the rights of man, 
peace or justice.  The extradition of politi-
cal refugees is forbidden. 
Egypt 2011 
Article 15. It is not permitted to expel a 
citizen from the country or forbid him from 
returning, or to give up political refugees.  
Egypt 2012 
Article 57. The right to political asylum 
shall be granted by the State to every for-
eigner deprived in their country of public 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  Extradition of political refu-
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gees is prohibited. All of the above shall be 
subject to law regulations. 
Egypt 2013/2014 
Article 91. The State may grant political 
asylum to any foreigner persecuted for de-
fending the interests of peoples, human 
rights, peace or justice.  Extradition of po-
litical refugees is prohibited.  All of the 
foregoing shall be according to the Law. 
El Salvador 1945 
Article 11. The Republic is a sacred asy-
lum for all foreigners residing in its territo-
ry, except when they are guilty of common 
offenses and are claimed by some other 
nation, under the provisions of an extradi-
tion treaty.  Extradition of Salvadorans, for 
any offense whatever, shall never be stipu-
lated.  Nor shall foreigners be extradited 
for political offenses, even if a common 
crime has resulted therefrom. 
El Salvador 1950 
Article 153. El Salvador grants asylum to 
any foreigner who desires to reside in its 
territory, except in those cases provided in 
its laws or by International Law.  These 
exceptions may not include anyone who is 
being persecuted solely for political rea-
sons.  Extradition may not be stipulated 
with respect to Salvadoreans on any 
grounds whatsoever, nor with respect to 
foreigners for political offenses, even if a 
common crime has resulted therefrom.  
El Salvador 1962 
Article 153. El Salvador grants asylum to 
any foreigner who desires to reside in its 
territory, except in those cases provided in 
its laws or by international law.  These 
exceptions may not include anyone who is 
being persecuted solely for political rea-
sons.  Extradition may not be stipulated 
with respect to Salvadorians on any 
grounds whatsoever, nor with respect to 
foreigners for political offenses, even if a 
common crime has resulted therefrom.  
El Salvador 
1983 
(Amended 
in 2000) 
Article 28. El Salvador concedes asylum to 
the foreigner who desires to reside in its 
territory, except in the cases established 
by the laws and by [the] international law. 
Any [person] persecuted only for political 
reasons cannot be included in the cases of 
exception.  Extradition will be regulated in 
accordance with the international treaties 
and when involving Salvadorians, [it] will 
only proceed if the corresponding treaty 
expressly establishes it and it has been 
approved by the legislative organ of the 
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subscribing countries.
France 1946 
Preamble: Anyone persecuted because of 
his activities in the cause of freedom has 
the right of asylum within the territories of 
the Republic. 
France 
1958 
(Amended 
in 2008) 
Article 53-1. The Republic may enter into 
agreements with European States which 
are bound by undertakings identical with 
its own in matters of asylum and the pro-
tection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, for the purpose of determining 
their respective jurisdiction as regards re-
quests for asylum submitted to them. 
However, even if the request does not fall 
within their jurisdiction under the terms of 
such agreements, the authorities of the 
Republic shall remain empowered to grant 
asylum to any foreigner who is persecuted 
for his action in pursuit of freedom or who 
seeks the protection of France on other 
grounds. 
Georgia 1995 
Article 47. 1. Aliens and stateless persons 
living in Georgia shall have the rights and 
obligations equal to those of the citizens of 
Georgia except as provided for by the Con-
stitution and law.  2. Georgia shall grant 
asylum to aliens and stateless persons 
according to universally recognised rules 
of international law, as determined by law. 
3.  No asylum seeker shall be transferred 
to another state if he/she is persecuted for 
his/her political creed or an action not 
considered a crime under the legislation of 
Georgia. 
Germany 1949 
Article 16. 1. No one may be deprived of 
his German citizenship.  The loss of citi-
zenship may occur only on the basis of a 
law and, against the will of the person 
concerned, only if the person concerned is 
not rendered stateless thereby.  2. No 
German may be extradited to a foreign 
country.  The politically persecuted shall 
enjoy the right of asylum. 
Germany 
1949 
(Amended 
in 1973) 
Article 16. 1. No one may be deprived of 
his German citizenship.  The loss of citi-
zenship may occur only on the basis of a 
law and, against the will of the person 
concerned, only if the person concerned is 
not rendered stateless thereby.  2. No 
German may be extradited to a foreign 
country.  The politically persecuted shall 
enjoy the right of asylum. 
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Germany 
1949 
(Amended 
in 1990) 
Article 16. 1. No one may be deprived of 
his German citizenship.  Loss of citizen-
ship may arise only pursuant to a law, and 
against the will of the person affected it 
may arise only if such person does not 
thereby become stateless.  2. No German 
may be extradited to a foreign country. 
Persons persecuted for political reasons 
enjoy the right of asylum. 
Germany 
1949 
(Amended 
in 1993) 
Article 16a. 1. Anybody persecuted on po-
litical grounds has the right of asylum.  2. 
Paragraph 1 may not be invoked by any-
body who enters the country from a mem-
ber state of the European Communities or 
another third country where the applica-
tion of the Convention relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees and the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms is assured.  Countries 
outside the European Communities which 
fulfill [sic] the conditions of the first sen-
tence of this paragraph shall be specified 
by legislation requiring the consent of the 
Bundesrat.  In cases covered by the first 
sentence measures terminating a person's 
sojourn may be carried out irrespective of 
any remedy sought by that person.  3. Leg-
islation requiring the consent of the Bun-
desrat may be introduced to specify coun-
tries where the legal situation, the applica-
tion of the law and the general political 
circumstances justify the assumption that 
neither political persecution nor inhumane 
or degrading punishment or treatment 
takes place there.  It shall be presumed 
that a foreigner from such a country is not 
subject to persecution on political grounds 
so long as the person concerned does not 
present facts supporting the supposition 
that, contrary to that presumption, he or 
she is subject to political persecution.  4. 
The implementation of measures terminat-
ing a person's sojourn shall, in the cases 
referred to in paragraph 3 and in other 
cases that are manifestly ill-founded or 
considered to be manifestly ill-founded, be 
suspended by the court only where serious 
doubt exists as to the legality of the meas-
ure; the scope of the investigation may be 
restricted and objections submitted after 
the prescribed time-limit may be disre-
garded.  Details shall be the subject of a 
law.  5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 do not conflict 
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with international agreements of member 
states of the European Communities 
among themselves and with third coun-
tries which, with due regard for the obliga-
tions arising from the Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees and the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, whose appli-
cation must be assured in the contracting 
states, establish jurisdiction for the con-
sideration of applications for asylum in-
cluding the mutual recognition of deci-
sions on asylum.  
Article 18.  Those who abuse their freedom 
of expression, in particular freedom of the 
press (paragraph 1 of article 5), freedom of 
teaching (paragraph 3 of article 5), freedom 
of assembly (article 8), freedom of associa-
tion (article 9), privacy of correspondence, 
posts and telecommunications (article 10), 
property (article 14), or the right of asylum 
(article 16a) in order to undermine the free 
democratic basic order shall forfeit these 
basic rights.  Such forfeiture and its extent 
shall be determined by the Federal Consti-
tutional Court. 
Germany 
1949 
(Amended 
in 2002) 
Article 16a. 1. Persons persecuted on po-
litical grounds enjoy the right of asylum. 
2. The right of Paragraph I cannot claim 
who enters from a European Communities 
country or from another country where the 
application of the Convention on the Legal 
Status of Refugees and the Convention to 
Protect Human Rights and Civil Liberties is 
ensured.  States outside of the European 
Communities for which the prerequisites of 
the first sentence hold true are determined 
by a statute requiring the consent of the 
Senate [Bundesrat].  In the cases of the 
first sentence, measures to end a stay can 
be effectuated independent of recourse to 
the course sought against these measures. 
3. By statute requiring the consent of the 
Senate [Bundesrat], states can be deter-
mined in which on the basis of law, law 
application, or general political conditions 
it seems to be guaranteed that neither per-
secution on political grounds nor inhuman 
or derogatory punishment and treatment 
takes place.  A foreigner from such a state 
is presumed to not being persecuted un-
less he asserts facts supporting that, con-
trary to this presumption, he is politically 
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persecuted. 4. The effectuation of 
measures to end a stay will, in the cases of 
Paragraph III and in other cases where the 
claim to stay is obviously unfounded or is 
regarded as obviously unfounded, only be 
suspended by court order if serious doubts 
arise concerning the legality of the meas-
ure; the scope of scrutiny can be limited 
and delayed assertions ignored.  Details 
are regulated by a statute.  5. Paragraphs I 
to IV are not contrary to public law con-
tracts of European Communities member 
states among each other and with other 
states which, honoring the obligations 
arising from the Convention on the Legal 
Status of Refugees and the Convention to 
Protect Human Rights and Civil Liberties 
the application of which has to be ensured 
in the contracting states, regulate respon-
sibilities to examine claims of asylum in-
cluding mutual acknowledgement of asy-
lum decisions. 
Guatemala 1945 
Article 26. Guatemala recognizes and of-
fers the right of asylum to politically perse-
cuted persons, provided that they respect 
national sovereignty and laws.  Extradition 
of persons accused of political offenses is 
prohibited.  In no case shall it be attempt-
ed to extradite Guatemalans accused of 
those offenses who have taken refuge in 
foreign territory.  No Guatemalan may be 
surrendered to a foreign Government for 
his judgment or punishment, except for 
serious common crimes included in trea-
ties in force negotiated on bases of reci-
procity.  It is similarly prohibited to re-
quest extradition or accede to it for com-
mon offenses related to politics.  When 
expulsion of an alien from the national 
territory is agreed to, it shall not be effect-
ed to a State that would persecute him, if 
political asylum is involved. 
Guatemala 1956 
Article 48. Guatemala recognizes the right 
of asylum and extends it to political refu-
gees who seek such protection provided 
they respect the sovereignty and the laws 
of the Nation.  Extradition of political refu-
gees is prohibited, and in no case shall an 
attempt be made to extradite Guatemalans 
who for political reasons take refuge in a 
foreign country.  No Guatemalan shall be 
handed over to a foreign government for 
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trial or punishment except for crimes cov-
ered by international treaties ratified by 
Guatemala.  It is also forbidden to request 
or grant extradition of persons accused of 
common law crimes connected with politi-
cal crimes.  When expulsion of a political 
refugee is ordered, he shall in no case be 
handed over to the country whose govern-
ment is pursuing him. 
Guatemala 1965 
Article 61. Guatemala recognizes the right 
of asylum and extends it to political refu-
gees who seek protection under its flag, 
provided they respect the sovereignty and 
the laws of the state.  Extradition of politi-
cal offenders is prohibited and in no case 
shall an attempt be made to extradite Gua-
temalans who for political reasons take 
refuge in a foreign country.  No Guatema-
lan shall be handed over to a foreign gov-
ernment for trial or punishment except for 
crimes covered by international treaties in 
force in Guatemala.  Extradition is also 
prohibited of persons accused of common 
crimes connected with political crimes. 
Whenever expulsion of a political refugee is 
ordered, he shall not be handed over to the 
country whose government pursues him. 
Guatemala 1982 
Article 23. 17. The right of asylum is rec-
ognized and shall also be granted to politi-
cal refugees who seek protection under the 
flag of Guatemala, provided they respect 
the sovereignty and the laws of the State. 
If the expulsion of a political refugee is 
agreed to, under no circumstances shall 
he be handed over to the country whose 
government pursues him. 
Guatemala 
1985 
(Amended 
in 1993) 
Article 27. Guatemala recognizes the right 
of asylum and grants it in accordance with 
international practices.  The extradition is 
regulated by that provided in the interna-
tional treaties.  The extradition of Guate-
malans will not be initiated for political 
crimes, and they will not be handed over to 
a foreign government, except for what is 
established in [the] treaties and conven-
tions regarding crimes against humanity 
or against the international law.  The ex-
pulsion from the national territory of a 
political refugee will not be accorded, with 
destination to the country that seeks him 
[or her]. 
Guinea 1958 Article 46. The Republic of Guinea shall 
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grant the right of asylum to foreign citizens 
persecuted for having fought to defend a 
just cause, or for their scientific or cultural 
activities. 
Guinea 1982 
Article 14. The Popular Revolutionary Re-
public of Guinea accords the right of asy-
lum to foreign citizens pursued because of 
their struggle for the defense of a just 
cause or for their scientific and cultural 
activity. 
Guinea 1990 
Article 11. Whoever is persecuted by rea-
son of his political, philosophical or reli-
gious opinions, his race, his ethnicity, his 
intellectual, scientific or cultural activities, 
in the defense of liberty has the right of 
asylum on the territory of the Republic. 
Guinea 2010 
Article 11. Whoever is persecuted by virtue 
of their political, philosophical or religious 
opinions, of their race, of their ethnicity, of 
their intellectual, scientific or cultural ac-
tivities, for the defense of freedom has the 
right to asylum on the territory of the Re-
public.  
Haiti 1946 
Article 30. The right of asylum is recog-
nized for political refugees under the con-
dition of conforming to the laws of the 
country. 
Haiti 1950 
Article 29. The right of asylum is accorded 
to political refugees, with the condition 
that they conform to the law.  
Article 30.  Extradition will be neither 
granted nor requested for political matters. 
Haiti 1964 
Article 36. The right of asylum shall be 
accorded to political refugees, provided 
they conform to the laws of the country.  
Article 37.  Extradition in political matters 
shall not be permitted. 
Haiti 1983 
Article 47. The right of asylum is accorded 
to political refugees, provided they conform 
to the laws of the country.  Extradition in 
political matters is not admissible. 
Haiti 1987 
Article 56. An alien may be expelled from 
the territory of the Republic if he becomes 
involved in the political life of the country, 
or in cases determined by law.  
Article 57.  The right to asylum for political 
refugees is recognized. 
Honduras 1957 
Article 86. Honduras recognizes the right 
of asylum in case of persecution not re-
sulting from a common offense, in accord-
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ance with international conventions to 
which it is a signatory. 
Honduras 1965 
Article 76.  The Republic of Honduras of-
fers asylum and recognizes the right of 
asylum to political fugitives, providing the 
asylees respect the sovereignty and laws of 
the nation.  The state shall not authorize 
the extradiction [sic] of criminals for politi-
cal crimes and related common offenses. 
Even when the expulsion of a foreigner 
from national territory is proper according 
to law, it shall not be carried out in the 
case of a political asylee to the territory of 
the state that may claim him. 
Honduras 1982 
Article 101. Honduras recognizes the right 
of asylum in the form and conditions es-
tablished by law.  When asylum is revoked 
or denied in accordance with the law, in no 
case shall the political refugee or asylee be 
returned to the territory of the State that 
may claim him.  The State shall not au-
thorize the extradition of persons accused 
of committing political crimes or related 
common offenses. 
Hungary 1919 
Section 13. In the Hungarian Soviet Re-
public every foreign revolutionist shall 
possess the right of asylum. 
Hungary 1949 
Article 58. 1. The Hungarian People’s Re-
public guarantees the rights of freedom to 
every worker residing on its territory.  2. 
Foreign citizens suffering persecution be-
cause of their democratic conduct and ac-
tivity displayed in the interest of the libera-
tion of peoples, enjoy the right of asylum 
in the Hungarian People's Republic. 
Hungary 
1949 
(Amended 
in 1989) 
Article 65. 1. The Republic of Hungary—in 
accordance with the provisions of law— 
grants asylum for those foreign citizens, 
who within their country, or for those 
stateless persons, who in their residence 
were persecuted for racial, religious, eth-
nic, linguistic or political reasons.  2. A 
person granted/enjoying asylum cannot be 
extradited to another state/country. 
Hungary 
1949 
(Amended 
in 1997) 
Article 65. 1. On terms laid down in the 
law, the Republic of Hungary ensures the 
right of asylum for foreign citizens perse-
cuted in their homeland and for those dis-
placed persons who are at their place of 
stay harassed on grounds of race, religion, 
nationality, language or political affiliation. 
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2. A person already granted asylum must 
not be extradited to another state.  3. The 
adoption of the law on the right of asylum 
requires the votes of two thirds of the MPs 
present. 
Hungary 
1949 
(Amended 
in 2002) 
Article 65. 1. In accordance with the con-
ditions established by law, the Republic of 
Hungary shall, if neither their country of 
origin nor another country provides pro-
tection, extend the right of asylum to for-
eign citizens who, in their native country 
or the country of their usual place of resi-
dence, are subject to persecution on the 
basis of race or nationality, their alliance 
with a specific social group, religious or 
political conviction, or whose fear of being 
subject to persecution is well founded.  2. 
A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the 
Members of Parliament present is required 
to pass the law on the right to asylum. 
Hungary 2011 
Article XIV. 1. No Hungarian citizen may 
be expelled from the territory of Hungary 
and every Hungarian citizen may return 
from abroad at any time.  Any foreign citi-
zen staying in the territory of Hungary may 
only be expelled by a lawful decision.  Col-
lective expulsion shall be prohibited.  2. No 
person may be expelled or extradited to a 
state where he or she faces the danger of a 
death sentence, torture or any other in-
human treatment or punishment.  3. Hun-
gary shall grant asylum to all 
non-Hungarian citizens as requested if 
they are being persecuted or have a 
well-founded fear of persecution in their 
native countries or in the countries of their 
usual residence due to their racial or na-
tional identities, affiliation to a particular 
social group, or to their religious or politi-
cal persuasions, unless they receive pro-
tection from their countries of origin or any 
other country. 
Indonesia 
1959 
(Amended 
in 2002) 
Article 28G. 1. Every person shall have the 
right to protection of his/herself, family, 
honour, dignity, and property, and shall 
have the right to feel secure against and 
receive protection from the threat of fear to 
do or not do something that is a human 
right.  2. Every person shall have the right 
to be free from torture or inhumane and 
degrading treatment, and shall have the 
right to obtain political asylum from an-
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other country.
Iran 1979 
Article 155. The Islamic Republic of Iran 
shall offer sanctuary to all those asking for 
political asylum, excepting those who are 
known, in accordance with the laws of 
Iran, to be traitors and criminals. 
Iraq 
1970 
(Amended 
in 1974) 
Article 34. a. The Republic of Iraq shall 
grant political asylum for all strugglers 
persecuted in their countries because of 
defence for human liberation principles, 
which the Iraqi people has abided by in 
this Constitution.  b. Political refugees 
shall not be delivered. 
Iraq 1990 
Article 34. a. The Iraqi Republic grants the 
right of political asylum for all militants, 
persecuted in their countries because of 
defending the liberal and human principles 
which are assumed by the Iraqi People in 
this Constitution.  b. The extradition of 
political refugees is prohibited.  
Iraq 2004 
Article 19. No political refugee who has 
been granted asylum pursuant to applica-
ble law may be surrendered or returned 
forcibly to the country from which he fled. 
Iraq 2005 
Article 21. First: No Iraqi shall be surren-
dered to foreign entities and authorities. 
Second: A law shall regulate the right of 
political asylum in Iraq.  No political refu-
gee shall be surrendered to a foreign entity 
or returned forcibly to the country from 
which he fled.  Third: Political asylum shall 
not be granted to a person accused of 
committing international or terrorist 
crimes or to any person who inflicted dam-
age on Iraq. 
Italy 1947 
Article 10. The Italian juridical system 
conforms to the generally recognized prin-
ciples of international law.  The juridical 
status of the foreigner is regulated by law 
in conformity with international rules and 
treaties.  The foreigner who is denied in his 
own country the effective exercise of demo-
cratic freedoms provided for by the Italian 
Constitution has a right to asylum in the 
territory of the Republic in accordance 
with the provisions of law.  Extradition of 
foreigners for political offenses shall not be 
granted. 
Korea,  
Dem. Rep. 
1948 
(Amended 
in 1962) 
Article 26. The [Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea] affords the right of asylum 
to foreign nationals persecuted for fighting 
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for democratic principles or national liber-
ation movements, or for the interests of the 
working people or for freedom of scientific 
and cultural activities. 
Korea,  
Dem. Rep. 
1972 
Article 66. The Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea protects the foreigners who 
seek asylum after fighting for peace and 
democracy, national independence and 
socialism, and for the freedom of scientific 
and cultural pursuits. 
Korea,  
Dem. Rep. 
1972 
(Amended 
in 1998) 
Article 80. The [Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea] shall grant the right of 
asylum to foreign nationals persecuted for 
struggling or peace and democracy, na-
tional independence and socialism for the 
freedom of scientific and cultural pursuit. 
Kyrgyz  
Republic 
1993 (as  
amended  
through  
2007) 
Article 19. 3. The Kyrgyz Republic may 
grant asylum under the procedure estab-
lished by law to foreign citizens and state-
less persons persecuted for political rea-
sons. 
Kyrgyz  
Republic 
2007 
Article 19. 1. Restrictions affecting the 
physical and moral inviolability of an indi-
vidual shall be permitted solely by a court 
sentence pronounced on the basis of law 
as punishment for the committing of a 
crime.  No one may be tortured, subjected 
to mistreatment or inhuman or degrading 
punishment.  2. The conducting of medi-
cal, biological or psychological experiments 
on people without their properly expressed 
and verified voluntary consent shall be 
prohibited.  3. The Kyrgyz Republic may 
grant asylum under the procedure estab-
lished by law to foreign citizens and state-
less persons persecuted for political rea-
sons.  
Kyrgyz  
Republic 
2010 
Article 19. 1. Foreign citizens and stateless 
persons in the Kyrgyz Republic shall enjoy 
rights and perform obligations equally with 
the citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic except 
for cases defined by law or international 
treaty to which the Kyrgyz Republic is a 
party.  2. In accordance with international 
commitments the Kyrgyz Republic shall 
grant asylum to foreign citizens and state-
less persons persecuted on political 
grounds as well as on the grounds of viola-
tion of human rights and freedoms. 
Lao PDR 1991 
Article 38. The Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic grants asylum to foreigners who 
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are persecuted for their struggle for free-
dom, justice, peace and scientific causes. 
Libya 2011 
Article 10. The State shall guarantee the 
right of asylum by virtue of the law.  The 
extradition of political refugees shall be 
prohibited.  
Libya 2014 Draft 
Article 18. Extradition of political refugees 
to their country of origin or any other 
country they express unwillingness to go 
to shall be prohibited.  Conditions and 
situations of political asylum shall be 
regulated by law 
Macedonia 1991 
Article 29. Foreign subjects enjoy free-
doms and rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution in the Republic of Macedonia, under 
conditions regulated by law and interna-
tional agreements.  The Republic guaran-
tees the right of asylum to foreign subjects 
and stateless persons expelled because of 
democratic political convictions and activi-
ties.  Extradition of a foreign subject can 
be carried out only on the basis of a rati-
fied international agreement and on the 
principle of reciprocity.  A foreign subject 
cannot be extradited for political criminal 
offences.  Acts of terrorism arc not regard-
ed as political criminal offences. 
Mali 1992 
Article 12. No one may be forced into exile. 
Any person persecuted for reason of his 
political or religious convictions, [or] by his 
ethnic affiliation [appartenance], may 
benefit from the right of asylum in the Re-
public of Mali. 
Moldova 1994 
Article 19. 1. Except in cases where the 
law has different rulings, aliens and state-
less persons shall enjoy the same rights 
and shall have the same duties as the citi-
zens of the Republic of Moldova.  2. The 
right to asylum shall be granted and de-
nied by rule of law in compliance with 
those international treaties the Republic of 
Moldova is a party to. 
Mongolia 1940 
Article 88. The Mongol People’s Republic 
affords the right of asylum to foreign citi-
zens persecuted for defending the interests 
of the workers, or for their struggle for na-
tional liberation.  
Article 89.  It is the duty of every citizen of 
the Mongol People’s Republic to abide by 
the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the 
Mongol People’s Republic, to observe the 
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laws, to maintain labor discipline, to pro-
mote in every way possible the economic, 
cultural, and political development of the 
country, and to perform their public duties 
honestly. 
Mongolia 
1960 (as  
amended  
in 1973) 
Article 83. Citizens of the [Mongolian Peo-
ple’s Republic], irrespective of their na-
tionality, have equal rights in all spheres of 
economic, cultural, social and political life 
of the country.  Any direct or indirect re-
striction of the rights of citizens on ac-
count of their nationality or race and the 
advocacy of the ideas of chauvinism or 
nationalism are forbidden by law.  The 
M.P.R. ensures representatives of all na-
tionalities living on the territory of the Re-
public the opportunity to develop their na-
tional culture and to receive tuition and 
conduct business in their own native lan-
guage.  The M.P.R. grants the right of asy-
lum to foreign citizens persecuted for their 
defense of the interests of the working 
people, for participation in the nation-
al-liberation movement, for their activities 
to strenghthen [sic] peace and for scientific 
activities. 
Mongolia 1992 
Article 18. 4. Aliens or stateless persons 
persecuted for their convictions, political 
or other activities in pursuit of justice, 
may be granted asylum in Mongolia on the 
basis of their well-founded request. 
Mozambique 1975 
Article 25. The People’s Republic of 
Mozambique grants the right of asylum to 
foreigners persecuted because of their 
struggle for peace, democracy and national 
and social liberation. 
Mozambique 1990 
Article 64. 1. The Republic of Mozambique 
shall support and be in solidarity with the 
struggles of peoples for their national lib-
eration.  2. The Republic of Mozambique 
shall grant asylum to foreigners persecut-
ed because of their fight for peace, democ-
racy, national and social liberation, or 
their defence of human rights. 
Mozambique 2004 
Article 20. 1. The Republic of Mozambique 
shall support and be in solidarity with the 
struggles of peoples for their national lib-
eration and for democracy.  2. The Repub-
lic of Mozambique shall grant asylum to 
foreigners persecuted on the grounds of 
their struggle for national liberation, for 
democracy, for peace and for the protec-
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tion of human rights. 3. The law shall de-
fine political refugee status. 
Namibia 1990 
Article 97. The State shall, where it is rea-
sonable to do so, grant asylum to persons 
who reasonably fear persecution on the 
ground of their political beliefs, race, reli-
gion or membership of a particular social 
group. 
Nicaragua 1893 
Title III. 9. The Republic of Nicaragua is a 
sacred asylum to all persons taking refuge 
in its territory.  10. Foreigners shall be 
obliged from their arrival in the territory of 
the Republic to respect the authorities and 
to observe the laws.  11. Foreigners enjoy 
in Nicaragua all the civil rights of Nicara-
guans.  12. They may acquire all kinds of 
property in the country, being subject, 
however, in respect of such property, to all 
the ordinary or extraordinary charges to 
which the nationals are subject.  13. They 
shall make no claims, nor demand indem-
nity of the State except in the cases and in 
the manner as would apply in the case of 
Nicaraguans.  14. Foreigners who having 
made unjust claims have recourse to dip-
lomatic intervention shall lose the right to 
dwell in the country if such claims are not 
determined in a friendly manner.  15. Ex-
tradition shall not be granted for political 
offences, even though the nature of such 
be that of a common offence.  16. The cas-
es in which extradition for serious com-
mon offences shall take place shall be de-
termined by law and Treaties.  17. The law 
shall establish the cases and the form in 
which entry to the national territory may 
be denied to a foreigner, as also those in 
which his expulsion may be ordered when 
his presence may be considered perni-
cious.  18. The law and Treaties shall regu-
late the use of these guarantees, but shall 
not diminish nor alter them.  19. The dis-
positions of this Title do not modify the 
Treaties in force between Nicaragua and 
other countries. 
Paraguay 1967 
Article 122. The right of asylum is recog-
nized, under the conditions and with the 
requirements established by the laws and 
the standards of international law, in favor 
of any person who for political reason or 
offense may be the object of persecution or 
find himself in danger of being persecuted.  
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Paraguay 1992 
Article 43. Paraguay recognizes the right 
to territorial and diplomatic asylum to an-
yone persecuted for political reasons or for 
related common crimes or for his opinions 
or beliefs.  Government authorities will 
have to immediately issue the respective 
personal and safe-conduct documents.  No 
one who has been granted political asylum 
will be forced to go to the country whose 
authorities are persecuting him. 
Peru 1993 
Article 36. The State recognizes political 
asylum.  It accepts the status of asylee 
[asilado] granted by a host government.  In 
case the asylee is expelled, he is not to be 
returned to the country whose government 
persecutes him. 
Poland 1952 
Article 75. The Polish People’s Republic 
grants asylum to citizens of foreign coun-
tries persecuted for defending the interests 
of the working people, for fighting for social 
progress, for activity in defence of peace, 
for fighting for national liberation or for 
scientific activity. 
Poland 1976 
Article 88. The Polish People’s Republic 
shall grant asylum to nationals of other 
countries persecuted in connection with 
defending the interests of the working peo-
ple, the struggle for social progress, activi-
ties in defence of peace, the struggle for 
national liberation, or as a result of scien-
tific activities. 
Poland 1997 
Article 56. 1. Foreigners shall have a right 
of asylum in the Republic of Poland in ac-
cordance with principles specified by stat-
ute.  2. Foreigners who, in the Republic of 
Poland, seek protection from persecution, 
may be granted the status of a refugee in 
accordance with international agreements 
to which the Republic of Poland is a party. 
Portugal 1976 
Article 22. 1. The right of asylum shall be 
secured to foreigners and stateless persons 
persecuted as a result of their activities on 
behalf of democracy, social and national 
liberation, peace between peoples or indi-
vidual freedom and rights.  2. The status 
of political refugees shall be defined by 
law. 
Romania 1948 
Article 35. The People’s Republic of Ru-
mania grants the right of refuge to all for-
eigners persecuted for their democratic 
activities, for their struggle for national 
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liberation, for their scientific or cultural 
activities. 
Romania 1952 
Article 89. The Rumanian People’s Repub-
lic affords the right of asylum to foreign 
citizens prosecuted for defending the inter-
ests of the working people, or for scientific 
activity, or for participating in the struggle 
for national liberation or the defence of 
peace. 
Romania 1965 
Article 38. The Socialist Republic of Ro-
mania grants the right of refuge to foreign 
citizens persecuted for their activity in de-
fence of the interests of the working peo-
ple, for their participation in the fight for 
national liberation or in defence of peace. 
Romania 1991 
Article 18. 1. Aliens and stateless persons 
residing in Romania shall enjoy the gen-
eral protection of persons and property 
guaranteed by the Constitution and other 
laws.  2. The right to asylum is granted 
and withdrawn under conditions of the 
law, observing the international conven-
tions and treaties to which Romania is a 
party. 
Soviet Union 1936 
Article 129. The [Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics] grants the right of asylum to 
foreign citizens persecuted for defending 
the interests of the toilers or for their sci-
entific activity or for their struggle for na-
tional liberation. 
Soviet Union 1977 
Article 38. The [Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics] grants the right of asylum to 
foreigners, persecuted for defending the 
interests of the working people and the 
cause of peace, for participating in revolu-
tionary or national liberation movements, 
or for progressive socio-political, scientific, 
or other creative activities. 
Russian  
Federation 
1993 
Article 63. 1. The Russian Federation shall 
grant political asylum to foreign nationals 
and stateless persons according to the 
universally recognized norms of interna-
tional law.  2. In the Russian Federation it 
shall not be allowed to extradite to other 
States those people who are persecuted for 
political convictions, as well as for actions 
(or inaction) not recognized as a crime in 
the Russian Federation.  The extradition of 
people accused of a crime, and also the 
handover of convicts for serving sentences 
in other States shall be carried out on the 
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basis of the federal law or the international 
agreement of the Russian Federation. 
Rwanda 1962 
Article 15. The freedom of the human per-
son is inviolable.  No one may be con-
demned except by virtue of a law in effect 
before the act was committed.  No one may 
plead ignorance of the law.  No penalty 
may be imposed except by virtue of a writ-
ten law.  Criminal responsibility shall be 
personal.  Civil responsibility shall be de-
fined by law.  The absolute right to a de-
fense is established in all the states and at 
all stages of the procedure.  The right to 
asylum is recognized under the conditions 
stipulated by law.  Extradition shall be 
authorized only within the limitations pro-
vided by law. 
Rwanda 1978 
Article 15. The right of asylum shall be 
recognized under the conditions prescribed 
by law.  Extradition shall be authorized 
only within the limits provided by law. 
Rwanda 2003 
Article 25. The right to asylum is recog-
nized under conditions determined by the 
law.  The extradition of foreigners shall be 
permitted only so far as it is consistent 
with the law or international conventions 
to which Rwanda is a party.  However, no 
Rwandan shall be extradited. 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
1975 
(Amended 
in 1990) 
Article 40. 1. The extradition and the ex-
pulsion of Sao Tomean citizens from the 
National territory are not allowed.  2. Ex-
tradition for political motives is not permit-
ted, nor for crimes which carry the death 
penalty according to the law of the peti-
tioning State.  3. The expulsion of foreign-
ers who have obtained residency authori-
zation, only may be determined by judicial 
authority, the law assuring expeditious 
means of decision.  4. Asylum is granted to 
foreigners persecuted or gravely threatened 
with persecution, in virtue of their activity 
in favor of democratic rights. 
Saudi Arabia 1992 
Article 42. The State shall grant the right 
of political asylum provided it is in the 
public interest.  International agreements 
and laws shall define rules and procedures 
for the extradition of common criminals. 
Yugoslavia 1946 
Article 31. Foreign citizens persecuted on 
account of their struggle for the principles 
of democracy, for national liberation, the 
rights of the working people, or the free-
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dom of scientific and cultural work, enjoy 
the right of asylum in the Federal Peoples 
Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslavia 1963 
Article 65. Citizens of other countries and 
persons without citizenship who are perse-
cuted for their defence of democratic ideas 
and political movements, social emancipa-
tion and national liberation, the freedom 
and the rights of the human personality or 
of the freedom of scientific or artistic crea-
tivity, shall be guaranteed right of asylum. 
Yugoslavia 1974 
Article 202. Foreign citizens and stateless 
persons who are persecuted for supporting 
democratic views and movements, social 
and national emancipation, the freedoms 
and rights of the human personality or the 
freedom of scientific and artistic creative 
endeavor, shall be guaranteed the right of 
asylum. 
Yugoslavia 1992 
Article 66. Aliens in the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia shall enjoy the freedoms and 
the rights and duties laid down in the 
Constitution, federal law, and internation-
al treaties.  An alien may be extradited to 
another state only in cases provided for 
under international treaties which are 
binding on the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia.  The right of asylum shall be guar-
anteed to foreign citizens and stateless 
persons who are being persecuted for their 
advocacy of democratic views or for partic-
ipation in movements for social or national 
liberation, for the freedom and rights of the 
human personality, or for scientific or ar-
tistic freedom. 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 2003 
Article 38. Any alien who reasonably fears 
that he/she might be persecuted because 
of his/her race, colour, sex, language, reli-
gion, ethnic affiliation, membership of a 
group or political conviction, shall have the 
right of asylum in Serbia and Montenegro. 
The asylum granting procedure shall be 
determined by law.  
Serbia 2006 
Article 57. Any foreign national with rea-
sonable fear of prosecution based on his 
race, gender, language, religion, national 
origin or association with some other 
group, political opinions, shall have the 
right to asylum in the Republic of Serbia. 
The procedure for granting asylum shall be 
regulated by the law.  
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Slovak  
Republic 
1992 
Article 53. The Slovak Republic grants 
asylum to foreign nationals persecuted for 
upholding political rights and liberties. 
Asylum may be denied to those who acted 
at variance with basic human rights and 
liberties.  Details will be defined by law. 
Slovenia 1991 
Article 48. The right to give sanctuary to 
foreign citizens and persons without citi-
zenship who are persecuted for their sup-
port of human rights and basic liberties is 
recognized within the limits of the law. 
Somalia 1960 
Article 19. 1. Extradition may be ordered 
only in the cases and in the manner estab-
lished by law and in any case only when 
required by international conventions.  2. 
No one may be subjected to extradition for 
political offenses.  3. A foreigner persecut-
ed in his country for political offenses has 
a right to asylum in the territory of the 
State in the cases and under the condi-
tions provided by law. 
Somalia 1979 
Article 35. 1. The Somali Democratic Re-
public may extradite a person who has 
committed a crime in his country or an-
other, and has taken refuge in the Somali 
Democratic Republic, provided that there 
is an extradition treaty between the Somali 
Democratic Republic and the state re-
questing the extradition of the accused or 
offender.  2. The Somali Democratic Re-
public may grant political asylum to a per-
son who has fled his country or another 
for political reasons while struggling for 
popular causes, human rights or peace. 
Somalia 1990 
Article 35. 1. A person who has committed 
an offence in his country or another coun-
try and has taken refuge in Somalia may 
be extradited, provided that there is an 
extradition treaty between the Somali state 
and the state that has requested the ex-
tradition of the accused offender.  Extradi-
tion of accused or offender may not affect 
political offences.  2. The state may grant 
political asylum to a person who has fled 
his country or another country due to po-
litical oppression while struggling for the 
interests of the people, human rights or 
peace. 
Somalia 2004 
Article 23. 1. Extradition may be granted 
against a person accused of a crime com-
mitted in his or another country only if an 
extradition treaty exists between Somalia 
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and the country requesting thereof.  2. The 
state may grant political asylum to a per-
son and his close relatives who flee his or 
another country on grounds of political, 
religious, and cultural persecution unless 
such asylum seeker(s) have committed 
crime(s) against humanity. 
Somalia 2012 
Article 37. 1. Every person who has 
sought refuge in the Federal Republic of 
Somalia has the right not to be returned or 
taken to any country in which that person 
has a well-founded fear of persecution. 
2. The Federal Parliament shall enact leg-
islation in compliance with international 
law, regulating refugees and asylum seek-
ers. 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
1973 
Article 34. Political refugees shall not be 
surrendered because of their political prin-
ciples or of actions they may take in de-
fense of the cause of freedom. 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
2012 
Article 39. Political refugees shall not be 
extradited because of their political beliefs 
or for their defense of freedom. 
Tajikistan 1994 
Article 16. A citizen of Tajikistan located in 
another country enjoys the protection of 
the state.  No citizen of the republic may 
be extradited to a foreign state.  Extradi-
tion of a criminal to a foreign state is per-
mitted on the grounds of a bilateral 
agreement.  Foreign citizens and stateless 
persons enjoy these announced rights and 
freedoms, and have obligations and re-
sponsibilities equal to those of citizens of 
Tajikistan, except in cases anticipated by 
law.  Tajikistan may offer political asylum 
to foreign citizens who have been victims of 
human rights violations. 
Timor-Leste 2002 
Section 10. 1. The Democratic Republic of 
East Timor shall extend its solidarity to the 
struggle of all peoples for national libera-
tion.  2. The Democratic Republic of East 
Timor shall grant political asylum, in ac-
cordance with the law, to foreigners perse-
cuted as a result of their struggle for na-
tional and social liberation, defence of hu-
man rights, democracy and peace. 
Turkmenistan 1992 
Article 8. Foreign citizens and persons 
without citizenship shall enjoy the rights 
and freedoms of citizens of Turkmenistan, 
with exceptions defined by law.  Turkmen-
istan shall grant the right of asylum to 
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foreign citizens persecuted in their coun-
tries for political, national, or religious 
convictions or faiths. 
Turkmenistan 2008 
Article 8. Foreign nationals and stateless 
persons enjoy the rights and freedoms, 
and bear the responsibilities, of citizens of 
Turkmenistan in accordance with law and 
international treaties of Turkmenistan. 
Turkmenistan, in accordance with univer-
sally recognized norms of international 
right and in the order established by the 
law, gives refuge to foreign citizens and 
stateless persons. 
Ukraine 1996 
Article 26. Foreigners and stateless per-
sons who are in Ukraine on legal grounds 
enjoy the same rights and freedoms and 
also bear the same duties as citizens of 
Ukraine, with the exceptions established 
by the Constitution, laws or international 
treaties of Ukraine.  Foreigners and state-
less persons may be granted asylum by the 
procedure established by law. 
Venezuela 1961 
Article 116. The Republic recognizes asy-
lum in behalf of any person subject to per-
secution or who is in danger, for political 
reasons, under the conditions and re-
quirements established by law and rules of 
international law. 
Venezuela 1999 
Article 69. The Bolivarian Republic of Ven-
ezuela recognizes and guarantees the right 
of asylum and refuge.  Extradition of Vene-
zuelans is prohibited 
Vietnam 1980 
Article 81. Foreigners who are persecuted 
for struggling for freedom and national 
independence, for socialism, democracy 
and peace, or for engaging in scientific 
pursuits, are granted the right of asylum 
by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. 
Vietnam 1992 
Article 82. Foreigners who are persecuted 
for their struggle for freedom and national 
independence, for socialism, democracy, 
and peace, or for engaging in scientific 
pursuits, may be considered and granted 
the right of asylum by the Socialist Repub-
lic of Vietnam. 
Vietnam 
1992 
(Amended 
in 2013) 
Article 49. The Socialist Republic of Vi-
etnam shall consider granting asylum to 
foreigners who are harmed because of 
their struggling for freedom, national inde-
pendence, socialism, democracy and 
peace, and scientific work. 
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